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This report was prepared by the Lockheed Missiles & Space Company,
Sunnyvale, California, and contains the results of a Lunar Hazards
Analysis and Safety Requirements Study performed for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Manned Spacecraft Center,
under Contract NAS9-10969, Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue Study.
This is one of the following four reports documenting the contract
findings:
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MSC-03975, LMBC-A984262A
Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue - Technical Summary
MSC-03976, L_C-A984262B
Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue - Hazards Analysis and
Safety Requirements
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Glossary
SYMBOLS,ABBREVIATIONS,ANDDEFINITIONS
AMU
Activation Time
Backpack
Base
Buddy System
CC
Communications Lag
C-PTV
Delta V or
Delta Velocity
Earth Vicinity
 /LSS
ECS
Escape
ESS
FD
Flyer
G&N
Hazard
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (generic term)
The time required to ready the rescue vehicle and crew
for a rescue operation following receipt of the alert
signal
Portable Life Support System (PLSS) carried on the back
of an astronaut (generic term)
Lunar Surface Base (generic term)
Two or more men working together in the same location and
environment
Crew Compar_ent used to house and transport men on the
PTV and tug (generic term)
The time required for the distressed crew to communicate
a request to the rescue crew
Chemically Powered Prime Transport Vehicle (generic term)
Change in vehicle velocity in inertial space
A general, unspecified location in Earth orbit or on Surface
Environmental Control/Life Support System (generic term)
Environmental Control System (generic term)
Extravehicular Maneuvering Unit (generic term)
Utilization of on-hand equipment and resources, without
outside assistance, to effect immediate removal from the
proximity of danger
Emplaced Scientific Station (generic term)
Propellant Depot (generic term)
Generic term for any flying vehicle designed for limited
travel over the lunar surface (LFV)
Guidance and Navigation
Presence of a potential risk situation caused by anunsafe
condition, environment, or act
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IPP
IVA
LCG
Lander
LEAP
LESS
LFV
L2 Libration Point
LLT
LM
LMP
LOD
LOI
LRV
LSB
LSSM
Maneuvering
Work Platform
Mev
MOLAB
MPL
N-PTV
OLS
0PS
PDD
PDI
PGA
Integrated Program Plan
IntraVehicular Activity
Liquid Cooled Garment
SeeLunar Lander Tug (LLT)
Lunar EscapeAmbulancePack
Lunar EmergencyEscape System
Lunar Flying Vehicle (Flyer)
Point of stable equilibrium in orbit on the far side
of the Moon
Lunar Lander Tug (generic term); space tug with landing
gear
Lunar Module
Lunar Module Pilot
Lunar Orbit Departure
Lunar Orbit Insertion
Lunar Roving Vehicle (Rover)
Lunar Surface Base
Lunar Scientific Survey Module
Platform designed for use in working on the exterior
of an Orbiting Lunar Station
Million Electron Volts
Mobile Laboratory
MannedPayload
Nuclear-Powered Prime Transport Vehicle (generic term)
Orbiting Lunar Station (generic term)
OxygenPurge System (generic term)
Project Description Document(produced by NASA-MSC)
PoweredDescent Initiation
Pressure GarmentAssembly
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PLSS
PTV
RCS
Rescue
rem
Response T_me
RNS
Rover
Safety
SLSS
Survival
Survival Time
Space Tug
Tug
TEl
Tumbling
_V
Portable Life Support System or Backpack (generic term)
Prime Transport Vehicle used to transport personnel and
cargo between Earth orbit and lunar orbit (generic term)
Reaction Control System
Utilization of outside assistance to effect a return to
a safe haven
Roentgens equivalent man
The span of time between the occurrence of an emergency
and the placement of the stranded crew into a temporary
or permanent safe haven
Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (N-PTV) (generic term)
Generic term for any lunar surface transport vehicle
moving on tracks, wheels, etc. (LRV)
Freedom from chance of injury/loss
Secondary Life Support System (generic term)
Refers to the utilization of resources immediately at
hand to extend the lives of crewmen to permit escape
or rescue
Refers to the maximum length of time that a crew can live
following an emergency, using resources immediately at
hand
Multipurpose vehicle used to transport men and cargo in
lunar orbit and to the lunar surface (generic term)
Space Tug
Transearth InJection
Random angular motion about any axis
Delta velocity
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SECTIONI
INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results of work performed by the Lockheed Missiles &
Space Companyfor NASA-MSC,under the hazards analysis subtask of Contract
NAS9-10969,during the period June 15, 1970 to March 15, 1971.
I.i Objectives
The objectives of the hazards analysis portion of the Lunar Mission Safety and
Rescue Study were to:
1. Identify potential hazards in lunar orbital and surface operations, crew
activities, functions, and environments.
2. Determine the effects of the identified hazards on crew safety.
3. Develop corrective measures for the identified hazards, including hazard
detection and preventive and remedial concepts.
4. Identify hazardous situations wherein rescue might be required.
5. Establish essential guidelines and requirements for risk reduction in ad-
vanced mannedlunar exploration.
6. Identify requirements for additional analyses and technology development
pertinent to crew safety.
1.2 Scope, GroundRules, and Assumptions
The study was limited to the lunar sphere of influence and to the 1980-1990
time period.
Lunar orbital activities were defined to commenceat lunar orbit insertion and
conclude either during spacecraft contact with the lunar surface or upon
compl_tion of the transearth maneuver.
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Lunar surface activities were defined to commencewith the final flight phase
immediately preceding spacecraft touchdown on the lunar surface and to conclude
once the crew had returned to a lunar ascent vehicle and ascent had begun.
The design and routine internal operations of major lunar orbital elements such
as the Tug, Nuclear Shuttle, and Orbiting Lunar Station were assumedto be op-
timized and were not studied. Failure of the elements to accomplish their in-
tended mission, and operational hazards between independent elements, were
postulated or identified and analyzed.
No probability analyses were performed during the study. Hazards were identi-
fied and analyzed even though the probability of occurrence might be low.
Current planning and definition of the Lunar Integrated Program Plan (IPP) was
accepted as a baseline for the study and as a point of reference, but the analy-
sis and results were kept general enoughthat the guidelines will be valid
even though the IPP elements and operations change. Whereterms such as Tug,
Orbiting Lunar Station, and Lunar Surface Base are used, no specific concept,
shape, size, capacity, or mass are implied, and only functions are indicated.
The results of Apollo flights, in particular flights No. ii, 12, and 14, were
used freely in the analysis. In addition, the results of current contracted
studies relative to the Space Tug, Orbiting Lunar Station, Reusable Nuclear
Shuttle, and complementarysafety efforts were madeavailable by NASAand were
used.
The study was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of
equipment or property.
i. 3 Approach
The approach to the Hazards Analysis subtask is illustrated in Fig. i. Hazards
characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and
the hazard groups. These are presented in Appendix A. The definition of a
hazard and the hazard levels were taken from MSCM-1702,"System Safety Program
1-2
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Requirements for Space Flight Contractors". NASA-MSC Houston, Texas (not
dated), while the hazard groups were derived as a part of the study effort•
The mission model was based on the Lunar Integrated Program Plan (IPP) and
Project Description Documents (PDD' s) and represented a lunar exploration
program for engineering development and scientific exploration in the 1980' s.
The model was used as a point of departure throughout the study in the search
for ways to enhance safety. Additional detail is presented in Appendix B•
Typical lunar exploration equipment elements and their usage are illustrated
in Fig. 2 and listed as follows:
• Transportation between Earth Orbit and Lunar Orbit
Nuclear Shuttle
Chemical Shuttle (alternate)
Lunar Lander Tug (emergency return)
. Operations in Lunar Orbit
Orbiting Luuar Station
Lunar Lander Tug (normal and rescue)
Propellant Depot
Consumables Capsules
Unmanned Satellites (scientific, communications, etc.)
• Transportation between Lunar Orbit and Lunar Surface
Lunar Lander Tug (normal and rescue)
• Operations on the Lunar Surface
Lunar Lander Tug (normal and rescue)
Lunar Surface Base
Roving Vehicles (normal and rescue)
Flying Vehicles (normal and rescue)
Science Equipment (emplaced stations, drills, telescopes, etc.)
Support Equipment (elec. power, trailers, supply cannisters, etc.)
Lunar mission operations examined in the study included the following.
LMSC-A984262C
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Earth-Moon
Shuttle Operations
Transport Payload
Lunar Orbit Insertion
Trans-Earth Injection
Rendezvous & Docking
Stati onke eping
Contingency Operations
Orbital Operations
Rendezvous & Docking
Operations Base
Orbit Keeping & Transfer
Resupply
Maintenance
Tug Refueling
Technology & Engineering
Science
Extra Vehicular Activity
Satellite Place & Service
Escape/Rescue
Contingency Operations
Surface Operations
Depl oyment
Exploration
Technology & Engineering
Science
Resupply
Maintenance
Walking
Driving (Roving)
Flying
Escape/Rescue
Contingency Operations
The methodology developed to carry out the hazards analysis is presented in
Appendix C. Working from study objectives and the mission model, the top-level
functions and operations of lunar exploration elements were described. This
was expanded in a first-level flow chart to identify potentially hazardous
conditions and situations requiring study. The top-level and first-level
hazards assessments are presented in Appendix D.
Working from the first-level hazards assessment charts, and from knowledge of
the planned future missions, a list of conditions and situations requiring
further hazards analysis was compiled, and individual Hazard Study efforts
carried out. From each Hazard Study the potential hazards were identified,
effects described, corrective measures proposed, rescue requirements noted,
and candidates for safety guidelines proposed. When the individual studies
were complete, a study of safety guidelines candidates was made to assess com-
patibility and feasibility, and to firm up the recommendations which appear
in _ISC 03976.
Certain data generated to support the individual Hazard Studies, or to sug-
gest approaches to improving safety, are presented in Appendix E as Supple-
mental Data Reports.
Symbols and abbreviations used in this report are defined in the Glossary.
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Section 2
HAZARDS ANALYSIS _TS
The hazards analysis methodology is described in detail in Appendix C. This
methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagram, to per-
form the first level hazards assessment presented in Appendix D, and to de-
velop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies.
This section presents the individual Hazard Study results in total. Each
Hazard Study is, in general, complete in itself and may be separated from
the document for use by a reader interested only in a specific subject. The
complete listing of Hazard Studies is presented in the Table of Contents.
Following completion of the Hazard Studies presented here, an anlysis was
performed to extract the significant hazards and the recommended guidelines
and requirements to prevent or remedy those hazards. These hazards and
guidelines are stu_m_ized in Section 2 of MSC 03976.
The situations leading to a requirement for rescue are identified in each
Study. These were made available to the Escape/Rescue subtask effort wherein
rescue requirements were developed in detail and escape/rescue guidelines and
a rescue plan were prepared and documented in _C 03978.
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HAZARD STUDY 1
PRIME TRANSPORT VEHICLE (PTV) IN AN UNCONTROLLED
TRAJECTORY - FAILURE OF PTV TO ACHIEVE LOI
INTRODUCTI ON
This study considers the hazards to man resulting from a failure of a prime
transport vehicle (PTV) to achieve Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI). The PTV may
be either chemical or nuclear powered.
ASSUMPTIONS
The following conditions are assumed for purposes of the analysis:
Case I. The PTV is transporting the first crew and Tug payload for the
initial manning and activation of an orbiting lunar station (OLS).
The crew is located in the crew module of a man-configured, fully
loaded Tug vehicle. The Tug is provisioned for a nominal 28-day
mission.
Case 2. The PTV is transporting a replacement crew and resupply consumables
to a currently manned and active OLS. The replacement crew is lo-
cated in a crew compartment docked to several cargo containers
which are in turn docked to the PTV. The crew compartment has no
independent propulsion capability.
The OLS is in a 60 nm circular orbit.
Navigation update is provided from Earth base.
The P_ configurations for the two conditions considered are as follows:
2-2
L_C-A984262C
TUG-1 TUG-2
N-PTV
INITIAL MANNING CONFIGURATION
CARGO
I
I I
SUBSEQUENT MANNED MISSION CONFIGURATION
Additional data for this study are presented in Appendix E, Supplemental
Data Report No. 1.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The primary function failures which defeat the achievement of an LOI are as
follows:
e
a. Degradation or loss of vehicle navigation capability.
b. Degradation or loss of vehicle orientation capability.
c. Degradation or loss of primary propulsion capability.
Of these three primary function failures, the degradation or loss of vehicle
navigation capability is the least likely to prevent ;I.OI,since navigation
errors of that magnitude could scarcely elude the attention of Earth stations
and the on-board crew. It is presumed that the crew would be provided with
2-3
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the capability (and up-date information from Earth base) to manually direct
the vehicle to the target position. Thus, this particular function failure
would not be permitted to develop into a hazard generator.
Regardless of which function failure triggers the inability to achieve lunar
orbit insertion, the resultant hazardous situation generated for Cases i and
2 is:
Crew personnel are aboard a disabled PTV in an uncontrolled lunar escape
trajectory.
The potential major hazards to man evolving from this situation are as
follows:
(a) For Case i - First Crew Delivery:
-i. Temporary stranding of crew aboard a disabled PTV.
-2. Potential loss of crew if the disabled PTV failed with
excessive rates/motions.
(b) For Case 2 - Subsequent Crew Deliveries:
-i. Potential loss of stranded crew on board disabled PTV.
-2. Probable loss of stranded crew if disabled PTV has failed
with excessive rates/motions.
(c) For both cases the PTV may be on an Earth return trajectory.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
The effects of the major hazards resulting from the inability of the PTV
to accomplish an LOI maneuver are considered for two significant function
failure modes:
(a) For an assumed function failure causing loss of main propulsion
capability but with attitude control capability intact.
(b) For an assumed function failure causing loss of vehicle orientation
capability.
2-_
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Hazard Effects:
The loss of main propulsion capability disables the PTV and places the on-
board crew in the hazardous situation of being temporarily stranded in a
coasting vehicle on a lunar escape trajectory.
The loss of vehicle orientation capability presents the same hazardous situa-
tion except that the vehicle may have acquired a rate vector or motion in
some axis other than the desired flight vector. The severity of the residual
rate or motion could have serious effects upon the crew well-being and sur-
vival capability and on escape/rescue.
The fate of the PTV in either event ranges from potential heliocentric
orbit insertion, or geocentric orbit insertion if the lunar approachvelo-
city is sufficiently low. It is also possible for the PTV trajectory to
result in Earth impact, though analysis of this hazard is beyond the scope
of this study.
Corrective Measures
PTV Delivery of First Manned Payload
Preventive measures:
The capability of the PTV to accommodate critical function failures via re-
dundant systems employing a fail-operational approach is primarily a basic
system and subsystem design problem. The capability of the PTV to continue
critical operations in a contingency mode is judged to be of prime importance
in its m_nned configuration.
Remedial Measures:
For the first crew delivery mission, and any subsequent manned PTV mission
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where a crew capsule configured Tug is a part of the payload, the crew has
the option of employing the Tug as an escape vehicle for leaving the PTV.
This presumes that the Tug is in a powered-up state at the time that an LOI
is approached and further that the Tug can be rapidly disengaged from the
PTV payload structure.
The remedial measures requirements in this case are:
a. Provision for power-up the Tug at any time in a PTV mission.
b. Provision for Tug guidance update on a continuously available basis.
c. Provision for emergency separation of Tug from PTV docking or pay-
load structure.
d. Provision of direct PTV/EDS alert and warning output for Tug flight
control station.
e. Provision of contingency L01 procedures for Tug emergency utilization.
PTV Delivery of Subsequent Manned Payloads (Personnel and Cargo) - Case 2
For all missions following the delivery of the first crew (excluding subse-
quent Tug delivery missions), the transport mode employed for rotational
crew delivery and return is the crew module. Basically, this unit is con-
ceived to be a crew shelter cannister having a complete and self-contained
life support system with facilities and provisions to maintain a crew during
transit to and from the OLS. The module is dockable to other cargo modules
and the OLS, and is moved about via a Tug to effect crew transfer operations.
The most singular characteristic about the crew module is its complete lack
of propulsion capability. The transport of personnel in this fashion trans-
fers the responsibility for the safety of the passengers completely and
irrevocably to the PTV and its operations.
2-6
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For the basic PTV, it will be necessary for the PTV to accommodate critical
function failures through redundant systems and subsystems employing fail-
operational criteria for stepping through available redundancies. Such pro-
cedures coupled with contingency operational modes for operating with de-
graded systems must be considered to be of prime importance.
(B) Crew Module Considerations:
In recognition of the fact that human efforts are fallible, it is prudent to
insure that not only the systems on which man is dependent are close to
failure free, but, that escape from disasterous consequences is possible in
the event of a chance failure or accident. Therefore, in order to provide an
adequate margin of safety for the survival and recovery of the crew-module
it is deemed necessary to provide some minimal propulsion capability which
would permit the crew and module to escape from a disabled or disabled and
tumbling PTV and at least achieve an "await rescue" position in the vicinity
of the PTV or even achieve an elliptical lunar orbit. The minimum propulsion
capability required for the crew module to accomplish an elliptical lunar
orbit insertion would be on the order of a 1000 fps AV. Data relative to
the crew module escape from a tumbling nuclear PTV are presented in Appendix E,
Supplemental Data Report No. 4. The module should have stabilization capa-
bility sufficient to permit the module to present a stable target for docking
to a rescue vehicle. On board systems _ould include emergency communications
equipment, a power system, a rescue beacon, and ECS/LSS. The fate of a
crew in a crew module must not be solely dependent upon the carrier vehicle
under any circumstances.
R_medial Measures:
Since the 0LS is manned for all subsequent PTV crew delivery missions, Tugs
stationed at the 0LS are available for rescue operations. However, the use of
2-7
LMSC-A984626C
the Tugs for rescue or retrieval operations must be considered in the light
of program resource-depletion, and hence, consideration must be given to the
time element allowable in each rescue or retrieval event. Realistically,
situations involving crew health and well being will require first order
priority at the expense of resource depletion. It is because of this un-
predictable requirement that logistic operations should be planned in such a
way that the impact of a non-catastrophic mishap does not result in a major
expenditure of resources. Thus, if a crew-module should leave a disabled
PTV (which could not make the L01) and enter in an await-rescue orbit, the
resources cost of the "rescue" would be far less than if the Tug had to
chase the PTV, retrieve the module, and return to the 0LS (rescue Tug _V
of 4,400 ft/sec vs 14,000 ft/sec). The above notwithstanding, crew-module
rescue, or even PTV capture and retrieval, appears to be quite feasible in
view of the Tug capabilities. The following three alternate remedial meas-
ures with respect to crew-module rescue are considered feasible:
I. A rescue vehicle (Tug with a A V capability of about 14,000 ft/sec stand-
ing by at the 0LS _ required to intercept the stranded crew and crew-
module on a disabled PTV and return them to the OLS.
2. A crew-module with an on-board AV capability of i000 ft/sec can leave
the PTV and enter a lunar orbit. It then becomes possible for a rescue
vehicle standing by at the OLS to recover the orbiting crew-module for
a _ V expenditure of only about 4400 fps. The weight for propulsion
system plus propellant to provide a _V of i000 ft/sec to a I0,000 ib
crew compartment and 3,300 Ib instrumentation unit is between 1500 and
2000 lb, depending on propellants assumed.
3. A crew-module with an on-board _ V capability of 3000 ft/sec can leave
the PTV, enter lunar orbit, and proceed to the 0LS without need for
rescue. Assuming that propulsion is added to provide a AV of 3,000 ft/sec
to a I0,000 Ib crew module and 3,300 ib instrumentation unit, the pro-
pulsion weight penalty would be between 4,500 and 6,000 Ib, depending
on propellants assumed.
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Escape/ Rescue Requirements
For manned PTV missions with a Tug in the payload, escape capability for
the crew utilizing the on-board Tug vehicle is a mandatory requirement.
Emergency separation capability for the Tug under tumbling conditions is
also required.
For manned PTV missions with a crew module, but no Tug, escape from a tumb-
ling or partially destroyed PTV, plus rescue from lunar escape trajectory
are required.
SOURCE DATA
i. Nuclear Shuttle System Definition Study - Phase III, Monthly Progress
Report, LMSC-A980259, Nov 15, 1970.
2. Nuclear Stage, PDD, MSC. April 13, 1970.
3. Equivalent Chemical Stage, PDD, Vol III, May 5, 1970.
4. Chemical Propulsion Stage, PDD, MSC, July 1970
5. IPP Reference Schedule - High Budget, MSC, May 5, 1970.
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HAZARD STUDY i
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES
i. The crew of a prime transport vehicle shall be provided with navigation
update information, and with the capability to manually direct the vehicle
to the target position.
2. If the crew module of a prime transport vehicle (PTV) is mounted on a
propulsion vehicle, such as a Tug, that Tug shall be in a powered-up
state at the time of lunar orbit insertion or departure and shall be
capab!e of rapid separation from the PTV to function as a crew escape
vehicle.
3. Nuclear prime transport vehicles shall not be placed on a free Earth
return trajectory leading to reentry at Earth.
4. During each manned prime transport vehicle arrival or departure at the
the Moon, other operations in orbit and on the lunar surface shall be
restricted to activities with low risk of generating a rescue require-
ment.
5. Crew modules, serving essentially as replacement-crew delivery shelters,
shall be capable (as a minimum) of quickly separating and moving away
from a disabled (stable or tumbling) prime transport vehicle. The crew
module shall be capable of providing coarse attitude control, communica-
tions (beacon and voice) and life support while awaiting rescue.
6. During each manned prime transport vehicle (PTV) arrival and departure
at the Moon a rescue vehicle, manned and ready, shall be on standby in
lunar orbit to intercept a PTV that fails to achieve lunar orbit inser-
tion or departure. This rescue vehicle, assumed starting from a 60 nm
circular, coplanar orbit and returning to that orbit, shall have a mini-
mum AV capability of 14,000 ft/sec.
The fo]_lowing two guidelines assume that the crew module is given a modest
V capability sufficient to place the crew into an elliptical lunar orbit,
and are alternates to guideline No. 6, above.
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7. The crew module shall have the capability to quickly separate from a dis-
abled prime transport vehicle, provide a _ V of 1,000 ft/sec to achieve
an elliptical lunar orbit, and maintain attitude, communications, and life
support while awaiting rescue.
8. During each manned prime transport vehicle arrival and departure at the
Moon a rescue vehicle, manned and ready, and with a A V capability of at
least 4,400 ft/sec, shall be standing by in lunar orbit (assumed to be
60 nm circular).
The following guideline assumes that the crew module is given a _ V sufficient
to allow the crew module to separate from the disabled prime transport ve-
hicle and proceed to a safe haven in a 60 nmlunar orbit without assistance
from a rescue vehicle. This guideline is an alternate to 6, 7, and 8 above.
e The crew module shall have the capability to quickly separate from a
disabledprime transport vehicle and provide all necessary life support
and communications functions while continuing on to a safe haven in
lunar orbit, assumed to be at 60 nm circular. The minimum a V capa-
bility shall be 3,000 ft/sec°
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HAZARD STUDY 2
PRIME TRANSPORT VEHICLE (PTV) IN AN UNCONTROLLED TRAJECTORY -
FAILURE OF PTV TO ACHIEVE TEl
INTRODUCTION
This study considers the hazards to man resulting from a failure of a prime
transport vehicle (PTV) to achieve Trans-Earth Insertion (TEl). The PTV
may be either chemical or nuclear powered.
DISCUSSION
Analysis has shown that the hazards, corrective measures, and candidate
safety guidelines for this failure are essentially identical to those pre-
sented in Hazard Study i and Hazard Study 3. The PTV may still be in an
orbit about the Moon, or may have achieved escape velocity at the time of
the failure. Hazard Study I snd 3 should be consulted for details.
2-12
LMSC-A984262C
HAZARD STUDY 3
UNCOOPERATIVE OR DISABLED PRIME TRANSPORT VEHICLE IN LUNAR ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
This study area addresses the situation of a prime transport vehicle (PTV),
manned or unmanned, which becomes uncooperative or disabled in lunar orbit.
The source of propulsive power may be either chemical or nuclear.
ASSVMPTIONS
i. The PTV failure leaves that vehicle in some orbit, about the Moon, vary-
ing from 60 x 60 nmto 60 x ll,800 nm.
2. For initial manning of an orbiting lunar station the PTV crew will be
located in the crew module of a man-configured tug vehicle.
3. For crew exchanges the men are located in a crew compartment which has
no independent propulsion capability.
Configurations for assumptions 2 and 3 are illustrated in Hazard Study I
which should be considered in concert with Hazard Study 3.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
1. Potential collision between a disabled PTV and another orbital vehicle.
2. Stranding of a crew aboard a disabled PTV.
3. Potential loss of crew aboard a disabled PTV that has failed with exces-
sive angular rates.
4. Radiation hazard to other orbital vehicles if the PTV is nuclear powered.
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ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i , Potential Collision
An uncooperative PTV in lunar orbit presents a potential collision hazard
with other vehicles in orbit such as an orbiting lunar station, tug, or other
PTV.
The consequences of a collision of an 0LS with a disabled PTV in the opera-
tional orbit, where both vehicles have very closely the same orbital velocity,
are not likely to be catastrophic in nature. However, damage to structures
or appendages could result and the integrity of the PTV and 0LS system could
be violated. The potential effects to man may range over the following:
a. Necessity for a potentially hazardous inspection and damage survey
mission to ascertain future OLS and PTV usability and/or salvage
potential. The mission would entail the capture (if possible) of the
PTV and its removal to a safe parking orbit.
b. Should the PTV be a nuclear vehicle which has suffered severe struc-
tural damage, a mission requirement will then exist for the remote
capture of the wreckage for disposal purposes in order to remove the
ultimate possibility of nuclear engine lunar impact.
For the case of a disabled PTV in elliptical lunar orbit having a 60 nm pe-
riapsis, collision with an OLS at the point of orbit coincidence would be of
a catastrophic nature. The potential effects impacting later manned missions
may range over the following:
a. Injury or death to crewman involved.
b. Necessity for a potentially hazardous inspection and survey mission
to examine and possible deorbit large wreckage segments.
c. If the PTVwere a nuclear vehicle, the fate of the nuclear engine
would have to be determined. If the engine were intact and orbiting,
it would have to be remotely captured for deep space disposal. If
the engine had impacted the lunar surface, the area of impact would
2-14
LMSC-A984262C
have to be identified for surface quarantine purposes. And finally,
if the nuclear engine had disassembled as a result of the collision,
it is probable that some portion of the debris would impact and the
rest would remain in an indeterminant spectrum of orbits for varying
lengths of time. This, of course, would lead to a somewhat random
distribution of eventually impacting nuclear debris over a large
portion of the lunar surface.
Corrective Measures for Hazard I
Preventive measures:
le Prime transport vehicles should preferably not be brought into the same
or an intersecting orbit with other operational elements such as an
orbiting lunar station, but should always operate from a higher orbital
altitude.
Remedial measures:
I. Each vehicle in lunar orbit should be constantly aware of other traffic,
be made aware of any emergencies or malfunctions that could present a
hazard, and have the ability to maneuver to avoid collision.
2. Orbital tug vehicles should have the capability to capture and control
a PTV in orbit in order to prevent collision.
3. If a collision is permitted to occur, rescue and medical laid will be
urgently required.
Collision is discussed further in Hazard Study ll.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
Rescue may be required to remove the crew of a disabled PTV from the threat
of collision.
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Effects of Hazard 2, Stranding of PTV Crew in Orbit
The crew of a prime transport that has failed in lunar orbit will be stranded
and in need of outside assistance unless the crew module is self sufficient.
On initial manning of an orbiting lunar station it is anticipated that the
crew module will be attached to a tug which can be separated and used to pro-
ceed to the OLS unassisted.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
I. Stranding of a PTV crew in lunar orbit may be prevented by providing each
PTV crew capsule with the capability to separate and proceed to the 0LS.
This would require attitude control and navigation capability plus a pro-
pulsive AV capability of about 2000 ft/sec.
Remedial measures:
i. A PTV crew stranded in lunar orbit must be provided outside assistance
to remove them from the disabled vehicle and transport them to a safe
haven such as an orbiting lunar station.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Rescue will be required if a PTV crew is stranded in lunar orbit.
Effects of Hazard 3, Tumbling PTV
A tumbling PTVwill present a considerable hazard both to the on-board crew
and to any subsequent rescue attempt. If tumbling rates are low, the crew
may not suffer greatly but cannot easily be rescued. If tumbling rates are
high, rescue may be rendered impossible and death occur if capability for
escape and survival is not provided.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 3
Preventive measures:
No measures to prevent a prime transport vehicle from tumbling are identified
beyond careful attention to reliability and redundancy in the associated sub-
systems, and fail-safe provisions to prevent excessive angular rates.
Remedial measures:
i. The crew of a prime transport vehicle should be able to assume manual
control of vehicle attitude in order to avoid or stop tumbling.
2. Means must be provided for the crew compartment on a tumbling PTV to
separate, stabilize, and support the crew while proceeding to a safe
haven, such as an orbiting lunar station, or awaiting rescue.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 3
Means must be provided for the crew of a tumbling PTV in lunar orbit to
escape and survive until rescue is accomplished. Rescue of the escaped
crew will be required.
Effects of Hazard 4, Nuclear Radiation from Failed PTV
A nuclear PTV, failed in lunar orbit, presents a potential radiation hazard
to the crew attempting to escape, to rescue crewmen, and to crews of other
vehicles in orbit. The crew of a tumbling nuclear vehicle will almost cer-
tainly be required to escape without outside assistance, and must be able to
depart the PTV quickly enough to avoid radiation damage. Appendix E, Supple-
mental Data Report No. 4, discusses velocity requirements when leaving a
tumbling nuclear PTV and shows that propulsive capability on-board the de-
parting manned payload will be required.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
Preventive measures:
1. Nuclear vehicles should not be brought into the same or intersecting
orbits with other operational elements such as an orbiting lunar station,
but should always operate at a higher altitude.
2. Rescue crews should not approach a tumbling nuclear powered vehicle
unless adequate radiation shielding can be provided.
Remedial measures:
4
1. Crew modules, serving essentially as replacement-crew delivery shelters,
should be provided the capability (as a minimum)to quickly separate and
move away from a disabled (stable or tumbling) prime transport vehicle.
The crew module should further be capable of providing coarse attitude
control, communications, (beacon and voice) and life support while await-
ing rescue or proceeding to a safe haven. The minimum A V required is
about lO0 ft/sec with a minimum propulsive acceleration of O.1 Earth g.
2. An uncooperative nuclear PTV in lunar orbit must be captured and repaired
or disposed of by placing it in a safe lunar orbit, return to Earth
orbit, or injection to heliocentric orbit. Means for capture of a tumb-
ling nuclear vehicle by another unmanned vehicle must be devised. The
space tug should be developed to have this capability.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
The crew of a disabled nuclear powered prime transport vehicle in lunar orbit
must be able to escape that vehicle and survive, and a subsequent rescue will
be required. The disabled PTV may be either stable or tumbling.
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DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
I. Nuclear Stage Program Definition Document, MSC, 9 Oct 1970
2. Equivalent Chemical Stage, Vol III (of) Nuclear Stage Program Definition
Document, MSC, 5 May 1970
3. Chemical Propulsion Stage Program Definition Document, MSC, July 1970
4. IPP Reference Schedule - High Budget, _C, 5 May 1970
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HAZARD STUDY 3
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. Prime transport vehicles, whether chemical or nuclear powered, shall not
be brought into the same or intersecting orbit with other operational
elements such as an orbiting lunar station, and shall always operate from
a higher orbital altitude.
2. Each manned vehicle in lunar orbit shall be constantly monitoring other
traffic, emergencies, or malfunctions that could present a hazard and
shall have the ability to maneuver to avoid collision.
3. Orbital tug vehicles shall have the capability to capture and control or
dispose of any prime transport vehicle in lunar orbit. The PTV may be
chemical or nuclear, stable or tumbling.
4. Crew modules, serving essentially as replacement-crew delivery shelters,
shall be provided the capability (as a minimum) to quickly separate and
move away from a disabled (stable or tumbling, nuclear or chemical) prime
transport vehicle. The crew module shall further be capable of providing
coarse attitude control, communications, (beacon and voice) and life
support while awaiting rescue or proceeding to a safe haven. The minimum
propulsive requirement is about lO0 ft/sec with acceleration of O.1
Earth g. A _V of about 2000 ft/sec would permit the crew to proceed to
an orbiting lunar station without rescue assistance.
5. Rescue crewmen shall not approach a tumbling nuclear vehicle unless adequate
radiation shielding can be provided.
6. Any uncooperative prime transport vehicle in lunar orbit must be captured
and either repaired or disposed of by placing it in a safe lunar orbit,
returning it to Earth orbit_ or injection to heliocentric orbit.
7. The crew of s prime transport vehicle shall be able to assume manual control
of vehicle attitude in order to avoid or stop tumbling.
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HAZARD STUDY 4
ORBITING LUNAR STATION NOT FUNCTIONALLY 0PERABLE/HABITABLE
INTRODUCTION
This study analyzes hazards associated with an orbiting lunar station (OLS)
that becomes functionally inoperable or uninhabitable either before or at
the time of initial manning, or while manned.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. An orbiting lunar station (0LS) has previously been stationed in lunar
orbit unmanned.
2. One or more fully operable lunar lander tugs are docked at the 0LS when
men are entering or occupying the OLS.
3. The internal design, functions, and safety of the 0LS are the concern of
other studies and not examined here.
4. Crew compartments are provided with contaminant detection and removal
equipment.
5. All critical life support system components are highly reliable and
have redundant parts.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
I. Insufficient time to don space suits or escape to adjacent, safe crew
compartment following sudden loss of cabin atmosphere. It is assumed
this could happen only following a meteoroid strike, collision, or
explosion that ruptured the cabin pressure shell, or a fire.
2. Inadequate backup or emergency power and life support supply to allow
time for subsystem repair, transfer to a nearby safe haven, or to await
arrival of rescue assistance.
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3. Illness or incapacitation or deprivation of oxygen following contamina-
tion of cabin atmosphere.
4. Injury and/or deprivation of life support following explosion or fire
with an internal system such as a high-pressure gas storage vessel,
pyrotechnic, or experimental device.
5. High angular rate following loss of the primary and backup station
attitude stabilization systems.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS 4
To prevent an abnormal condition from be_coming a threat at t_ time of
initial manning the following measures should be taken.
Preventive measures:
I. Remote activation and checkout of the OLS prior to initial manning so
that deficiencies or problems will be known and can b_ planned for in
advance.
2. Provision of pressure suits and PLSS units, repair parts and tools,
portable battery powered lights, and specific procedures for inspecting
and repairing an inoperative OLS on initial manning.
Remedial measures for initial manning are not applicable.
The following descriptions apply to effects and corrective measures for
failures occurring subsequent to initial manning of the OLS.
Effects of Hazard I, Insufficient Time to Don Suits or Escape
Insufficient time to don pressure suits or escape to an adjacent, safe com-
partment following sudden loss of cabin pressure will result in loss of the
crew.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 1
Preventive measures:
I • Escape to a separate pressurized c_npartment could normally be accom-
plished much more quickly than donning of a pressure suit. Action must
be accomplished before cabin pressure drops to 1.7 psia (Ref. I). Thus
it is advisable to have multiple pressurized compartments available,
with interconnecting passageway or airlock hatches open at all times but
quickly sealable• The tug crew compartment, propulsion module, and
instrument unit, assumed always present and docked to the OLS, is the
preferred haven since this provides a complete support and communication
system capable of separating from the OLS if necessary for safety• The
compartment selected must have the capability to provide a safe haven
for all crew members present until one of the following can be accom-
plished_
a. The station failure can be corrected
b. External assistance can _ provided
c. The crew compartment(s) can be removed to a permanent safe haven
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard 1.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 1
Rescue may be required if the station cannot be repaired by the threatened
crewmen, or the tug has insufficient capability to transport the crew to a
permanent safe haven.
Effects of Hazard 2, Inadequate Power and Life Support
Inadequate backup or emergency power and life support supply to allow time
for subsystem repair, transfer to a nearby safe haven, or to await arrival
of rescue assistance will result in loss of the crew following failure of a
vital station subsystem.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures :
I • Each mission sequence must be planned such that a backup or emergency
source of power, life support, and communication capability will be
available at all times so that following loss of a primary source the
crew can proceed to a safe haven unassisted or await rescue, whichever
time is greater•
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard 2.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Rescue of a crew in lunar orbit with inadequate power and life support
supplies may be required.
Effects of Hazard _, Illness or Incapacitation Following Contamination
Contamination of cabin atmosphere will result in illness, incapacitation,
or deprivation of oxygen if corrective action is not taken.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive measures:
1. Provision of oxygen mask, emergency pressure garments and/or pressure
suits, or seps_ate pressure compartment and ECS, and immediate use of
one of these, following detection of contaminants.
2. Monitoring of cabin atmosphere to detect contamination and initiate
corrective action before illness, incapacitation, or oxygen deprivation
Can OCClIr.
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Remedial measures :
1. Outside assistance, or temporary abandonment of the station may b-_ re-
quired if contamination cannot be removed.
2. Crewmen suffering from breathing contaminated atmosphere must be pro-
vided clean air, a safe haven, and medical aid.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
Rescue will be required if corrective measures are not taken to prevent
illness or incapacitation from contamination.
Effects of Hazard 4, Injury or Deprivation of Life Support Following Fire or
Explosion
An explosion or fire may have hazardous effects similar to Hazards I and
3, already discussed, and additionally cause injury to one or more crewmen.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive measures for Hazard 4 include those discussed for Hazards S and
3, plus the following:
1. High-pressure gas storage bottles, pyrotechnics, and hazardous
experimental devices should be separated from the main cabin
and from vital subsystems components by structures designed to
help control an explosion or fire.
2. Pressures in high-pressure storage vessels should be monitored
to provide explosion warning, and procedures developed to cor-
rect potential hazards.
3. Where multiple pressure compartments are provided in a system,
crew members should not all occupy one compartment at one time.
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Provision should be made in station design for sealing each
pressurized compartment separately, and then remotely exhaus-
ting the atmosphere to extinguish a fire. (See note Page 2-26)
Fire extinguishers should be provided in each pressurized
compartment.
Remedial Measures :
i. Crewmen injured by explosion or fire will require immediate
medical assistance_ provision of pure atmosphere, and removal
to s safe haven.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
A crewman injured by fire or explosion must escape to be rescued and provided
a safe haven and medical aid. Removal to Earth may be necessary for adequste
treatment.
Effects of Hazard 5, High Angular Rate
A rotating station in orbit could pose a hazard to crewmen ranging from neg-
ligible to catastrophic, depending on rotational rate, direction of acceler-
ation, and duration. Prolonged rotation st rates on the order of 300 degrees/
second will lead to unconsciousness and eventually death.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 5
Preventive Measures:
1. Attitude control thrusters should be designed to fail "off" to prevent
excessive angular rates. Do not design systems with hot coils that are
grounded in order to fire.
2. Backup attitude stabilization systems should be provided to arrest
tumbling_ should it occur_ to allow repair or capture by an assisting
vehicle. Means should be provided to detect and isolate a failed engine.
3. Space tugs docked to an orbiting lunar station should be capable of
providing emergency attitude stabilization for the entire system_
assuming the 0LS attitude control system is inactive.
4
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Remedial measures:
1. If preventive measures are not taken, provision must be..made for crewmen
to escape from a rotating orbital station.
2. It is recommended that study of methods for arresting tumbling of
space vehicles by outside means be. accomplished.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
If preventive measures are not taken, escape and rescue will be required.
Data Source References:
1. "Analysis of the Required Operational Characteristics of Space Escape
Systems," Vol. III,J. E. Moeller, et al. N.A.R. Nov 1967, SAMSO-TR-67-7
2. "Fire Extinguishment in Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Environments."
J. Howard Kimzey, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, presented to the NASA
Conference on Materials for Fire Safety, HOuston, Texas, May 6-7, 1970
NOT._._E:
Following the completion of the technical study effort, the advis-
ability and effectiveness of evacuating a cabin atmosphere to
extinguish fire was questioned. Tests discussed in Reference (2)
have shown that in an open-celled polyurethane-foam fuel in pure
oxygen (5 to 16.2 psia), the cells trapped oxygen and the ignited
fuel continued to burn until the pressure was dropped to 0.12 psia
in two minutes.
It is recommended that further testing be carried out in mixed gas
and in pure oxygen atmospheres with materials now considered accept-
able for use in space cabins.
Reference (2) also describes the test of a high-expansion, breath-
able, foam extinguishing agent composed of approximately300 parts
gaseous oxygen (the ambient gas in the test chamber) to one part of
water-based solution. This agent was found to be quite effective
and to show promise for future applications.
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HAZARD STUDY 4
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
I. Provision shall be made to remotely activate and checkout an orbiting
lunar station which has been taken to lunar orbit by an unmanned trans-
port vehicle.
2. A crew sent to activate a defective unmanned orbiting lunar station
shall be provided with pressure suits and PLSS units, repair parts and
tools, portable battery powered lights, and specific procedures for in-
spection and repair.
3. Development of safe and effective means for arresting the rotation of a
tumbling station in orbit by outside means shall be a prime reqlirement.
4. Each orbiting lunar station shall have more than one pressurized com-
partment capable of supporting the crew. Hatches to interconnecting
passageways or airlocks shall be kept open at all times, but quickly
sealable in an emergency.
5. Each orbiting lunar station shall have docked to it, and immediately
accessible, space tug vehicles with crew compartments, propulsion
modules, and instrument units capable of housing and supporting the
entire remaining station crew.
6. Each orbiting lunar station mission sequence shall be planned such that
a backup or emergency source of power, life support, and communication
capability is available at all times so that following loss of a primary
source the crew can proceed to a safe haven unassisted or await rescue,
whichever time is greater.
7. Cabin atmosphere in an orbiting lunar station shall be monitored at
all times to detect contaminants such as solid particles, excessive
C02, vaporized chemicals, and permit correction action to be taken
before illness, incapacitation, or oxygen deprivation can occur.
8. Each orbiting lunar station shall provide oxygen masks and emergency
pressure garments at each crew station, pressure suits and PLSS units
for each crew member, and immediate use of these or escape to a separate
compartment following explosion, fire, loss of pressure, or detection
of contaminants in the atmosphere.
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10.
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
High-pressure gas storage bottles, pyrotechnics, and hazardous exper-
imental devices shall be separated from the main cabin of an orbiting
lunar station and from initial subsystems components by enclosing in
compartments vented to space and in structures designed to help control
an explosion of fire.
Pressures in high-pressure storage vessels shall be monitored to pro-
vide warning of an impending explosion, and procedures shall be devel-
oped to correct potential hazards so detected.
Where multiple pressure compartments are provided in a system, crew
members shall not all occupy one compartment at one time.
Provision shall be made in orbiting lunar station design for quickly
sealing each pressurized compartment separately, and then remotely
exhausting the atmosphere to extinguish a fire. (See note Page 2-26)
Fire extinguishers shall be provided in each pressurized compartment
of manned vehicles.
Attitude control thrusters and electronics for space vehicles shall
be designed to fail "off" to prevent excessive angular rates from
developing.
Space vehicles shall be provided with backup or emergency attitude
stabilization system to arrest tumbling and allow repair or capture
by an assisting vehicle.
Space tug vehicles docked to an orbiting lunar station shall be capa-
ble of providing emergency attitude stabilization for the entire system.
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HAZARD STUDY 5
ASS_BLY OF ORBITING LUNAR STATION ELEMENTS IN LUNAR ORBIT
INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
b
In the event that a capability to transport a fully assembled orbiting
station to lunar orbit is mot developed, assembly of station modules in
lunar orbit will be required. It is believed that such orbital assembly
will consist of docking and coupling of modules, aided by manned space tugs
in a manner little different from normal operations with tugs, crew com-
partments, cargo modules, and propellant modules. Major appendages such
as solar arrays, antennae, and scientific experiment booms will be_ployed
by mechanical means not requiring EVA.
No major hazards unique to orbital assembly of an orbiting lunar station
are foreseen for the conditions described above.
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
I. Orbital assembly, if required, shall be planned to use normal docking
and coupling procedures and devices developed for operational use with
tugs, crew compartments, cargo modules and propellant modules.
2. Major appendages for an orbiting lunar station, including solar
arrays, antennae, scientific experiment booms, and other, shall be.
deployed by m_ns not requiring EVA.
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HAZARDSTUDY6
CREWINGRESS/EGRESSFORSPACECRAFTIN LUNARORBIT
INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with crew ingress/egress for all spacecraft in lunar
orbit and for crew membersin a shirtsleeve or a spacesuit mode. However, the
actual EVAmodeof operations by any crew memberis reserved for discussion
in Hazard Study 7. Dysbarism is discussed in Hazard Study 39. 4
In the course of events in lunar orbit, crew members will accompl_ sh various
transfers between spacecraft; such transfers will include movement between:
i. The lunar space station and various tugs
2. The crew module leaving or arriving on a PTV and the lunar station
3. One tug and another
4. The lunar space station and any of Its docked cargo or experiment modules
ASSUMPTIONS
i. All crew members engaged in planned EVA will do so through the use of an
airlock.
2. Airlocks are constructed with equipment to supply environmental control
either through a space suit loop or to a crew member in shirtsleeves.
3. Each airlock will accommodate a minimum of two crew members.
4. Ingress/egress hatches are designed to be jam-proof, quick opening, and
to open in a direction judged optimum for safety for the specific con-
figurations.
NAJORHAZARDS
i. Crew member(s) are isolated outside of an airlock, by virtue of a mal-
functioning hatch, while in a space suit and returning from EVA operations.
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2. A crew memberis unable to leave the spacecraft through an airlock
whenrequired for his own safety.
3. A crew memberin a shirtsleeve modeis 'trapped' in an airlock.
ANALYSISOFTHEIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard l, EVA Astronaut Isolated outside Spacecraft
le Since the astronaut(s) are in the process of returning from EVA their
consumables will be largely depleted, therefore, they face the threat
of asphyxiationunless oxygen can be gotten to them. Temperature con-
trol mechanisms and power are also nearly depleted so that the qualities
of environmental control in toto deteriorate as spacecraft entry is
prolonged.
Corrective Measures for Hazard ]
Preventive measures:
1. Provision should be made for supplying all of the necessities for en-
vironmental control by plug-ins outside of the airlock including
oxygen supplies, temperature control, power, humidity control, and con-
taminant control. Communications facilities should be supplied also.
The astronauts should have the option of controlling these supplies
themselves in addition to such control as may be exerted by the space-
craft crew. These supplies should be tapped from the spacecraft's main
ECS to cover the case of a prolonged stay outside. It is recognized
that the additional outlets represent potential leak paths.
2. A second airlock should be available on the orbiting lunar station for
use by crews deployed in EVA operations.
3. It is suggested that the outer hatch be kept open while a crew member
is on EVA.
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Remedial measures:
I. Provide outside assistance to open the malfunctioning hatch or rescue
the isolated crewman. The hatch should be operable from either side.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 1
1. The astronauts must be aided in getting into their spacecraft through
the malfunctioned hatch or be rescued by another vehicle. The outer
hatch may be forced from the inside by a suited crew member.
2. If assistance is not available, the astronauts will have to get to
another airlock or to a different spacecraft.
Effects of Hazard 2, Astronaut _apped in Spacecraft
1. Because emergency EVA is postponed the crew member's life is endangered
by some undefined condition on the spacecraft.
2. If a crewman is attempting to transfer from a spacecraft for rescue
operations then such rescue is endangered.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
I. It is recommended that the lunar space station have a minimum of two
airlocks in order that members of its crew may have alternate paths to
leave the spacecraft.
2. It is also suggested that space tug design be examined to ascertain the
desirability, as well asthe cost in volume and weight, of having two
airlocks for crew use during tug activities.
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Remedial Measures:
i. Provide equipment and procedures for forced exit as a part of the space-
craft or station design.
Effects of Hazard _, Astronaut Trapped in Airlock
le A crewman working in shirtsleeves in an airlock will be endangered
should the inner hatch fail to open. Life support supplies in the
airlock may be limited, and access from outside cannot be gained with-
out evacuating the airlock.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive measures:
1. Provision should be made for supplying all of the necessities for en-
vironmental control within the airlock including oxygen, power, temp-
erature and humidity control, and contaminant control. A communications
loop will also be required. The crew in the airlock should have the
option of controlling their immediate needs. ECS supplies should be
gotten from the spacecraft's main ECS to cover the case of a prolonged
stay in the airlock. All airlock hatches are expected to be open when
crew members in a shirtsleeve mode are moving between a pair of docked
spacecraft. Such hatches are all kept open until transfer has been
completed.
2. It is suggested that crew members in a shirtsleeve mode do not engage
in airlock activity that requires working with the inner hatch closed.
3. If a crew member must work in an airlock with both inner and outer
hatches closed it is suggested that pressure suit and PLSS be available
in case EVA exit is required.
Remedial measures:
le Provide equipment and procedures for forced opening of an inner hatch
from either side.
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2. Provide rescue through the outer hatch to a docked, shirtsleeve environ-
ment, vehicle.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
With assistance:
Without assistance :
The 'trapped crew members will have to be rescued
through the efforts of other members of their crew or
another spacecraft will have to be used in a rescue.
The 'trapped' crew will have to force the hatch to
"escape _ to the main cabin.
Further Recommendations
It is recommended that studies be conducted to determine the necessary
numbers of airlocks for each of the spacecraft and vehicles in the entire
lunar complex.
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HAZARDSTUDY6
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
e
i. Each orbiting lunar station shall have a minimum of two airlocks to
use for EVA purposes.
2. An outer hatch shall remain open on an orbiting lunar station while
crewmen are on EVA.
3. Design of hatches shall include provision for forced opening from
either side.
4. The ECS operations for airlocks shall be supported by the spacecraft's
main ECS and have emergency separate environmental controls as well.
Each airlock should have self-contained regulatory controls both for
ECS supplied from the main cabin supply and for airlock emergency ECS.
Crew members in shirtsleeves should not carry on airlock activities
with the inner hatch closed. If unavoidable, then pressure suits and
PLSS's should be available in the airlock.
e All airlocks shall be connected to the spacecraft communications loop.
Moreover, it should be possible to contact other members of the lunar
complex using airlock communications.
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HAZARDSTUDY7
ORBITALEXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY(EVA)
INTRODUCTION
Commensuratewith missions of long duration and the choice of hardware with
inherent high reliability, characterized by either designed-in multiple re-
dundancy or selection of componentswith very long mean-time-before-failure
MTBF,strong implications of high cost exist• Alternatively, to obviate the
high cost but still retain high reliability the use of man in the main-
tenance/repair loop should be instituted. As themission lifetime increases
without end, as in the OLS-lunar base, the use of man in this maintenance/
repair cycle becomesmandatory.
Tasks will occur for long-lived spacecraft that require the presence of man
outside the Spacecraft. Becausethe OLSlifetime will be measured in years,
it is reasonable to expect a variety of EVAfor purposes of meteoroid
puncture repair, replacement of RCSthrusters and for general inspection and
preventive maintenance activity in order to assure the crew of the general
integrity of their spacecraft during the time the lunar space station orbits
the Moon. This activity implies innumerable extravehicular engineering
tasks throughout the OLS-lunar base program. Manned'locomotion', maneuvering,
materiel handling, maintenance and repair, alignment, and assembly-aid con-
stitute integral parts of the EVAtasks• It is reasonable to state that
without the aid of EVAthe OLS-lunar base program would becomemuchmore
complex and therefore more expensive and less reliable.
ASSUMPTIONS
I •
2.
EVA will be required in the OLS-lunar base program.
EVA typical tasks are:
a. Replacement of the RCS nozzles on the OLS
b. Performing maintenance on antennas
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c. Repairing meteoroid damage externally (separate from whatever is
repaired internally)
d. Replacing sections of the environmental control system radiators
e. Servicing unmanned lunar satellites under the Jurisdiction of the
0LS
f. Performing some assembly and disassembly f_mctions at the propellant
farm in lunar orbit
g. Obtaining close-up photographs of external damage or other phenomena
which have an impact on the operation/integrity of the OLS
Methods of providing ECS and communications will not include using long
umbilicals if the EVA crew member is away from the 0LS.
If EVA is required for some task on the external surface of the 0LS then
the crew member will have three options :
a. Connecting a short umbilical to an external plug built into the
station surface, or
b. Using a PLSS
c. Using a cherry-picker like device (described later in this discussion)
which obviates the need for a PLSS or a long, free-floating umbilical.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
I. Malfunction of oxygen supply.
2. Communications malfunction.
3. AMU malfunction leading to loss of attitude control.
4. Overburn of propulsion unit leading to stranded astronaut and/or excess
_V separating astronaut from vicinity of OLS or heading him into a
collision with OLS or other spacecraft in vicinity.
5. Illness while in EVA mode leading to vomiting, etc.
6. Loss of electrical power.
7. Exposure to excessive radiation.
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ANALYSISOFTHEIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard 1, Oxygen Supply Loss
It is conceivable that the crew member operating in an EVA mode may be so
interested in his task that he neglects to monitor his oxygen supply and
runs out of oxygen. Alternately, his oxygen supply may malfunction through
hardware failure. This failure may be internal - a component failure, or
external - failure due to meteoroid strike.
Lack of oxygen for,_20 seconds results in loss of consciousness, and lack
of oxygen for 3 minutes results in irreparable damage, and 5 minutes denial
results in death.
Corrective Measures for Hazard I
In addition to his normal oxygen supply the astronaut should have an emer-
gency, 30 minute, independent supply. Initiation of use of that supply
should set off an alarm both at the astronaut and on the display board by
which he is monitored, and makes return to the cabin of his spacecraft (tug,
OLS, etc.) mandatory and immediate.
If the EVA is on the external surface of a spacecraft, particularly the 0LS,
then a relatively short umbilical from the astronaut should be plugged into
an external plug on the spacecraft surface for an oxygen supply.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard I
If the emergency oxygen supply suffices for return to a safe haven then no
requirements for rescue exist. The astronaut has escaped from his dangerous
situation. If for some reason his emergency oxygen is insufficient to
permit safe return then rescue must be initiated at once. Thirdly, one
astronaut should be able to plug into the ECS of a co-working 'partner' who
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is in an EVA mode or vice-versa. The latter situation should make return
to a spacecraft cabin mandatory and immediate. ECS plugs should be available
on the surface of every spacecraft used by man so that an astronaut in EVA
could plug into such systems using a short umbilical; from this position
he should be safe until rescue is completed.
Effect_ of Hazard 2, Communications Malfunction
By equipment failure, by meteoroid strike or by loss of electrical power a
communication malfunction and loss can occur. Equipment failure means the
failure of any of the hardware in the communications subsystem which imme-
diately leads to loss of communications.
Loss of communications leads to a lack of information exchange between EVA
astronaut and the spacecraft from which he is operating. The information
includes both voice communication and monitoring of the vital signs (life
functions) of the astronaut, thus knowledge about astronaut well-being is
not constantly available.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Communications loss leads to mandatory and immediate return to spacecraft
for EVA astronaut. Circuit failure, either voice or monitoring, should set
off alarm for EVA astronaut, and alarm operation should be independent of
communications circuit operation. Communications for an EVA astronaut
should be an essentially continuous activity while he is outside the space-
craft. At the very least a communications check should be made every
5 minutes.
Escape/Re_cue Requirements fgr Hazard 2
Primary measure is for EVA astronaut and monitoring spacecraft to recognize
lack of communications and to get a signal to the astronaut to tell him to
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return to his spacecraft immediately. Such a signal could include the use
of flashing beacon aimed at his helmet or a tug on his umbilical if he is
attached to the spacecraft. If astronaut's alarm does not work then another
astronaut is required to go out and get the crew member whose system has
failed.
Effects of Hazard _, AMUMalfunction
Failure of an attitude control thruster to stop firing when all other
thrusters have stopped or, incorrect, unbalanced thrusting will lead to
loss of attitude control. Loss of attitude control leads to uncontrolled
tumbling of the astronaut, disorientation, nausea and illness (vomiting).
Illness, nausea and vomiting will not be dealt with here, they are discussed
in Hazard Study 35. Prolonged tumbling at rates of 300 degrees/second
will lead to unconsciousness and eventually death.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
The astronaut should have a method of shutting down any 'runaway' thruster
prior to reaching dangerous rate limits. He should have control of each
thruster separately or any combination in concert to null out all tumbling.
Attitude control thrusters should be disabled whenever EVA astronaut is
tethered or is moving about on the surface of any spacecraft using handrails,
etc. Astronaut should be able to disable thrusters by choice no matter what
his location.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
Recovery methods for an astronaut with attitude control loss are essentially
the same as the capabilities listed in the corrective measures. If, however,
after shutting down attitude control this function is still necessary for a
return to a safe haven, then the EVA astronaut will need assistance from
outside in the form of rescue.
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Effects of Hazard 4, Propulsion Overburn
The AMU (astronaut maneuvering unit) has frequently been suggested as a
means of propelling an EVA astronaut from one location to another during the
course of space activity. One system uses a hot gas and can supply a AV
to the astronaut of at least several tens of ft/sec. Should the system fail
and continue to operate after a co_nand to cease is instututed, the astro-
naut will be propelled past his destination at a rate that could easily ex-
ceed 20 ft/sec if he does not steer himself to nullify this effect.
The astronaut will rapidly extend his distance from his intended destination.
His capability to return unassisted is made exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, since most, or all_ of his propellant will be expended. A _V
of 20 ft/sec will carry him, in 15 minutes, 18,000 feet from his location
at the burn initiation if he does not maneuver. Implications then follow
concerning his orygen supply as well as his propulsion capability.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
The EVA astronaut must have positive capability to shut down thrusters, which
may be accomplished by cutting off propellant flow, or by cutting off elec-
trical power to the AMU. This cutoff should not affect life support.
Alternately, with judicious use of his attitude control system, the astro-
naut could stay in a desired vicinity by steering himself. Thus, a propul-
sion overburn may be controlled to the extent of not changing his location
by any significant amount.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
The EVA astronaut must have the capability (as a last resort) to steer him-
self to remain in the vicinity of his spacecraft in the event of propulsion
shutdo_a_ failure. A rescue mission will be required if the overburn is per-
mitred to drive the EVA astronaut away from his normal work area.
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Hazard 5, Illness during EVA, is discussed in detail in Hazard Study 35.
Effects of Hazard 6, Loss of Electrical Power
Electrical power may be lost by the EVA astronaut through battery failure or
through failure of other components in the electrical power supply circuit.
Either of these failures may occur because of failure in the hardware itself
or through the mechanism of an outside agent; e.g., a meteoroid strike. An
EVA astronaut using an umbilical will have power supplied _j his 'mother'
spacecraft, and a battery pack only for emergency use should the umbilical
power line fail. Failure of electrical power shuts down all EVA subsystems.
Communications, temperature control, automated oxygen flow and atmosphere
cleansing, and propulsion capability are all lost for the astronaut.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 6
A separate pack of batteries, for emergency use in the event of prime power
pack failure, is required for the EVA astronaut.
If the astronaut is working as part of a team he should have an umbilical to
plug into the power system of a fellow astronaut and vice-versa. In the
event of working on the external surface of a spacecraft, and tethered to
that surface, the astronaut ahould have the opportunity to plug into external
power-source plugs located on the surface of all spacecraft including the
OLS. Such plugs should also make available life support supplies and
communications.
The EVA astronaut must have:
I. A totally independent communications alarm (May-day signal) that will
activate if his normal electrical power fails, and
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2. a separate battery pack to power his communications alarm and his pro-
pulsion system for a minimum of ten minutes to permit return to 'mother'
spacecraft,
3. a manual oxygen flow control in the event of power failure,
4. a suit designed such that loss of electrical pow_ will not cause
temperature in the suit to rise above 90°F for 30 minutes after power
loss occurs.
5. it should be possible for one astronaut to plug into the life support,
power, and communications of a fellow astronaut in the event of mal-
function. The buddy system in EVA activity is strongly recommended.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 6
1. His electrical power fails and the EVA astronaut now separated from his
mother spacecraft must be rescued within a time bounded by his manually
operated emergency oxygen supply which is 30 minutes.
2. The EVA astronaut becomes 'entangled' in some large structure he is
assembling and must be extricated with the use of outside aid, and
a. He has a plentiful supply of consumables to that rescue must be com-
pleted within 3-4 hours. Also, he is not injured in this instance, or
b. He is injured and must be rescued post-haste.
3. The EVA astronaut's propulsion fails "off"; he is not on an umbilical
and is unable to return to his spacecraft unaided. His consumables
supplies are :
a. In good order and plentiful.
b. In good order but limited.
4. The EVA astronaut's communications have failed; he is unaware of this
since he is busy at his assigned task away from his spacecraft. Regular
voice contact is mandatory, therefore, another astronaut must be sent
cut to bring back the first astronaut. If the astronaut is close to his
monitoring spacecraft it could be possible to signal him with a flashing
beacon; he might even wear such a beacon and have it activated _j his
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governing spacecraft. Should continual communications be mandatory then
the astronaut will quickly be aware of a failure by lack of response
from his monitor.
GENERALCOMMENTS
All of the numbersused in the. following candidates for safety guidelines
represent current best engineering judgment. Further analysis is recommended.
An alternate and suggested method for EVAtasks - as opposed to long umbil-
icals and/or free flying astronauts - encompassesthe use of a cherry-picker-
like device attached to a tug, see Fig. 1. The cherry-picker is composedof
a cradle and attached cages to hold the astronaut and parts and tools, a
wristlike joint which is an attach point for the cradle and one-half the
cherry-picker arm, the second-half of the arm is also attached to the tug
and at this attach point at least one degree of rotational freedom is
available. The entire cherry-picker arm folds into a longitudinal slot
built into the exterior of the tug. Whenfolded, the cradle is at the tug
airlock. The astronaut is tethered in the cradle and is free above his hips
to handle tools and parts and to perform a very wide variety of tasks.
Umbilicals from the tug to the astronaut may be run along the cherry-picker
arm. An emergencypower and ECSsupply is fixed to the cradle and plugged
into the astronaut. It is activated at the turn of a switch. Such a
device, when and where available, would obviate most of the proposed safety
guidelines and the various hardware/cost penalties associated with imple-
menting the guidelines. The safety of the EVAastronaut is vastly improved
by virtue of use of the cherry-picker. His permissible EVAtask time will
be muchmore fruitfully used, since he is constantly tethered comfortably,
works more efficiently, and knows he is safe.
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HAZARD STUDY 7
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. In the event of loss of primary electrical power by an orbital EVA astro-
naut, an emergency battery pack shall supply power to
a. run the astronaut propulsion unit for a minimum of i0 minutes
b. keep suit temperature below 90°F for 30 minutes
c. run a May-day communications alarm for one hour
d. run a flashing light (wattage to be determined) for at least one hour
2. EVA astronaut propulsion must fail "off".
3. An EVA astronaut attitude control subsystem shall be capable of being used
to keep the astronaut in the vicinity of his spacecraft in the event of a
runaway propulsion system.
4. An astronaut shall be capable of disabling any or all AMU attitude control
thrusters at all times.
5- AMU attitude control thrusters for an EVA astronaut shall be disabled when-
ever he is tethered and not translating. Tethers must be impervious to
damage from hot gas or other AMU exhaust products.
6. An EVA astronaut shall have a communications (May-day) alarm, self-powered,
and activated automatically should his communications subsystem or his
electrical power subsystem fail.
7. A communications failure shall lead to an immediate and mandatory return
to the EVA astronaut's spacecraft.
8. All EVA astronauts shall carry a 30-minute emergency oxygen supply to be
used only in the event of failure of the main oxygen supply. Switcho-¢ers
may be manual or automatic, but a signal of automatic switchover must be
provided the astronaut.
9- The emergency oxygen supply feed shall be capable of manual control by
an EVA astronaut.
i0. An EVA astronaut using his emergency oxygen supply shall have an immediate
and mandatory requirement to return to his spacecraft.
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ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
z6.
All spacecraft shall have plugs strategically located on their surfaces
so that an EVA astronaut can attach umbilicals for oxygen, electrical
power_ and communications.
All spacecraft shall have hand-holds and tethering places strategically
located on their surfaces so that an EVA astronaut may use these in the
course of those tasks in which he is located on the spscecraft surface.
The buddy system - or presence of a safety man - is mandatory when EVA
astronauts are assigned tasks in which they are operating detached from
the spacecraft or station.
The buddy system - or presence of a safety man - is desirable for an
EVA astronaut assigned to a task on the surface of a spacecraft to
which he is tethered.
EVA should be viewed as the method to accomplish tasks outside of
spacecraft when good judgment by the mission commander (in some cases
perhaps_ with Earth-control concurrence) deems it useful.
Untethered EVA should be prohibited until an astronaut maneuvering
unit (ANU) is developed to the extent of being very reliable.
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HAZARD STUDY 8
SATELLITE DEPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION
The deployment of satellites in lunar orbit for scientific purposes is a
planned activity to be accomplished on-board an orbiting lunar station (OLS).
The handling, check out, launching and recovery of these units entails certain
potential hazards to the personnel involved. This study area considers the
hazards aspects of satellite deployment activities.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. Freeflying satellites (when docked to an OLS) will be docked to the
experiments airlock docking subsystem and not to OLS docking ports. (Ref.1)
2. Maintenance and repair of experiment satellites will be performed in an
experiments airlock, which will be part of the OLS experiments Laboratory.
(Ref.l)
3. The satellites to be launched from an 0LS may have propulsion systems
for delivery of instrument packages to orbits unlike that of the 0LS.
(Ref. 1 and 2)
4. Most satellites will have stabilization/propulsion systems for orientation/
stabilization or station keeping purposes.
5. Shirtsleeve environment for satellite servicing is an 0LS operational
requirement. (Ref. i)
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
Hazards considered to be significant are:
i. Liquid propellant spillage
2. Liquid or solid propellant ignition/detonation
3. Electrical fire in experiment airlock (satellite or checkout equipment)
4. Satellite collision with OLS during capture maneuver
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Effects of Hazard I, Liquid Propellant Spillage
The replenishment or initial filling of satellite propellant tankage requires
manual connection of transfer hoses or pipes. Any misalignment, failure to
tighten adequately, or entrapment of fuel or oxidizer in quick disconnect
fitting results in leakage and/or spillage of hazardous fluids.
1. The introduction of even small quantities of corrosive or explosive
oxidizer, hydrocarbon fuel or some of the more exotic, storable mono-
propellants into the airlock atmosphere presents the following hazards:
a. Toxic material concentrations
b. Creation of explosive atmosphere
c. Potential fire hazard
d. Corrosion of 0LS structuralmaterials
e. Potential rapid oxidation of structural materials and/or metal fire
involving thin structural 0LS segments.
2. Spillage in zero-g could permit 360 ° dispersal of active fluid to all
parts of compartment as well as permitting ingestion by crewmen. The
ingestion of fuel or oxidizer into the air purification system could
yield a disasterous situation for the entire 0LS section serviced by
the purification system.
Effects of Hazard 2, Propellant Ignition/Detonation
The servicing of satellites will involve the installation and removal of
propulsion components in the satellites. Thus failure to purge fuel and
oxidizer systems thoroughly could result in fluid release during disassembly
with resulting auto-ignition or detonation. Similarly the installation of
solid propellant packages can involve accidental ignition and/or grain
explesion under certain circumstances.
The sudden ignition or detonation of liquid or solid propellants within the
confines of the experiment airlock is certain to inflict injury upon the
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crewmeninvolved, even if they are garbed in protective clothing. Further,
the generation of gases involved is quite likely to violate the integrity
of the airlock compartmentand either open it to space vacuum, or to other
compartmentsof the OLS, thus propagating the hazard by exposing other crew-
men. Conceivably the pressure surges could open both inner and outer seams
causing depressurization of a large segment of the 0LS.
Corrective Measures for Hazards i and 2
Preventive measures:
1. Refueling of satellites - Provide a design which accepts prepackaged
(precharged) fuel or oxidizer containers. Containers should have built-in
check valves which open only after connection is made and final torque-
down is accomplished.
2. Provide a satellite propulsion system design which can be totally blown
down with small amount of nitrogen which vents overboard through a
disposable neutralizing trap. Provide a vacuum line to the disconnect
area so that vapors and fluid droplets are swept out to space.
3. Provide solid propellant cartridge modules as complete replaceable com-
ponents such that installation is safe with no-fire condition until the
satellite is armed just prior to deployment (when airlock is open to
space) or outside the 0LS.
4. As an alternate to 1 and 3 above, provide a high strength closed chamber,
mounted on an 0LS wall with a blow-out door, in which satellites can be
serviced using reinforced arm gloves or a remote manipulator. (Requires
spare blow-out doors). A hangar could be used for this function with
tethered crew members in soft suits while servicing the satellites.
5. All electrical equipment should be properly grounded to ensure that no
accidental electrical discharge occurs involving satellites or servicing
equipment.
Remedial Measures:
I. Provide emergency lightweight masks with remote air supply as remedial
measure for toxic fumes.
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2. Provide warning instrumentation and sensors to detect low levels of
oxidizers and fuel materials to be used in satellites.
Effects of Hazard _, Electrical Fire in Experiment Airlock
Electrical fires in the satellite circuiting or test and checkout circuiting
may result from a number of causes such as shorts, circuit overloads, damaged
parts, simple random failures or human errors in the test and checkout setup
or operations.
The effects of an electrical fire in the test and checkout of a satellite
will range from simple circuit damage to loss of the satellite and may
include activation of the pyrotechnics, ignition and/or detonation of pro-
pellants with subsequent major fire or overpressure generation. Thus a
simple fire may result in loss of the experiment airlock area and damage to
the major OLS structure. An electrical fire in the presence of propellant
vapors would lead to the production of various toxic gases which in turn
could penetrate the environmental control system.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive Measures:
1. Test and checkout of satellites shall be conducted for the major systems
while the unit is unfueled.
2. Final checkout shall be conducted remotely when airlock is open to space
vacuum.
3. Use wiring insulation that does not yield toxic gases in combustion.
Remedial Measures:
I. Use gas mask if toxic gases appear.
2. Have vent to space if fire occurs, while crew uses oxygen masks.
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Effects of Hazard 4, Satellite Collision with OLS
The recapture of a satellite (by an 0LS) upon completion of its mission
implies that the satellite can be maneuvered so as to return to the OLS
vicinity and into the open airlock. The degree of design sophistication
required for this ambitious undertaking is thought to be somewhat beyond
current state-of-the-art. However, granting that it is possible for a large
relatively passive station like the OLS to serve as the target into which
a satellite must be maneuvered, then a recognizable hazard is the collision
of the satellite with the 0LS if its approach velocity were too great.
Effects include:
1. Probable loss or destruction of the satellite.
2. Possible damage to 0LS structures from mass of satellite (velocity
dependent).
3. Possible damage to 0LS due to detonation of satellite from propellant
mixing and ignition upon impact.
4. Decompression of OLS if satellite penetrates OLS via windowport or thin
structure area.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
Preventive Measures:
The capture of satellite vehicles at the completion of _ts mission can best
be accomplished via a tug vehicle which is specifically equipped to snare,
grab, enclose, or otherwise latch onto the satellite. It is expected that
the satellite orbit will be known and its spatial position easily determined
by either 0LS or tug vehicle. Further, the satellite would have a trans-
ponder or beacon for this purpose. Thus a tug could transfer to the orbit
at an opportune time and effect the satellite capture, shut it down and
return to station at no danger to the OLS.
2-52
LMSC-A984262C
_k
Excape/Rescue Requirements for Hazards i through 4
Such events as fire and propellant detonation or explosion in the experiment
servicing area of the OLS will in all probability generate escape and rescue
requirements for the personnel involved. The collision of a satellite with
the OLS, either as a direct impact or a grazing collision could also generate
such requirements. The various aspects of the above hazards have been con-
sidered in some detail in the Ref. 1 document.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
It is recommended that satellite servicing be conducted in a pressurized
hangar separated from the main OLS compartment by an airlock in the general
manner planne d for the Earth Orbiting Space Base.
SOURCE DATA REFERENCES
@P
i. Orbiting Lunar Station - Phase A Study Final Report - Sec. i, Objectives
and Requirements. MSC-02686, (SD 70-518), dated Oct 1970, North American
Rockwell, Space Division, Downey, Calif.
2. Lunar Orbit Stations - Project Description Document, AMPO, MSC, Houston,
Texas. Dated April 1970.
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HAZARD STUDY 8
STIMMAHY OF SAFETY GUIDELINE CANDIDATES
i. Satellite deployment and initiation of operations considered hazardous
shall be made ready from a remote location before exposing crewmen to
potential hazards.
2. Refueling of satellites shall be accomplished by use of prepackaged fuel
and oxidizer container with built-in valves which open only after final
installation.
3. Servicing of satellite propulsion shall only be accomplished after thorough
system venting and purging.
4. Vacuum venting of immediate area where system piping or tubing is opened
shall be accomplished for each system breaching operation involving danger-
ous liquids or gases.
5o All solid propellant installations shall be designed to accept a complete
prepackaged solid propellant module designed to be "no-fire" safe until
satellite is armed for deployment.
6. Emergency breathing masks shall be available in the experiment airlock
as a quick remedy for atmospheric contamination.
7. Specific warning instrumentation and sensors designed for the satellite
propellant fluids to be handled shall be installed in areas where such
fluids are to be stored or handled.
8. Automatic fault detection equipment utilization shall be employed as the
first step in the test and checkout of satellites. The sudden rise of
current above test limit shall cause power cut-off to the test-and-check-
out setup as a means of preventing electrical fires.
9- Satellite capture for data return and reuse shall be accomplished via a
tug specifically equipped for the task, in order to avoid potential col-
lision problems for the OIS.
i0. Careful attention shall be given to the use of non-flammable materials
where possible in satellite design.
ii. Grounding and arming of explosive and propulsive devices should be accom-
plished On a satellite after it has been removed from the orbiting lunar
station. 2-54
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HAZARD STUDY 9
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION AT AN ORBITING LUNAR STATION
-@
INTRODUCTION
The utilization of nuclear power plant technology for lunar space station
application is motivated primarily by the sizable station power requirements
and the logistics constraints inherent in the operation of a distant, self-
contained facility. The factual recognition of the penalties associated with
utilizs,tion of the only existing device capable of providing multi-kilowatt
electrical power will permit the evolution of a practical, space-operable
nuclear power system.
A study is currently being conducted for the NASA (Ref i) which is intended
to provide key nuclear safety design guidelines and overall nuclear hazards
identification for space based nuclear electrical power systems. Therefore,
this Study Area will only address itself to the major manned lunar explora-
tion operational mission hazards interfaces generated by the space based
nuclear power unit.
ASSUMPT IONS
I. The synthesized orbiting lunar station with nuclear reactor power module
is assumed to be configured as follows:
200 ft ..... -_
Orbiting Lunar
Station
I I
.... L
Nuclear Power
System Module
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2. The operations conducted in and about the orbiting station are the normal
planned activities as defined in the lunar exploration program model.
3. The normal planned radiation levels around the nuclear power module are
such that the detectable natural space radiation level exceeds normal
shielded reactor emitted radiation level.
The primary hazard generators, related to manned operations around a lunar
orbiting station equipped with a nuclear power module of the type considered
in Ref. l, are as follows:
I. The recognized major sources of potential radiation leakage associated
with the nuclear power module are (Ref. 1):
a. Excessive radiation from the reactor and from components located
external to the reactor shield
b. Released fission products from reactor and primary coolant circuit
assembly
2. The interfacing lunar exploration program elements and operations exposed
to the potential hazard generators are:
a. Orbiting Lunar Station
b. Tug Vehicle operations
c. Prime Transport Vehicle operations
d. Replacement of nuclear fuel or of reactor assembly
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
Primarily, the major hazard which can be generated by a function failure
and/or system integrity violation within the nuclear power module, is the
exposure of man to excessive amounts of nuclear radiation.
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The routes by which mancan be endangeredby exposure to excessive radiation
from a nuclear power module are essentially direct in nature. The time span
over which the exposures can occur are variable and range from a large, high-
level pulse resulSing from a destructive reactor excursion to a low-level near
background exposure resulting from leakage between power system coolant loops
or from plate-out of released fission products on the space station exterior.
Other typical sources of radiation hazards examinedin the Ref. I study are
given in Tables I and 2.
ABOARD
SPACE
BASE
Table i
NORMAL SOURCES OF RADIATION
NATURAL
ENVIRON_NT
REACTOR
POWER
SYSTEM
RADIATION SOURCE
NORMAL REACTOR RAD-
IATION FIELD
NORMAL RADIATION
FROM PRIMARY LOOP
NORMAL RADIATION
FROM ACTIVATED
COMPONENTS
GALACTIC COSMIC
RADIATION
SOLAR RADIATION
RADIATION
ARISING
FROM
REACTOR AT POWER
OR SHUTDOWN
REACTOR AT POWER
OR SHUTDOWN
REACTOR AT POWER
OR SHUTDOWN
DEEP SPACE
SOLAR FLARE
Effects of the Hazard
Pending definition of the radiation "source-term" for a specific reactor and
shield configuration to be employed in the nuclear power module, only a
general approximation of the hazards effects can be made for the various
accident postulations that are within the realm of credibility.
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Table 2
ACCIDENTRADIATIONSOURCES
ABOARD
SPACE
BASE
ABOARD
INTERFACING
VEHICLES
REACTOR
POW-_R
SYSTEM
NUCLEAR
SHUTTLE
TUG
ACCIDENTRADIATION
SOURCE
EXCESSIVERADIATION
FROMREACTOR
EXCESSIVERADIATION
FROMCOMPONENTS
LOCATEDEXTERNALTO
SHIELD
RELEASEDFI SSION
PRODUCTS
RELEASEDACTIVATED
MATERIALS
• COOLANT
• STRUCTURE
• FUEL ELEMENTS
EXCESSIVE RADIATION
RELEASE OF FISSION
PRODUCTS IN ORBIT
RELEASE OF RADIO-
ACTIVE DEBRIS IN
ORBIT
EXCESSIVE RADIATION
ARISING FROM
REACTOR EXCURSION
OPERATING OR SHUTDOWN,
WITH DAMAGED SHIELD
FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN
LEAKAGE BETWEEN POWER
SYSTEM LOOPS
NORMAL REACTOR RADIA-
TION ENVIRONMENT
DESTRUCTIVE REACTOR
EXCURSI ON
CLAD AND PRIMARY
SYSTEM FAILURE
REACTOR DI SASSEMBLY
DESTRUCTIVE REACTOR
EXCURSI ON
PRIMARY SYSTEM FAIL-
URES OR LEAKS
TRITIUM RELEASE FROM
SHIELD
SHUTTLE COLLIDES WITH
BASE
SHUTTLE PASSES IN CLOSE
PROXIMITY TO BASE
SHUTTLE REACTOR
EXCURSI ON
SHUTTLE EXPLOSIONS
TUG COLLIDES WITH
POWER MODULE
TUG PASSES IN CLOSE
PROXIMITY TO POWER
MODULE
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A compilation of the anticipated crew allowable exposure limits proposed as a
revision to the "Provisional Radiation Dose Limits for MannedSpace Flight
Beyond Apollo", originally issued by the NASA-Radiation Constraints Panel, is
presented in Table 3. This table, taken from Ref. i, can be utilized to eval-
uate the relative hazard magnitude associated With credible accidents when
the respective "source-terms" for the accident have been defined.
For the nuclear power system employedin the Ref. i study the preliminary
source-terms for the system are defined. Utilizing this data and the lunar
space radiation environment as defined in NASATMX-53865 (Ref 2) it is
possible to compareexpected crew dose and exposure limits for an orbiting
lunar station equipped with a nuclear power supply module of the type and
configuration employedin the Ref. I study. These data are presented in
Figure I. Notice that a single solar flare will nearly deplete the crewman's
allowable short-time limit if it occurs early in his tour of station duty.
For a no-flare condition the crewmanwould normally receive his largest ex-
posure from the naturalspace radiation environment.
For a typical case of abnormal station radiation level from a nuclear power
system module (without regard to causative factors), the effects of the re-
sulting abnormal ambient radiation level on the crew can be readily assessed.
As an example, assumethat the ambient level in the station has risen to 20 mr/
hr of predominatly I MEVgammaradiation ( which could be typical of a leak
between the primary and secondary reactor coolant loops). Assume,also, that
a new crew has just started a station duty tour and that the power module is
being kept on-line because of critical station requirements for supporting
lunar surface base activities. A replacement power module is not available
until the next logistics supply mission arrives. The exposure data when
plotted as in Figure 2 readily presents the cross-over points for crew dose
limits, the ambient gammadose, the total man-madeand space radiation dose,
and the impact of a solar event. It can be seen that because of the natural
space radiation ambient level and the possible magnitude jump due to a solar
event, there is really very little margin for accommodatingfurther radiation
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Area
Depth
Skin (0.i MM)
Eye (3 _)
Testes (3 CM)
Marrow (5 CM)
I Yr. Avg.
Daily
0.6
0.3
0.i
0.2
3O Day
75
37
13
25
Quarterly
105
52
18
35
Yearly
225
112
38
75
Career
1,200
6OO
2O0
400
TABLE 3 - ANTICIPATED CREW RADIATION LIMITS (rem)
SPACE STATION/BASE, SKYLAB, SHUTTLE
level increases due to additional problems with man-made radiation sources.
Should, for instance, the reactor shielding integrity be violated, it is
quite possible to have station ambient radiation levels which could range up-
wards to lO3 R/hr or better if the reactor viewed the station directly. The
credibility of such an event being due, for example, to a meteorite strike
is enhanced by recent data indicating the presence of reasonable populations
of incoming large meteorites in the lunar vicinity (Reference 3).
For a significant breaching of the reactor shielding, giving rise to high
level radiation within the orbiting lunar station, the effects of high level
exposure upon the crew are predictable. Data developed in a current NASA
Study (Ref. l) is presented in Figure 3 illustrating the early time effects
for acute whole-body exposure resulting from given doses. The chart has been
constructed such that an estimate of the capability of an individual crewman
as a function of time after exposure can be identified for various radiation
doses. The value 50 Rads was taken as the limit below which no debilitating
effects would occur. Vomiting was taken as the earliest effect which could
incapacitate an individual crewman. In fact, it has been shown that nausea
and vomiting occur nearly simultaneously in the onset of radiation sickness
(Ref. 1).
The nuclear power module normally would be located some 200 feet from the
station, probably on the end of an extendible boom, in order to take advan-
tage of distance as a shielding augmentation factor. A second reason for
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the distance is the necessity for a very large unobstructed radiator needed
to reject excess reactor heat. The extended boomand power module are vul-
nerable to collision and hence must be considered to be within a restricted
operations volume so far as vehicles operating around the station are concerned.
Corrective Measures
Preventive Measures:
1. A nuclear power supply module attached to the orbiting lunar station
will necessarily have to be designed to be redundant in all critical
control systems and to fail-safe for all critical failure modes.
2. Positive reactor shut-down must be possible under all conditions of
mechanicalmalfunctions, shock, or collision.
3. Reactor-over temperature sensing must cause shut-down prior to thermal
degradation of core structure and fuel cladding materials.
4. Reactor shielding integrity_ust be capable of surviving all credible
malfunctions for the shield region which faces and shields the space
station. If the shield must vent to preserve its major area integrity,
then the venting shall occur in the direction away from the station.
5. The sudden loss of coolant from the primary coolant loop of the reactor
must not be possible in less time than required for safe reactor shut-
down without melt-down.
6. The reactor shielding shall be designed to be capable of attenuating
the radiative energy release of the credible postulated maximum reactor
excursion to levels which do not exceed the allowable crew dose (per
duty tour) in the space station.
7. Station radiation monitoring instrumentation telemetry data should in-
clude one channel which reports ambient radiation levels over the range
of ITom background level to and including ten percent above the maximum
level expected in the station from a credible maximum power module re-
action excursion. The data thus provided would alert and enable earth-
base to rapidly access the incident and render such assistance as
necessary or possible in subsequent contingency activity. Data would
include dose and dose rate at selected station areas.
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8. The reactor system employed shall (as a meansof enhancing reliability
and useful life in space) be designed to operate at temperatures well
Within the knowncapabilities of the proven materials employed in its
construction. Design safety margins shall not be less than a factor of
2.0 for the most critical parameter in any given system of subsystem.
9. The power system module design configuration shall be such that it is not
possible for a malfunctioning nuclear power system module to inhibit
access to, or escape or rescue from, the orbiting lunar station by virtue
of direct gammaor neutron radiation beamsor fields.
Design provision shall be madefor detaching an expendedor failed nuc-
lear power system module and removing the module from the operational
orbit via a tug vehicle (remotely operated if necessary). The disposal
of a spent or failed module Will be accomplished by procedures that are
yet to be determined.
Replacement of nuclear fuel or removal of the reactor assembly would
have to be provided for by development of techniques for accomplishing
these procedures remotely using a tug or other appropriate mechanism.
Alternately, a properly shielded tug, operated by crew membersand equipped
with mechanical manipulators could be used for these functions.
lO.
ll.
Remedial Measures:
i. The orbiting lunar station, if equipped with a nuclear power supply
module, will require on-board capability for emergencytreatment of
radiation sickness to somelimited extent.
2. The Earth-return tug stationed at the lunar orbiting station, mmstbe
capable (once activated and separated from the station) of autonomous
or Earth-base directed return to Earth orbit, in the instance where an
entire station crew has been exposed to radiation levels which will
produce incapacitation and serious organic degradation.
3. All crew members will always wear dosimeters, chsnged at regular intervals
so as to keep accurate records of their exposures. Dosimeters will be
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mounted at selected points in the OLS(and other spacecraft) and their
readings read out on demandby Earth stations, the LSB, orbiting base,
and other appropriate spacecraft.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
Since the station would be provided With only a solar-storm shielded area and
there is literally no place to retreat to if the station were exposed to large
fluxes of high energy gamma and neutron radiation, it is therefore necessary
that it be possible to escape from the station if such an event occurred. The
station would be equipped with radiation monitoring instrumentation and re-
actor control equipment as a necessary adjunct to the nuclear power system.
Preset alarm levels would warn the crew of the rising radiation level and mag-
nitude of the station radiation emergency. A predetermined level alarm would
call for station abandonment to be instituted. The crew would then be required
to escape. In the unlikely (but possible) case of a reactor excursion, it is
probable that the excursion radiation, impinging on the station, would take
the form of a brief but very high level pulse lasting up to one or two min-
utes followed by a decaying field level as the reactor either shut down or
came apart and became noncritical. Such a situation might subject the station
to radiation levels which, though brief, could induce subsequent radiation
sickness. It is likely that such a situation would require external assist-
ance in the form of rescue and aid.
SOURCE DATA REFERENCES
i. "Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study," First Performance Review,
GESP-7059, General Electric Co., Nov. 24, 1970.
2. "Natural Environment Criteria for the NASA Space Station Program,"
2nd Ed., NASA TM X-53865, MSFC August 20, 1970
3. "Date from U.S. Lunar Station Show Cold, Stiff Moon Regularly Bombarded
by Meteorites" by H. M. Schmeck, Jr., New York Times, Nov. 19, 1970°
4. "Radiobiological Factors in Manned Space Flights," W. H. Langham, Ed.,
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Washington,
D. C., (1967). 2-66
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HAZARD STUDY 9
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. The radiation shielding incorporated in the nuclear power system module
shall be capable of attenuating the radiative energy and particle release,
for the postulated maximum credible nuclear source accident, to levels
which do not exceed the allowable crew dose, per duty tour, in the orbit-
ing lunar station.
2. The nuclear source shielding integrity shall be such that it will survive,
in an integral condition, all assaults resulting from source system mech-
anical malfunctions, thermal shock, and vehicle collision. Further,
the shielding area facing the station shall survive intact the postulated
maximum credible nuclear source accident.
3. It shall not be possible for a failed or failing power module to inhibit
access to, or escape or rescue from, the orbiting lunar station by reason
of direot exposure from gamma or neutron radiation.
4. The nuclear energy source (reactor) shall be capable of positive shut-
down in any orientation and under all conditions of mechanical malfunction.
The source reactor shall fail-safe to a shut-down condition for all credible
nuclear transient conditions.
5. The nuclear power system module shall incorporate design features
which permit remote detachment of the module by a tug vehicle for dis-
posal purposes.
6. Flight operations in and around the station shall be constrained to avoid
the restricted volume around the power module for a distance determined to
be safe.
7. The station telemetry link to Earth shall sample and report the ambient
radiation level in the station at any time when the radiation values
exceed an established background nominal. The TM shall regularly report
dese and dose rate at selected station areas.
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8. Replacementof nuclear fuel for the reactor or replacement of the reactor
itself will be accomplished using techniques that ensure that the crew
membersinvolved do not receive an injurious radiation dose. Actual
permissible dose, in the light of the importance of this operation,
should be determined.
9. Each crew membershall always wear a dosimeter, cha_ged at regular inter-
vals so as to keep accurate records of radiation exposure. Dosimeter
readings will be reported regularly, or on demand, to Earth stations,
to the LSBor to other appropriate spacecraft.
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HAZARDSTUDYiO
LOSSOFPROPULSIONAND/ORCONTROLOFA MANNEDTUGIN ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
I
Successful completion of any orbital tug maneuver or transfer operation is
dependent on a functioning reaction control system (RCS). This system
provides propulsive thrust for minor delta velocity needs and docking
maneuvers in addition to attitude control. Where large delta velocities
are required, both the primary propulsion system and the RCS must function.
This study examines the hazards resulting from failure of either primary
propulsion or RCS or both during lunar orbital operations. Descent to and
ascent from the lunar surface are discussed in Hazard Study 16.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. The propulsion/RCS failure does not disturb other subsystems such as
life support and communications.
2. The tug carries a crew of two to six men.
3. External assistance may or may not be available.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
I. A crew is stranded in lunar orbit in a tug without primary propulsion
and/or attitude control, and the vehicle may or may not be tumbling.
2. A tug in lunar orbit with primary propulsion and/or attitude control
failed has been rendered unavailable for use in rescue situations.
3. A tug in lunar orbit with primary propulsion failed presents a collision
hazard.
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ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard I, Stranded Crew
Stranding of a crew in orbit may result in depletion of necessary expendables
and in illness or death from excessive tumbling rates or duration.
Corrective Measures for Hazard I
Preventive measures:
I. Provision of adequate expendables to sustain the crew until remedial
measures can be taken. A seven-day supply appears to be adequate for
orbital emergencies.
2. Use of RCS thrusters to return to a nearby safe haven, assuming primary
propulsion has failed but the RCS is operating and can provide the
necessary delta velocity.
3. Provision of a small secondary propulsion system to back-up the primary,
and provision of two independent attitude control systems, each having
the capability to provide translational delta velocity. The secondary
propulsion system is independent of the control systems. It provides
translational capability to the limit of main propellant exhaustion and
is a small investment for the safety provided.
4. Use of two tugs for initial orbiting lunar station manning operations
where outside assistance will not be available in lunar orbit. Because
the initial crew is far from aid it is incumbent upon mission planners
to ensure a substantial degree of safety to this crew. Historically,
most vehicle failures are of the propulsion/controls type. Therefore,
an alternate method of ensuring propulsion capability would be to provide
two complete propulsion stages and intelligence units mounted in tandem,
useable one-at-a-time, and surmounted _y a single crew cabin.
5. Provision for manual control of each RCS thruster separately.
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e Provision for the crew capsule and instrument unit (IU) to separate from
a failed propulsion module. This would allow the RCS, assumed part of
the IU, to provide a much greater delta velocity if needed to return
the crew to a safe haven.
Remedial measures:
I • External assistance from a second vehicle to stop tumbling, provide any
needed consumables, and propel the disabled tug and crew to a safe
haven. If the tumble rate is slow enough the crew could wear PLSSs and
leave the tug by jumping out where they will be picked up by a rescue
spacecraft waiting close by for them• Should the tumble rate be large
enough so that the crew could not exit in this manner then some method
will have to be used for slowing the tumble rate or stopping it. The
problem is too complex to give specific details here; a separate study
is warranted.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 1
P
A rescue vehicle must be provided to rendezvous with a disabled tug in
lunar orbit, arrest tumbling motions if present, provide expendables if
needed, and propel the disabled tug and crew to a safe haven. If the
tumbling cannot be arrested, provision must be made for removing and rescuing
the crew via EVA.
Effects of Hazard 2, Disabled Tug Unavailable for Rescue Support
Disabling of any tug in lunar orbit renders that vehicle unavailable for
rescue service. Further, if this disabled vehicle requires outside
assistance a second rescue vehicle must be committed to that duty. If only
two vehicles with rescue capability are normally based in lunar orbit this
hazard could occupy both, and leave other orbital and surface systems
unprotected.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
I. Provision of self-help capability for the disabled tug to avoid need for
assistance. Possible self-help methods include:
a. One or two AMUs aboard the tug which may be worn by one or two
astronauts could be used to tow the other astronauts to a safe
haven provided it was within the range capability of the AMUs.
Optimally the PLSS-wearing crew could leave the tug and orbit
until they were within range of a safe haven that could be reached
by the use of the AMUs.
b. An auxiliary propulsion unit attached to the exterior of the tug
and detachable from it could serve the same purpose.
2. Provision of a minimum of three vehicles in the lunar complex with the
capability of supporting a rescue mission. One tug is assumed to be on
the lunar surface engaged in a sortie-investigation, a second is presumed
to be engaged in orbital operations away from the space station, and the
third is docked at the station, quiescent, monitored, filled with pro-
pellant and ready for any rescue situation.
No remedial measures have been identified for Hazard 2.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
No additional escape/rescue situation is identified, hit a backup rescue
vehicle should be made available.
Effects of Hazard _, Potential Collision
A disabled tug in lunar orbit presents a potential collision hazard to other
orbital systems. If the reaction control system, with translation capabilit_
is operative then collision can be avoided. The hazard results only when
attitude control is lost.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard
@
Preventive measures:
I. Provide two independent attitude control systems, each having the capa-
bility to provide translational delta velocity of 50-to-100 ft/sec.
Remedial measures:
I. Rescue of crew and capture of the disabled tug by a rescue vehicle.
2. Disposal of a derelict tug, following crew removal, by deorbiting or by
returning it to a lunar station for repair.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
A rescue mission is required to remove a disabled orbital vehicle from
danger of collision with other systems in lunar orbit.
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HAZARD STUDY i0
OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. Each manned tug on a solo mission in lunar orbit shall carry expendables
adequate to support the crew for a period of seven days beyond the planned
mission time.
2. Two independent reaction control systems shall be provided on each manned
tug, with each system having the capability to provide translational delta
velocity of 50 - i00 ft/sec.
3. A small secondary maneuvering propulsion system oriented in the same direc-
tion as the main engines and operating off the main propellant supply_ shall
be provided to back up the primary propulsion system of any tug in lunar
orbit.
L_. Where outside assistance cannot be available, such as during initial man-
ning of an orbiting lunar station, the crew compartment of a manned tug in
lunar orbit shall be carried on two complete tug propulsion modules and
instrument units mounted in tandem.
5- The crew of a manned tug in lunar orbit shall be provided the capability
for manual control of each RCS thruster separately.
6. Each crew capsule and instrumentation unit, including RCS, on a tug in
lunar orbit must be provided the capability to separate from a failed pro-
pulsion module and proceed to a safe haven or await rescue.
7. When lunar sumface missions are being performed_ a minimum of three vehicles
capable of supporting an escape or rescue mission must be provided; one is
a standby reserve vehicle in lunar orbit; one is a mission vehicle in lunar
orbit; one is a mission/escape vehicle on the lunar surface.
8. A cspability for a rescue vehicle to arrest a tumbling manned tug in lunar
orbit, provide any needed consumables, and propel the disabled tug and
crew to a safe haven must be provided.
9. A capability to dispose of_ or salvage_ a derelict tug in lunar orbit,
following removal of the crew, must be provided.
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HAZARD STUDY ii
COLLISION IN LUNAR ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
Collision in lunar orbit could occur between two space vehicles or between a
vehicle and space debris. The probability of such an occurrence, resulting
in a hazard to lunar crewmen, appears to be quite low if spacecraft trajec-
tories, orbits, and relative velocities are carefully planned and controlled.
Meteoroid collisions are discussed separately in Hazard Study 38.
ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that each spacecraft arriving, departing, or operating in lunar
orbit has propulsion and attitude control subsystems permitting control of
trajectory and velocity and evasive maneuver capability.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
A collision in lunar orbit could have very serious consequences, ranging from
damage to spacecraft subsystems and rupture of pressure shells to total de-
struction through crushing, explosions, and fire. This study cannot deal ad-
equately with the multitude of situations that could result from a collision,
but rather will suggest measures that can be taken to prevent collisions from
occurring.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of the Hazard
As discussed above, the effects of a collision can vary so widely that this
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aspect cannot be adequately covered in this study.
eliminate the "effects" by avoiding collision.
Corrective Measures to Prevent Collision
The approach taken is to
Collisions may to a large extent be avoided, or limited to very minor, non-
hazardous events by operational planning and procedures, collision risk de-
tection, and avoidance capability. The following preventive measures are pro-
posed. Where numerical limits are suggested, additional study is recommended
for verification.
1. No two undocked spacecraft should be based in near-identical or inter-
secting orbits.
2. No two spacecraft should be permitted to approach each other on a colli-
sion course either with main propulsion engines "on" or with a closing
velocity greater than about 2 ft/sec.
3. A vehicle intending to dock in orbit shall not be placed on a collision
course with the primary propulsion burning.
4. All prime transport vehicles arriving in lunar orbit should rendezvous
at an altitude different from that of the target station by lO00 ft or
more.
5. To accomplish docking following rendezvous, altitude adjustment should
occur first followed by establishment of an intercept trajectory. 0nly
docking thrusters should be used, and closing velocity limited to a max-
imum of about 2 ft/sec until about 200 ft from contact. From 200 ft to
contact velocity should be limited to less than 1 ft/sec.
6. Vehicle or subsystem appendages should be kept clear of docking areas
on space vehicles.
7. Spacecraft docking mechanisms should be designed to absorb twice the
normal maximum expected docking impact energy without damage.
8. Spacecraft departing a seoond vehicle should first make an altitude ad-
justment sufficient to ensure that orbits are non-intersecting before
initiating main thrust. This ensures that no common orbital point will
exist if departure propulsion or control should fail.
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. The position of space debris in Orbit about the Moon should be monitored,
and each such debris should be removed at the earliest opportunity should
any danger of collision exist. If debris removal is impractical, space-
craft threatened with collision should select a new, safe orbit.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
O
If collision occurs in lunar orbit, rescue may be required.
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HAZARD STUDY ii
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
The following guidelines are proposed as candidates to help avoid collisions
in orbit about the Moon:
i. No two space vehicles or structures shall be based in near-identical or
intersecting orbits.
2. No two space vehicles shall be permitted to approach each other on a col-
lision course either with main propulsion ':on" or with a closing velocity
greater than about 2 ft/sec.
3- A vehicle intending to dock in orbit shall not be placed on a collision
course with the primary propulsion burning.
4. To accomplish docking following rendezvous of two vehicles in orbit, alti-
tude adjustment shall occur first, followed by establishment of an inter-
cept trajectory. 0nly docking thrusters shall be used for velocity adjust-
ment_ and closing velocity shall be limited to a maximum of about 2 ft/sec
until about 200 ft from contact. From 200 ft to contact the closing velo-
city shall be limited to less than i ft/sec.
5- Docking areas on space vehicles shall be kept free of vehicle or subsystem
appendages such as engines, antennas_ and solar cells.
6. Docking mechanisms shall be designed to absorb twice the normal maximum
expected docking impact energy without damage.
7. Spacecraft departing from a second vehicle shall first make an altitude
adjustment sufficient to ensure that orbits are non-intersecting before
initiating main thrust°
8. The positions of all objects in lunar orbit_ including space debris, shall
be monitored. Debris shall be removed at the earliest opportunity should
at@ significant possibility of collision exist. If debris removal is not
practical, the orbit of vehicles threatened with collision shall be appro-
priately altered.
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9. Each manned vehicle in lunar orbit shall be constantly monitoring other
traffic, emergencies, or malfunctions that could present a hazard and
shall have the ability to maneuver to avoid collision.
lO. Orbital tugs shall have the capability to capture and control or dispose
of any vehicle or object in lunar orbit. The vehicle may be chemical or
nuclear powered, stable or tumbling.
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HAZARDSTUDY12
MANNEDTUGMANEUVERINGERRORSIN THEVICINTY
OFA NUCLEARPROPULSIONSTAGE
INTRODUCTION
A mannedtug, operating in the vicinity of a nuclear propulsion stage, must
be constrained in its modeof approach to avoid the hazard of nuclear radia-
tion. This study considers the extent of the operating constraints and the
consequenceof violating these constraints.
ASSUMPTIONS
I. Transfer of all payload cannisters or crew transport modules from a
nuclear poweredvehicle to an oribiting lunar station and elsewhere is
accomplished by, or controlled from, a mannedtug. Wherean unmanned
tug is used for actual transfer, it will be under control of a manned
tug physically located nearby.
2. Primary responsibility for tug maneuversis vested in the tug commander.
3. The nuclear powered transport vehicle, the orbiting lunar station, and
the propellant depot are assumedto be stable passive targets for ren-
dezvous and docking activities of the tug vehicle.
4. Tracking information is initially provided by the orbiting lunar station
until target acquisition is accomplished by the tug vehicle. After
acquisition the tug provides its own data. The orbiting lunar station
continues to monitor the tug and target until out of range.
5. A tug crew for orbital sorties and logistics operations is assumedto
vary between two and six men.
The principle hazard generators are those planned or unplanned maneuvers
which place the mannedtug in close proximity to a nuclear powered vehicle,
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but outside of the radiation shielded cone envelope in the forward region of
that vehicle. The region protected by the nuclear engine shield and the
tankage for a typical nuclear propulsion state is approximately a 30° cone
aligned with the vehicle axis, having its apex at the engine reactor core
center point. The shield region geometry is illustrated in the following sketch.
SHIELDED _ICONE IREGION
f
f
TYPICAL NUCLEAR POWERED VEHICLE
p,
The inadvertent placement of the tug crew in the radiation environment of the
nuclear stage can arise as the result of one of several sets of circumstances:
I. From human error in trajectory data input which permits the tug to arrive
at the nuclear stage in the region of the nuclear engine exposure.
2. From faulty guidance and navigation equipment.
3. From erroneous range data resulting from malfunctioning range radar.
4. From failure to verify nuclear stage orientation prior to approach re-
sulting in closure on nuclear engine in a darkside passage.
5. From a closure velocity error which requires a translation maneuver to
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miss collision with nuclear stage payload and permits the tug to penetrate
an unshielded region.
From propulsion systems inoperative on-board the tug, leaving the tug with
excess velocity relative to the nuclear stage and causing passage through
the engine radiation field.
From failure of the tug power system during tug/nuclear stage rendezvous
sequence causing the tug to drift by the nuclear stage at low relative
velocity.
THE MAJOR HAZARD
The major hazard generated by inadvertent entrance into the unshielded radia-
tion region around the nuclear stage is the potential exposure of man to
excessive amounts of nuclear radiation.
ANALYSIS OF THE HAZARD
The hazard identified is exposure of men in a tug crew compartment to nuclear
radiation while operating in the vicinity of a nuclear propulsion stage.
Effects of the Hazard
The penetration of a tug vehicle into the radiation environment surrounding
the nuclear powered vehicle will result in crew exposure of some magnitude.
The effects of such an exposure will range from a small increase in the crew
radiation dose burden, to major significant dose increases which can expend
the crew allowable dose limit, to a crew dose burden reaching into the physio-
logical damage region.
The cre_ dose in all seven of the cited situations is a function of the ex-
posure time and the spatial position radiation dose rate. Since the crew will
be moving through a region of changing dose rate as the radiation source is
approached and passed, the integrated dose to the crew is normally computed
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for small time steps to accommodate the changing exposure function. For pur-
poses of this study, however, it is sufficient to make a conservative approxi-
mation of the expected exposure values and address the problem in terms of
these approximate values.
The respresentative situation to be considered is given as follows:
@
Assume that a nuclear stage payload is to be removed one day after arrival at
the Moon. Further, ass_Lme that the tug vehicle in performing the necessary
orbit transfer and phasing maneuvers to achieve rendezvous with the nuclear
stage suffers a loss of power in the final orbit circularization maneuver such
that the tug will fly by the nuclear stage. For the analysis it is assumed
that the fly-by velocity is on the order of I meter per second relative to the
nuclear stage and the tug will pass the nuclear engine at a distance of 30
meters. Taking the stage and payload length to the nuclear engine (reactor-
core) center to be close to 53 meters, it is then possible to compute the tug
crew exposure resulting from the postulated mishap.
Ref. I, Supplemental Data Report No. I presented in Appendix E, should be
consulted and considered a part of this study. Several Figures from Ref. I
are pertinent to the following discussion. The ambient fission-product dose
rate at a position 30 meters from the side of the NERVA nuclear engine is
given in Figure 4 of Ref. I. The data are presented for a view angle of 90 °
as a function of time after engine shutdown. Dose - distance data over a
wider range of distance is given in Figure 5 of Ref. I.
The variation in gamma radiation dose rate for the entire engine view-angle
range seen by the tug in its fly-by is obtained from Figure 6 of Ref. 4.
The appropriate "view-factor', is applied to dose rate data from Figures 4
and 5 of Ref. I to obtain a corrected dose rate for any point in the tug path.
Figure I presents the corrected dose rate profile for the tug fly-by of the
nuclear engine. Included is a sketch of the fly-by situation showing the
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parameters considered. The integrated tug crew exposure values as a function
of fly-by velocity are given below for a tug/nuclear engine approach distance
of 30 meters and an engine shutdown time of one day.
Velocity Crew Dose
(Meters/See) (REM)
3.04 0.4
1.0 1.2
0.304 3.9
0.0304 39.0
In all cases the exposure integration was performed over the time required
for the tug to traverse 600 meters relative to the nuclear stage. The data
clearly illustrate that the tug stay-time in close proximity to the nuclear
engine must be controlled to minimize crew dose accumulation. A disabled
tug in close proximity to a nuclear stage must be removed as expeditiously
as possible.
Corrective Measures
Preventive Measures:
1. Tug vehicles shall be equipped with on-board radiation sensors and instru-
mentation which alarm and call attention to the fact that the vehicle is
penetrating a region of increasing radiation level.
2. Tug vehicles shall be so designed that total failure of all on-board pro-
pulsion capability or attitude control cannot result from failure of a
single system or subsystem.
3. Normal tug operating procedures shall require phasing termination, in
the vehicle radiation shield cone, at a distance of at least 350 meters
from a nuclear powered vehicle.
4. Do not plan activity around the NPTV until it is stabilized and has been
shut down for one or more days.
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Remedial Measures:
Noneidentified.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
Should the tug become totally propulsion disabled, as in the above situation,
external assistance Mill be required to remove it from the vicinity of poten-
tial radiation exposure.
SOURCE DATA REFERENCES
I. "A Study to Evaluate Radiation Exposure to the Orbiting Lunar Station
and Lunar Surface, Related to the Reusable Nuclear Shuttle OpeN=tions"
Supplemental Data Report No. I, Appendix E, of this report.
2. Nuclear Stage PDD, MSC, April 13, 1970.
3. Nuclear Shuttle System Definition Study, Phase III, Monthly Progress
Report, L_C-A980259, November 15, 1970.
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HAZARDSTUDY12
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINECANDIDATES
The safety guideline candidates derivable from the analysis are as follows:
_e
I • No single function failure of any system or subsystem on board a tug shall
result in loss of capability to control attitude and velocity of that tug.
• Normal tug operating procedures shall require phasing termination, in the
vehicle radiation shield cone, at a distance of at least 1,150 ft from a
nuclear powered prime transport vehicle.
• Tug operations in the vicinity of a nuclear prime transport vehicle shall
be constrained by adequate procedures such as rigid control of approach
path - velocity - distance parameters, to prevent inadvertent intrusion
into the nuclear vehicle radiation zone during normal transfer and phasirg
maneuvers.
4. No activity shall be planned around a nuclear stage until it is stabilized
and the nuclear engine has been shut down for at least 24 hours.
• Tug vehicles shall be equipped with on-board radiation sensors and
instrumentation with provision for auto-alarm whenever the tug vehicle is
penetrating a region of increasing radiation level.
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HAZARD STUDY 13
PROPELLANT DEPOT IN LUNAR ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
This study area includes discussion of hazards associated with depot basing
schemes and propellant transfer methodology for a propellant depot in lunar
orbit. The consideration of a propellant depot on the lunar surface, as well
as discussion of the necessity for a propellant depot in the lunar complex,
is dealt with in Section 3-
The establishment and use of a propellant depot (or farm) in lunar orbit in
some form is assumed for the conduct of manned operations including rescue on
the Moon and in lunar orbit (see Section 3.) Such a propellant farm
can take many forms and be located either at (i.e., attached to) an orbiting
lunar station (0LS)or sited in orbit at some convenient d_stance from the OLS.
If separate from the OLS, the farm can be completely dormant and serve only to
receive and transfer propellants from or to a spacecraft. Alternately, it
may be desirable to maneuver the farm to be near or docked at the OLS for pro-
pellant transfer operations. If the latter, the farm may be maneuvered to
the OLS unmanned or a pilot may be put aboard for this purpose. A special
case of the maneuverable propellant farm is that of tug alone loaded with pro-
pellant in lunar orbit.
There is a distinct lack of knowledge in a number of areas which inhibits a
complete discussion of this topic; these include:
i. The lunar environment is not defined well enough in that the frequency
and sizes of meteoroids as a function of time (per unit area, assuming
isotropic distribution) is not known. The statistics supplied by the
Lumar Orbiters are insufficient.
2. The entire area of propellant depot design has no substantial definition.
3. The power system for operating the depot propellant transfer functions
has not been determined.
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4. The degree of automation in loading and unloading procedures for pro-
pellant at the depot is unknown.
b
In order to make well founded decisions on the propellant depot basing and
transfer techniques, detailed studies will have to be conducted in each of
the areas noted. It is recommended that such studies be instituted.
ASSUMPTIONS
a. The propellant depot is in the same orbit plane with the OLS and has
the same perigee and apogee.
b. The depot is never further than 200 miles away, and preferably closer
for spacecraft delivery of propellant tothe depot or for transfer of
propellant to a spacecraft.
c. The depot has attitude control at all times in lunar orbit.
d. The depot has its own power supply for pumps for propellant transfer
to and from depot tanks. If the depot does not have its own power,
a considerable demand will then be made on the power system of the
vehicle conducting the propellant transfer.
e. Whole tanks of propellant may be transferred to the using spacecraft;
i.e., tank plus propellant; alternately propellant may be pumped
aboard.
f. The depot has a framework into which the tanks are set. The frame
carries a series of flashing lights and beacons. The frequency for
these beacons are made known to all space-faring nations.
g. All of the depot framework is designed with tethering places and hand
holds so that, if necessary, an EVA astronaut can reach a working
position at any tank connecting link or at any propellant transfer
connection.
h. A separated depot in less than 200 miles from the lunar station,
preferably much closer. It is recommended that a study be conducted
to determine the optimum method(s) for station-keeping for the depot.
i. In the case of a depot attached to a space station, it is in a position
facing the lunar surface and rigidly attached. In the event of such
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a need, that portion of the depot holding the tanks should be separ-
able from the space station.
Unattached, the depot may be rotated to aid in the propellant trans-
fer process.
An entire station with depot attached will not rotate as a unit to
initiate acceleration for propellant transfer.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. Collision between depot and spacecraft.
2. Explosion of a loaded or partially loaded tank due to a meteoroid strike.
3. EVA astronaut on umbilical gets entangled in depot.
4. Tank mishandled when being transferred to depot, 'escapes' to form hazard
in depot - 0LS orbit.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Hazard i, Collision between the _epot and a Spacecraft, is dealt with in
Hazard Study lland is not, therefore, repeated here.
Effects of Hazard 2, Meteoroid strike on propellant tank
An explosion of a propellant tank will result if it is struck by a meteoroid
large enough to penetrate the tank and impart sufficient energy to the pro-
pellant. If such an event occurs at the time that a propellant transfer
operation is underway, the spacecraft involved could be severely damaged or
destroyed. The depot could sustain damage ranging from destruction of the
struck tank to severe degradation of all operations with the depot.
As a result of such an explosion, the safety of other spacecraft crews in
lunar orbit will be endangered by debris that has orbits intersecting those
of such spacecraft.
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Some debris will almost certainly be deorbited so that the crews of vehicles
and shelters on the surface could be struck.
ev
A severe explosion could be generated by a meteoroid strike with the depot
and could cause damage to the attached OLS to the extent of piercing the
main cabin and causing a loss of atmosphere which then endangers the entire
crew. Cabin atmosphere may be lost over periods ranging from minutes to
hours. The latter period implies a puncture repairable, perhaps, with some
of the crew in space suits and others in safe isolatable areas; this level
of problem will not be considered further. The loss of atmosphere measured
in minutes is our present concern. The effects of such an event include:
i. Loss of atmosphere and subsequent loss of crew in ruptured cabin area
unless crew can get to safe compartment soon enough.
2. Loss of communications through debris collision.
3. Severe damage to tugs docked to OLS leading to degradation of rescue
capability.
Corrective Msasures for Hazard 2
Preventive Measures:
1. A propellant depot attached to an OLS should be in the OLS 'shadow'.
This lessens the area for a meteoroid strike on the depot. The depot
would be attached to the OLS on the side facing the lunar surface.
2. A grid s_ould be considered for placement between an OIS _nd s propellsnt
depot so that large debris from any propellant tank explosion will be
deflected or trapped. The grid should 'shadow' all of the OLS plus tugs
parked at end ports of the OLS.
3. Design meteoroid shields into all tankage with shield protection cap-
ability to be maximum obtainable within engineering feasibility and
cost factors as deemed appropriate. Established meteoroid design
criteria should be used.
In addition to protection offered in 3 above, design a detached depot to
maintain gravity-gradient-supported attitude and add a meteoroid shield
to depot frame in horizontal plane on face furthest from lunar surface.
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Remedial Measures:
i. Large chunks of debris with intersecting orbits should be captured by
tug and deorbited to the lunar surface.
2. Prevent collision by capturing large chunks of debris in intersecting
orbits. Eventually capture all debris on intersecting orbits.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
1. Orbiting lunar stations should be compartmented so that multiple areas
exist for t_e crew to go to in the event of one pierced cabin.
2. Rescue will probably be required in the event of a propellant depot
explosion adjacent to an 0LS.
3. If spacecraft at a detached propellant depot are damaged, rescue will
be required.
Effects of Hazard 2, Astronaut Entangled in _epot
An astronaut in EVA mode connected to his spacecraft by long umbilical and
performing operations at propellant depot gets entangled in the propellant
depot and therefore is unable to return to his spacecraft. The astronaut
could run out of consumables and be lost if he is not rescued. In efforts
to free himself, the astronaut may detach his umbilical or rip his spacesuit
and therefore lose oxygen and be asphyxiated.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive Measures:
1. Wear PLSS for all propellant depot EVA operations.
2. Use cherry picker-EVA mode described in Hazard Study 7.
Remedial Measures:
le First aid - resuscitation methods in a safe enclosure should be applied
by fellow astronauts engaged in rescue if the rescuers are late in
arriving. The use of the buddy system will ensure early aid and may be
a preventive method as well. 2-92
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Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
I. If umbilical is to be worn, then also wear a 30 minute PLSS. Cut
entangled umbilical free after activating PLSS and return to spacecraft
immediately.
2. Send second EVA astronaut out to disentangle first astronaut.
Effects of Hazard 4, Mishandled Tank Escapes
One of the suggested methods for attaching loaded tanks to the propellant
depot encompasses the use of manipulators and automatic connectian devices.
Another requires EVA astronauts to connect the tanks. Independent of the
method used for such installation amisstep can lead to the tank floating
free in orbit and consequently presenting a hazard to the depot and other
spacecraft in lunar orbit. The hazard may occur, of course, in detaching
a tank from the depot. The effects that may occur due to a tank floating
free in lunar orbit include:
1. Collision with other spacecraft (including the OLS and the propellant
depot). A derelict in lunar orbit.
2. Collision with the EVA astronaut handling the procedures for attaching
the tank to the depot with resulting injuries to the astronaut.
3. Loss of all the propellant in the tank if it is a full one. It may be
a last available tank and needed for rescue.
Corrective Msasures for Hazard
Preventive Measures:
In delivering or removing a tank to or from a depot, add a design element to
permit tethering to the depot or tug before release from the delivering
spacecraft or release from the depot.
Remedial Measures:
In designing tanks add handles or rails for grasping by the tug in retrieval
procedure, should tank actually float away from the depot.
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Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
None necessary.
Additional information:
Overfilling or underfilling propellant tanks were examined from the hazard/
safety viewpoint. An overfilled tank vents to space, and at worst some pro-
pell_it is lost from one of the tanks involved. Only one propellant is trans-
ferred at a time. Moreover, LOX and LH 2 are not hypergolic. Any escaped pro-
pellant will quickly dissipate in the space environment. If it is spacecraft
tanks that are being filled, there would have to be a double failure to over-
fill; failure of measuring devices on both the depot and the receiving craft.
Additionally, the two measuring devices would have to register equal amounts
dispensed and received in order for the failure to be overlooked by the
monitoring crew members.
The procedures leading to underfilling in either direction - to or from the
depot - would also require two failures with both dispenser and receiver
measuring devices not only failing but showing identical and incorrect
amounts of propellant transferred.
Such double failures together with identical errors on both (failed) measur-
ing devices are thought to be completely unrealistic.
4
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HAZARD STUDY 13
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
le
e
Always tether propellant tanks the depot during delivery, or to tug dur-
ing removal, to prevent these tanks from becoming a collision hazard in
orbit.
EVA astronaut(s) should not use long umbilicals in and about a pro-
pellant depot in order to avoid entanglement of the umbilical with any
part of the depot structure or mechanimms.
3. Propellant depot tankage should be designed with maximum meteoroid
shield protection commensurate with engineeriug feasibility and cost
and penetration depth probability.
4. A propellant depot attached to an orbiting lunar station should be placd
between the OIS and the lunar surface in order to lessen the area of de-
.
o
pot exposed to meteoroid strikes.
To prevent the collision of large pieces of debris with an orbiting
lunar station following a propellant tank explosion, design and emplace
a grid between the propellant depot and the OLS. The grid should
shadow the OLS-docked tugs at the end port.
When a propellant depot is attached to an orbiting lunar station, keep
one tug docked at a transverse port on the side of the OLS away from the
depot to prevent debris from striking the tug in the event of explosion
of a propellant tank.
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HAZARD STUDY 14
INJURY OR DAMAGE DURING CARGO HANDLING IN ORBIT
INTRODUCT ION
The delivery of cargo to the lunar space station or to a tug in lunar orbit
presupposes concern with a number of related problems. These include:
1. Guidance and control good enough to keep rates low to avoid collision
in docking.
2. The imposition of docking hatch size on cargo packages (modules) to
be delivered.
3. Actual delivery mode can include:
a ..... Entire delivery vehicle docks to receiver
b ..... Cargo bay is separated from delivery vehicle and then
docks to receiving vehicle. If the latter, the cargo
module needs separate propulsion, guidance, and control.
4. Whether or not the cargo bay arrives at lunar orbit internally
pre ssuri zed.
Some items such as experiments attached to the space station externally, pro-
pellant, and tanked and pressurized consumables generally are not brought
aboard the lunar space station or other spacecraft in lunar orbit. However,
oxygen for emergency use and some gases associated with experiments, both in
pressurized tanks, are very likely to be brought on board the lunar space-
craft. In particular, oxygen tanks to supply the PLSS's as well as the PLSS
tanks themselves are highly pressurized. No liquids are likely to be pumped
aboard the station due to the deterioration of plumbing connection seals when
corrosiw_ liquids are handled and the subsequent maintenance problems encom-
passed. Non-corrosive, passive liquids (e.g., water) are more easily handle_i
by carrying tanks aboard. Because this study is limited to the cargo handling
itself, a number of assump_ions are made -- not intended to represent a final
system_ but only one of many alternatives -- to establish a scenario for car-
go handling in lunar orbit.
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ASSUMPTIONS
4
I. If cargo is delivered via an unmanned, nuclear prime transport
vehicle (PTV) then the PTV will stand off from the station
about five miles and a manned tug will move the cargo module
from the PTV to the lunar space station. It will be possible
for a crewman to enter the cargo module to aid in the docking
procedure at the station. Ref. I, 2.
2. In order not to impose additional burdens on the lunar space
station all cargo modules arrive pressurized at the level of
the lunar station.
3. There are hatches and docking hardware at both ends of the
cargo modules. Ref. I, 2.
4. Cargo module docking ports are compatible with the Earth space
station as well as the lunar space station; this means port
diameters permitting passage of a 5-foot diameter cylinder.
Ref. I, 2, 3.
5. Crew members handling docking procedures will have visual
access to the cargo module during docking (this is based on
decisions used in the Earth space station studies by North
American Rockwell, Ref. 3.
6. When cargo modules and crew modules arrive together on a PTV
they can be removed by a tug and docked as a unit to the station.
Then the crew can pass through the cargo module into the space
station. This passage is preferred so as to avoid carrying or
moving cargo through the crew module and thus exposing crew
module instrumentation to the possibility of "collision" with
such cargo.
7. Cargo handling is accomplished in a shirtsleeve environment.
Ref. I, 2, 3.
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THEMAJORHAZARD
The major hazard identified is a cargo container (package) which "escapes"
while being manually movedfrom module to station.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of "Escaped" Cargo Package Hazard
An escaped or improperly handled cargo package being moved within a zero g
space vehicle may strike and injure a crew member or damage and disable a
vital subsystem.
Corrective Measures
Preventive Measure s:
I. Except for the size of package that can be comfortably tucked under
one's arm all cargo containers and packages are best constrained
during transfer from the cargo module to the space station or to a
tug. The small package is not likely to be encountered during such
cargo transfer. (It should be observed, however, that if a cargo
module is docked at the station and is used in the pantry concept
many containers are opened in the cargo module for removal of
relatively small packages - small in size and mass - for transfer
to the station or tug).
Assuming that a package is less than 500 lb and has dimensions
such that:
a. An astronaut can "peer" around a package to see his
intended translation path, and
b. will easily pass through the docking hatch, then the
package may be handled by one man.
A package less than 1OO0 lb (but over 500 lb) and less than
20" x 30" x 40" in dimensions should be handled by two men.
.
o
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4. Packagesover 1000 ib (Earth weight) and/or over 20" x 30" x 40"
in size (for a box-like shape) are best movedusing restrain-
ing systems such as the pallet and rails method described in
Ref. I and 2. A detailed humanfactors/engineering analysis
in Ref. 1 is the source of the numbersquoted here.
5. Limit packages to sizes that comfortably pass through the docking
port - observing that handling hardware must also be e_placed in
the open port area.
6. Select techniques of moving cargo packages from their stored
positions in the cargo module to the module transfer-to-
station system that ensure package restraint at all times.
Again, such a system is discussed in Ref. I.
7. For any movementof cargo packages, grasping points are de-
sired. A generous handhold and adequate clearance to reach
the grasping point should be ensured.
No remedial measureshave been identified.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
None required.
DATA SOURCES REFERENCES
A I. Unnumbered LMSC Report, "Space Station Program Interim Logistics
Vehicle Study Report," S. B. Kramer, et al, 9 June 1969; Section
on Cargo Handling - Part II.
2. LMSC-A955317, "Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle (ILRV),"
31 July 1969; Section 12.1.3 on Cargo Handling.
3. Space Station Program, Phase B, Definition, Vol. V, MSC-00720,
N&SA NAS 9-9953; North American-Rockwell, July 1970, and Space
Base Definition, Vol. II, MSC-00712 (part of the Space Station
Program, Phase B, Definition) North American-Rockwell, July 1970.
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HAZARDSTUDY14
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
1. It is strongly recommendedthat cargo packages whosedimensions
exceed 20" x 30" x 40" or whoseEarth weight exceeds SO00pounds
be movedfrom the cargo module to the lunar space station, or to
a tug, using a restraint/transport method such as guide rails.
2. A packagewhoseEarth weight is greater than 500 pounds but less
than 1000pounds and whosedimensions do not exceed 20" x 30" x 40"
should be handled by two crew memberswhenin a zero-g, shirtsleeve
environment.
3. In order for a package to be hsndled by one man in a zero-g shirtsleeve
environments it should: (a) have dimensions permitting comfortable hand-
ling and vision, and (b) be less than 1,500 poundsEarth weight.
4. Cargo containers/packages should be designed to provide generous
grasping points or handholds.
5. In order to minimize hazards associated with cargo handling in
orbit, the pantry technique is recommendedfor receiving cargo. In
such a method the cargo module is docked to a logistics port at the
station, cargo is removedon an as-needed basis, the cargo con-
tainers are opened in the module and the contents removedin separate
pieces as needed. This technique requires entry to the module on a
daily (or more frequent) basis but the handling is reduced, in large
part, to removal of small packages.
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HAZARD STUDY 15
INCORRECT DESCENT OR ASCENT TRAJECTORY OF A MANNED I/JNAR LANDER TUG
INTRODUCTION
During the course of advanced lunar operations there will be many trips to
and from lunar orbit and the lunar surface. As time progresses, such expe-
ditions to the surface are likely to encompass exploration of any location
on the lunar surface that proves of interest, including the far side.
On any trip, the possibility exists of s malfunction of navigation equipment
or data input leading to an unplanned and undesired trajectory. The naviga-
tion type of malfunction is the sole concern of this Hazard Study with propul-
sion and control failures discussed in Hazard Study 16.
AS_IONS
I. Two types of trajectories could occur from 8 navigation malfunction
during descent to, or ascent from, the lunar surface:
a. An undesired lunar surface impact trajectory
b. An unintended orbit about the Moon
2. No propulsion, control, or communication malfunction has occurred.
J
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards are identified as:
i. A navigation failure or input error has placed a tug on an unplanned
impact trajectory with the lunar surface. This may or may not be
evident to the tug crew, but if uncorrected will lead to an unplanned
landing, to landing at the wrong site, or to a crash. Time available
for corrective action may vary from seconds to approximately one hour.
2. A navigation failure or input error has placed a tug in an unplanned,
non-impact orbit trajectory about the Moon. This may or may not be
evident to the tug crew, but if uncorrected may lead to isolation.
Time available for corrective action is on the order of several days.
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ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard I, Impact Trajectory from Navigation Error
An unplanned impact trajectory, if not detected and corrected in time, will
lead to landing at the wrong site or to a crash.
lation, and crew injury or death may result.
Corrective Measures for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
i,
o
Vehicle damage, crew iso-
The tug guidance subsystem should incorporate backup features and
redundancy to provide a high degree of reliability.
The tug crewmen must be provided with manual navigation capability
and trained in manually controlling the tug trajectory at all points
from orbit to landing and return to orbit. The option to assume
manual control must be immediately available at all times.
Remedial measures:
i. Since the tug crewmen may be unable to detect a navigation error
within an acceptable time, the tug trajectory on descent and ascent
should be tracked and status confirmed.
2. Upon detection of a navigation malfunction or error, standard pro-
cedure should call for assumption of manual control by the tug crew
and redirection of the vehicle to a safe orbit. If a landing was
intended, that landing should be abandoned until the navigation sys-
tem is returned to proper operating condition.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
If corrective action is not taken, the tug will land or impact at the wrong
site, with the possibility of tug structural damage and crew injury or death
resulting. A rescue capability would be required to cover this range of pos-
sibilities. If outside tracking was not used, and landed crewmen are unable
to communicate their condition and position, the tug will be extremely diffi-
cult to locate. A crash locator beacon should be mandatory tug equipment.
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Effects of Hazard 2, Undesired Lunar Orbit
An unplanned non-impact trajectory will lead to a safe but undesired orbit
about the Moon. The tug crew will be isolated until trajectory corrections
can be accomplished. Since all systems other than navigation are assumed to
be functioning, and the tug will normally carry life support adequate for
several days' duration, the crew has adequate time for corrective action.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures for Hazard 2 are identical to those for Hazard i.
Remedial Measures :
With the assistance of Earth tracking, determine the trajectory parameters
and the corrections required to return to the orbiting lunar station. Use
manual control, or automatic navigation equipment if repair has been accom-
plished, to return to the lunar station.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
A crew is in a safe but undesired orbit about the Moon, with navigation
failed. Escape is not required. Rescue assistance in the form of naviga-
tion information may be required in order to permit a manually controlled
return to a lunar station in orbit. If manual navigation capability is not
provided, a repair/rescue mission will be required.
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HAZARD STUDY 15
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES
The crewmen of a lunar lander tug must be provided with manual navi-
gation capability and must be trained in manually controlling the
tug trajectory at all points from orbit to landing and return to orbit.
The option to assume manual control must be immediately available at
all times.
All lunar lander tug ascent and descent trajectories shall be tracked
and status confirmed.
Upon detection or notification of a navigation malfunction or trajec-
tory error_ standard procedure shall call for assumption of manual
control by the tug crew and redirection of the vehicle to a safe
orbit°
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HAZARD STUDY 16
LOSS OF PROPULSION OR CONTROL OF MANNED TUG
DURING LANDING OR ASCENT TO ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
During the procedure of ascent from or descent to the lunar surface, the in-
terval with main propulsion active is critical. If lunar lander tug pro-
pulsion fails or attitude control is lost during ascent or descent using some
of the proposed concepts for the tug, the crew will be lost.
ASSUMPTIONS
4
1. Main propulsion or attitude control has failed during ascent from or
descent to the lunar surface.
2. The crew members are all wearing space suits and are on the LSS suit loop
during ascent or descent. (This is an aid if a survivable mishap occurs
wherein the cabin pressure shell is ruptured.)
3. Lunar surface landing commences from a lunar orbit with a perilune of
50,000 feet above the mean lunar surface.
4. Descent insertion commences at an appropriate time before reaching the
50,000 feet altitude point.
5. Main engine on at the 50,000 ft point commits the tug to a landing.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
I. If the tug loses attitude control or does not obtain sufficient _V to
go into a lunar orbit during ascent it will be on an impact trajectory.
If no further steps are taken, the tug will be destroyed and the crew
lost in a lunar surface impact.
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Additionally, in the event of main propulsion failure or loss of attitude
control after a landing procedure is initiated at 50,000 ft the tug will
impact the lunar surface and the crew will be lost if no further action
is initiated.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard I, Loss of Propulsion or Control
If a failure of the tug's main propulsion system occurs during ascent to or
descent from lunar orbit such that the acquired tug velocity is less than that
necessary for orbiting or insufficient for landing, then the tug will impact
the lunar surface. Unless some measure is taken to avoid such an impact the
crew will be lost. Should attitude control fail during ascent or descent the
results will be the same, the crew will be lost if the malfunction cannot be
corrected immediately.
Corrective Measures for Hazard I
Preventive Measures:
I. In order to circumvent the dangers inherent in a main propulsion system
failure, it is suggested that main propulsion consisting of four engines
be operated as redundant, throttleable pairs; with each pair capable of
performing the ascent or_scent function. In this manner a failure in
any one engine leads to cut-off of its mate whereupon the thrust of the
second pair is increased to continue the ascent or descent.
2. Since the main propulsion engines for the tug can be gimballed, it is sug-
gested that the attitude control engines and main engine gimbal control be
designed as separable functions. This will permit the main propulsion en-
gine to supply control for the tug without the use of the primary attitude
control engines should the latter fail. The tug control loops should be
designed to use either control mode separately, or to use both sets of en-
gines acting in concert for control.
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3. Although the requirement for greatly increased funding is recognized,
together with the programmatic implications, an alternate tug design is
suggested for consideration as a measure to countermand propulsion failure.
The tug could be designed as a two stage spacecraft in the manner of the
Apollo Lunar Module, a major difference being that the ascent (upper)
stage is only used if the lower stage propulsion (or other critical sub-
system) fails during ascent (or descent).
4. Redundancy in all critical main propulsion system parts is suggested so
that there are at least two propulsion loops per stage to run the tug
engines.
Remedial measures:
I • For use in events where propulsion failure occurs at very low altitude
(tens of feet above the surface) an emergency communications device,
designed to survive severe impact, should be included in the assemblage
of instrumentation for use when some of the crew survive the impact or
to locate the downed tug.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
I. If there has been a propulsion or control failure at a very low altitude -
tens of feet above the surface - an urgent rescue will be necessary.
2. Other failures considered here lead to loss of the crew - no requirements
for rescue exist•
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
I. Apollo 12 Mission Report, NASA/_C, MSC-01855, March 1970.
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HAZARD STUDY 16
SUMMAEY GF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
.
.
.
.
.
.
The critical nature of lunar lander tug descent and ascent maneuvers de-
mands special attention to items such as redundancy, backup, manual over-
ride_ propellant reserves, control authority, and anytime-abort where
feasible_ in all critical functions and subsystems associated with control
of velocity and attitude.
The main propulsion engines for the tugs in the lunar complex should be
designed as redundant_ diametrically located pairs; throttleable_ with
each pair capable of performing the ascent from and descent to the lunar
surface.
The pilot of a lunar lander tug must be provided the capability to assume
manual attitude control at any time.
The attitude controls on the tug for the lunar complex should be separable
so that either main propulsion (i.e., gimballing engines) or the RCS, or
both could be used for the attitude control function.
Include as part of standard equipment aboard all lunar complex tugs a
lunar-impact-survivable communications beacon that would activate on
impact at some selected acceleration level. In the event of tug impact
its location could then be determined.
All crewmen shall wear space suits and operate on the LSS suit loop dur-
ing ascent and descent between lunar orbit and lunar surface.
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HAZARDSTUDY 17
LOSSOFTUGPROI_LSIONONTHELUNARSURFACE
INTROI_JCTIONANDDISCUSSION
A failure of an ascent propulsion system on the lunar surface will result
in the temporary isolation of the crew. They will be in danger only if
they do not have sufficient life support provisions.
The crew compartmentmust be provisioned to support the crew for a period of
time following a planned return to orbit until s rescue mission can be accom-
plished. Depending on the rescue concept, the emergencystay time require-
ment is estimated to be 7 to 14 days. This would allow a rescue from orbit
at a time of minimumenergy requirement for the descent and ascent.
ESCAPE/RESCUER _JIREMENTS
Rescue is required for a solo crew isolated in the crew compartment of a
failed tug on the lunar surface. A wait time of 7 to 14 days can be provided
the crew while the rescue is accomplished.
I.
.
_Y OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
A capability must be provided to rescue a crew stranded on the lunar
surface because of ascent propulsion module failure.
The crew compartment of a solo vehicle on the lunar surface must be
provisioned to support the crew for a period of time following a
planned return to orbit until a rescue mission can be accomplished.
This time is estimated to be 7 to 14 days.
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HAZARD STUDY 18
LOSS OF TUG CREW COMPARTMENT HABITABILITY ON THE LUNAR SURFACE
INTRODUCTION
The hazards considered are those resulting from a failure of a critical
subsystem in the crew compartment of a solo lunar lander tug on the lunar
surface, or from failure of the pressure shell containing the crew.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. It is assumed that the lunar lander tug includes a pressurized crew com-
partment for several men in a shirtsleeve environment, and an attached
airlock nominally used for egress/ingress.
2. Loss of habitability can occur at any time during the surface mission,
and the crew situation at the time of the emergency could typically be:
a. All crewmen in shirtsleeves inside the cabin.
b. Some crewmen in shirtsleeves in the cabin and some on EVA sortie up
to several miles distant on a non-cabin roving vehicle.
c. Some crewmen in shirtsleeves in the cabin and some are walking EVA
close to the tug.
3. The tug crew compartment is provided with contaminant detection and removal
equipment.
4. All critical life support system components are highly reliable and have
redundant parts.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
io Insufficient time to don space suits following sudden loss of cabin
atmosphere. It is assumed this could occur only following fire or a
meteoroid strike, collision, or explosion that ruptured the cabin pressure
shell.
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2. Inadequate power and life support supply to allow time for subsystem
repair, return to a safe haven in lunar orbit, or rescue from orbit.
3. Illness or incapacitation or deprivation of oxygen following contamina-
tion of cabin atmosphere.
4- Injury following explosion or fire with an internal system such as a
high-pressure gas storage vessel, pyrotechnic, or experimental device.
5. Isolation of crew members on EVA traverse if the tug must return quickly
to a safe haven in lunar orbit to save crew members at the tug.
6. Inability for crewmen to operate the tug and return to orbit in pressure
suits following loss of cabin atmosphere.
ANALYSIS OF THE IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard l, Insufficient Time to Don Space Suits
Insufficient time to don space suits following sudden loss of cabin pressure
will result in loss of the crew unless an emergency compartment or emergency
pressure garment is readily available.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 1
Preventive measures:
1. Provide two separate pressure compartments in each tug crew compartment,
with quick access from one to the other and with pressure suits (or
emergency pressure garments) and PLSS's stored in each. The second
compartment could be ansirlock, with generous dimensions and emergency
life support.
2. Provide emergency pressure garments which can be donned more quickly
than pressure suits. Atmosphere supply for the garments should be
two-gas, if the cabin is two-gas.
3. Keep crewmen in pressure suits at all times, assuming a backup pressurized
compartment or emergency pressure garments are not readily available.
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No remedial measures are identified for Hazard i.
No escape/rescue requirements are identified for Hazard i.
Effects of Hazard 2, Inadequate Power and Life Support Supply
Insufficient emergency power and life support supply to allow subsystem re-
pair, return to station in orbit, or rescue from orbit will result in loss
of the crew following failure of a vital tug subsystem.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
1. Plan each mission sequence such that emergency supplies are always avail-
able to allow time for return to safe haven in orbit or rescue from
orbit, whichever is greater. Preliminary analysis indicates this time is
on the order of 48 hours in the worst case.
2. Use two tugs for each surface mission such that a backup system is always
available.
3. Provide capability for operation and return of the tug to orbit by crew-
men in pressure suits.
Remedial measures:
1. Provide a "care" package from lunar orbit, if this can be accomplished
more quickly than rescue or escape to orbit.
No escape/rescue requirements are identified for Hazard 2.
Effects of Hazard _, Impairment following Contamination
Contamination of cabin atmosphere will result in illness, incapacitation, or
deprivation of oxygen if corrective action is not taken.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive measures:
1. Provide oxygen masks, emergency pressure garments and/or pressure suits,
or separate p_essure compartment and ECS, and immediate use of one of
these, following detection of contaminants.
2. Monitor cabin atmosphere to detect contamination and initiate corrective
action before illness, incapacitation, or oxygen deprivation can occur.
Remedial measures:
1. Don space suits and return to a safe haven in lunar orbit if contamination
cannot be removed.
2. Crewmen suffering from breathing contaminated atmosphere must be provided
clean air, a safe haven, and medical aid.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
Rescue will be required if corrective measures are not taken to prevent illness
or incapacitation.
Effects of Hazard 4, Explosion or Fire
An explosion or fire with an internal system such as a high-pressure gas
storage vessel, pyrotechnic, or experimental device may damage vital sub-
systems, rupture cabin walls, and injure or kill crewmen.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
Preventive measures:
i. The use of hazardous items should be minimized or eliminated by substi-
tution where possible. Where such items are high-pressure gas storage
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bottles, pyrotechnics, and hazardous experimental devices must be car-
ried, they should be separated from the main cabin and from critical
subsystem components by enclosing in vented compartments and structures
designed to contain an explosion or fire.
Explosions in gas storage bottles should be prevented by reliable re-
lief valves and by monitoring to provide warning of excessive pressures,
plus use of manual procedures to vent a malfunctioning bottle.
Achieve reliability and safety by use of adequate safety factors (burst
to operating pressure) in pressure vessel fabrication.
Remedial Measures :
i.
.
.
In the event of fire or explosion, it should be possible to seal quickly
each pressurized compartment separately, and then remotely exhaust the
atmosphere of the compartment containing the fire or explosion. (See Page 2-26)
Fire extinguishers should be provided in each pressurized compartment
of manned vehicles.
Oxygen masks and emergency pressure garments should be available in each
pressurized compartment.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
Escape and rescue will be required in the event of fire or explosion in a
tug crew compartment on the lunar surface.
Effects of Hazard 5, Isolation of Crew Members on EVA Traverse
If the crew members in a tug on the lunar surface must return to orbit quickly
for their own safety, they may have abandoned crew members away from the land-
ing site on traverse. The crewmen on traverse will be isolated, with a limited
life support stay time capability, and will require rescue from lunar orbit.
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Gorreetiv@ M_asures for Hazard
Preventive measures:
I. All crew members on EVA should return to the tug without delay following
notification of an emergency at the tug. This will minimize time delay
in 1_t_trmimg to orbit, if this action is chosen, and require only one set
of rescue operations should rescue be necessary.
2. Emergency life support duration capability on board the lander tug should
always exceed the time required for return of all crewmen to the tugplus
return to a safe haven in lunar orbit. This capability must be estab-
lisheduniquely for eachmission.
3. Use of two tugs for each surface mission such that a backup system is
always available.
Remedial measures:
I. Provide life support and other necessities with the EVA crew on traverse
calculated to assure a safe stay time exceeding rescue time. Perform a
rescue mission.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
IA
Rescue will be required for crewmen abandoned while on traverse away from
the lander tug.
Effects of Hazard 6, Inability to Fly the Tug in Pressure Suits
Inability to fly the tug and return to orbit in pressure suits, following
loss of cabin atmosphere, will leave the crew stranded on the lunar surface
to await rescue.
2-115
LMSC-A984262C
Corrective Measures for Hazard 6
Preventive measures :
Provide capability for operation and return of the tug to orbit by crewmen
in pressure suits.
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard 6.
Escape/Rescue Requirements fQr Hazard 6
Rescue will be urgently required if crewmen are unable to fly the tug in
pressure suits.
4
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HAZARDSTUDY18
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINECANDIDATES
O
i. Each lunar lander tug shall be provided with two separate pressure compart-
ments, with quick access from one to the other and with pressure suits (or
emergency pressure garments) and PLSS's stored in each.
2. Each lunar lander tug shall be provided with emergency pressure garments
which can be donned more quickly than full pressure suits.
3. Crewmen in a solo lunar lander tug on the lunar surface shall remain in
pressure suits at all times if quickly accessible separate pressure
compartments and emergency pressure garments cannot be provided.
4. The lunar lander tug must be flyable by crew members in pressurized space
suit s.
5. No subsystem failure in a lunar lander tug crew compartment shall deprive
the crew of the ability to perform at least one of the following actions :
a. Replace or repair the failed article.
b. Return to a safe haven in orbit.
c. Await rescue.
6. A rescue vehicle should be standing by in lunar orbit at all times during
a solo lunar lander tug mission on the lunar surface.
7. Cabin atmosphere shall be monitored continuously to detect contamination,
and immediate action taken to use either oxygen masks, emergency pressure
garments, pressure suits, or separate pressure compartment and ECS as
appropriate if contaminants are present.
8. Oxygen masks, emergency pressure garments, and pressure suits shall be
provided for use following detection of contaminants in cabin atmosphere.
Availability of a second, separate pressurized compartment and ECS is
also recommended.
9. Standard operating procedures shall require that crew members, on EVA
traverse from a solo lunar lander tug, return to base without delay
following notification of an emergency at the tug.
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i0. Emergencylife support capability on board a solo lunar lander tug shall
always exceed the time required for return of all crewmen to the tug plus
return to a safe haven in lunar orbit. This capability must be established
uniquely for each mission.
ii. Each EVA crew on traverse shall be provided with life support and other
necessities calculated to assure a safe stay time exceeding rescue time.
12. High-pressure gas storage bottles, pyrotechnics, and hazardous experimental
devices shall be separated from the main cabin and from critical subsystem
components by enclosin_ in compartments vented to space and structures de-
signed to help control an explosion or fire.
13. Pressures in high-pressure storage vessels shall be monitored to provide
warning of an impending explosion, and procedures shall be developed to
correct potential hazards so detected.
14. Provision should be made for quickly sealing each pressurized compartment
separately and then remotely exhausting the atmosphere to extinguish a
fire. (gee note Page 2-26)
15. Fire extinguishers shall be provided in each pressurized compartment of
manned vehicles.
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HAZARD STUDY 19
LOSS OF LUNAR SURFACE BASE (LSB) HABITABILITY DURING OCCUPANCY
b
INTR0gJCTION
The lunar surface base will provide living and working facilities on the
lunar surface for scientists and engineers conducting a wide variety of
tasks over an extended period of time, and will provide support for lunar
surface expeditions (Ref. i).
This study analyzes hazards associated with a lunar surface base (_B) that
becomes functionally inoperable or uninhabitable either before or at the
time of initial manning, or while manned.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. A lunar surface base has previously been taken to the lunar surface
unmanned.
2. One or more fully operable lunar lander tugs with crew compartments
are required to be at the surface base site at all times when the
base is manned. The surface-based tugs provide alternate shelter
capability, escape capability, and transportation to an orbiting lu-
nar station for normal and emergency transport requirements (Ref. 2).
3. Access to the ISB crew compartment from the lunar surface will require
an elevator, long ladder, or ramp.
4. Crew compartments are provided with contaminant detection and removal
equa pme nt.
5- All critical life support system components are highly reliable and
have redundant parts.
6. The internal design, functions, and safety of the LSB are the concern
of other studies, and are not examined here.
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TEEMAJORHAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. Insufficient time to don space suits or escape to an adjacent, safe
compartmentfollowing sudden loss of cabin atmosphere. It is assumed
this could happen only following a meteoroid strike, collision, or
explosion that ruptured the cabin pressure shell.
2. Inadequate backup or emergencypower and life support supply to allow
time for subsystem repair, transfer to a nearby safe haven, or to
await arrival of a rescue crew.
3. Illness or incapacitation or deprivation of oxygen following contami-
nation of cabin atmosphere.
4. Injury following explosion or fire with an internal system such as a
high-pressure gas storage vessel, pyrotechnic, or experimental
device.
5. Loss df access from base to surface, or surface to base following
damageto elevator, ladder, or ramp.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i, Insufficient Time to Don Space Suits
Insufficient time to don pressure suits or escape to an adjacent, safe com-
partment following sudden loss of cabin pressure will result in loss of the
crew.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 1
Preventive measures:
1. Escape to a separate pressurized compartment could normally be accom-
plished much more quickly than donning of a pressure suit. Action
must be completed before cabin pressure drops to 1.? psia (Ref. 3).
Thus it is advisable to have multiple pressurized compartments avail-
able, with interconnecting passageway or airlock hatches open at all
times but quickly sealable. According to Ref. l, the LSB is to con-
tain a separate compartment for survival in case of primary compart-
ment failure.
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The compartment(s) selected must have the capability to provide a
safe haven for all crew members present until one of the following
can be accomplished:
a. The base failure can be corrected
bo The crewmen can move to the shelter of a lunar lander Tug crew
compartment.
2. Provision Of an emergency pressure garment that could be donned much
more quickly than a full pressure suit would enhance the ability of
s crewman to safely make repairs or reach a safe haven. This garment
mightbe constructed of nylonor dacron polymer impregnated material
which could be stored under inert conditions in a flat aluminum con-
tainer with "rip-out" sealcovers. The emergency suit would be designed
to operate directly off either the primary base atmosphere SuPply or
bottled supply of the same gas mixture.
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard i
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
Escape to a safe haven will be required, but there should be no need for rescue.
Effects of Hazard 2_ Inadequate Power and Life Support SuPPly
Inadequate backup or emergency power and life support supply to allow time
for subsystem repair, transfer to a nearby safe haven, or to await arrival
of rescue assistance will result in loss of the crew following failure of a
vital station subsystem.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
Each mission sequence must be planned such that a backup or emergency source
of power, life support, and communication capability will be available at all
times so that following loss of primary source, the crew can proceed to a
safe haven unassisted or await rescue, whichever time is greater. It is as-
sumed that lunar lander tugs, stationed 1 to i_2 nm from the ISB, will always
be available as a safe ha_en.
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard 2.
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Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Rescue of a crew in a lunar surface base with inadequate power and life sup-
port supplies may be required if lunar lander tugs are not standing by as
safe havens.
Effects of Hazard 3, Impairment followina Contamination
Contamination of cabin atmosphere will result in illness_ incapacitation, or
deprivation of oxygen if corrective action is not taken.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 3
Preventive measures:
i. Provision of oxygen mask, emergency pressure garments and/or pressure
suits_ or separate pressure compartment and ECS, and immediate use of
one of these, following detection of contaminants.
2. Monitoking of cabin atmosphere to detect contamination and initiate
corrective action before illness, incapacitation, or oxygen depriva-
tion can occur.
Remedial measures:
i. Outside assistance_ or temporary abandonment of the station may be
required if contamination cannot be removed.
2. Crewmen suffering from breathing contaminated atmosphere must be pro-
vided clean air, a safe haven, and medical aid.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 3
Rescue will be required if corrective measures are not taken to prevent ill-
ness or incapacitation from contamination.
Effects of Hazard 4_ Explosion or Fire
An explosion or fire may have hazardous effects similar to Hazards 1 and 3,
plus the following:
I. High-pressure gas storage bottles_ pyrotechnics, and hazardous experi-
mental devices should be separated from the main cabin and from vital
subsystems components by structures designed to contain an explosion
or fire. 2-122
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2. Pressures in high-pressure storage vessels should be monitored to
provide explosion warning_ and procedures developed to correct poten-
tial hazards.
3- Where multiple pressure compartments are provided in a system_ crew
members should not all occupy one compartment at one time.
4. Provision should be made in station design for sealing each pressur-
ized compartment separately and then exhausting the atmosphere to
extinguish a fire.
5. Fire extinguishers should be provided in each pressurized compartment.
Remedial measures:
Crewmen injured by explosion or fire will require immediate medical assistance_
provision of pure atmosphere_ and removal to a safe haven.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
A crewman injured by fire or explosion must escape or be rescued and provided
a safe haven and medical aid. Removal to Earth may be necessary for adequate
treatment.
Effects of Hazard _ Loss of Access between Surface and Base
Loss of access from base to surface_ or surface to base_ could result in en-
trapment of base crewmen, denial of access to base crewmen for assistance or
rescue_ and denial of a safe haven to EVA personnel returning to the base.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 5
Preventive measures:
The lunar surface base should be provided with alternate access ports and
alternate access/escape routes. Alternate means for transporting incapaci-
tated crewmen both from surface to base and from base to surface should be
provided.
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard 5.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 5
No escape or rescue requirements are identified.
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HAZARD STUDY 19
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
Provision shall be made to remotely activate and check out a lunar
surface base which has been taken to the lunar surface by an unmanned
lunar landing tug.
A crew sent to activate a defective unmanned lunar surface base shall
be provided with pressure suits and PLSS units, repair parts and tools,
portable battery powered lights, and specific procedures for inspec-
tion and repair°
Each lunar surface base shall have more than one pressurized compart-
ment capable of supporting the crew. Hatches to interconnecting pas-
sageways or airlocks shall be kept open at all times, but be quickly
sealable in an emergency.
Each lunar surface base shall have parked near the site space tug vehi-
cles with crew compartments, propulsion modules, and instrument units capa-
ble of housing and supporting the entire base crew and escaping to orbit.
Each lunar surface base mission sequence shall be planned such that a
backup or emergency source of power, life support, and communication
capability is available at all times so that following loss of a pri-
mary source, the crew can proceed to a safe haven unassisted or await
rescue, whichever time is greater.
Cabin atmosphere in a lunar surface base shall be monitored at all
times to detect contaminants and permit corrective action to be taken
before illness, incapacitation, or oxygen deprivation can occur.
Each lunar surface base shall provide oxygen masks and emergency
pressure garments at each crew station, pressure suits and PLSS units
for each crew member, and immediate use of these or escape to a separ-
ate compartment following detection of contaminants in the atmosphere.
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High-pressure gas storage bottles, pyrotechnics, and hazardous experi-
mental devices shall be separated from the main cabin of a lunar sur-
face base, and from critical subsystems components by enclosing in
compartments vented to space, and in structures designed to help con-
trol explosion or fire.
Pressures in high-pressure storage vessels shall be monitored to pro-
vide warning of an impending explosion, and procedures shall be devel-
oped to correct potential hazards so detected.
Where multiple pressure compartments are provided in a system, crew
members shall not all occupy one compartment at one time.
Provision shall be made in lunar surface base design for quickly seal-
ing each pressurized compartment separately, and then exhausting the
atmosphere to extinguish a fire. (See Note Page 2-26)
Fire extinguishers shall be provided in each pressurized compartment
of manned vehicles.
Each lunar surface base shall be provided with alternate access ports,
alternate access/escape routes, and alternate means for transporting
incapacitated crewmen from surface to base, and from base to surface.
Careful attention should be given to the use of non-flammable materials
in the lunar surface base design, and the atmosphere provided should be
two-gas. Hazardous materials should be handled in a specially desig-
nated area.
2-126
LMSC-A984262C
o
HAZARD STUDY 2O
STUDY OF OPERATIONS IN AND AROUND THE LUNAR SURFACE BASE
INTRODUCTION
A lunar surface base constitutes a complex system having a large number of
interactions analogous to a multi-loop feedback system. Activities that will
occur in the establishment and operation of a lunar base will commence with
delivery of site-preparation vehicles and materials, and will be followed by
delivery, unloading, and location of the lunar base modules. Initial start-up
and checkout of base systems will then occur through use of an umbilical, for
example, connected to a tug on the surface acting as a temporary shelter for
the initial crew. The crew will then begin lunar operations and conduct sci-
entific and engineering studies as scheduled in the mission program. These
activities will encompass base and vehicle (e.g., the rovers) ingress/egress
procedures, layout of instrumentation - typified by setting up radio astron-
omy and X-ray telescopes - and a variety of rover and lunar flyer traverses
to remote sites for exploratory purposes.
A nuclear reactor may be chosen for the generation of electrical power. The
SNAP 8 system, supplying a nominal 35 kw of electrical power, is a likely
initial candidate for this function. This study will assess the impact, from
the potential hazards viewpoint, to the manned lunar mission of the presence
of such a nuclear power system.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. From an orbiting lunar space station a crew will descend to the lunar
surface in a tug and complete site preparation at the selected loca-
tion for the lunar surface base.
2. The nuclear reactor power plant will arrive at lunar orbit and be
delivered to the surface base area, prepared for operation and kept
in a quiescent state until the lunar base modules have arrived and
are set up, ready for checkout.
3. Auxiliary vehicles such as the rovers and flyers will arrive as sched-
uled in the NASA mission plans.
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THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
I. Damage to personnel shelters (i.e., the base) and injury to crew
members by ejecta thrown up by the engine plumes of the tug as it
nears the lunar surface.
2. Module handling leading to tip-over and injury or damage during
arrival and location of lunar base modules.
3. Accident while handling and setting up large structures for research
purposes while in an EVA mode.
4. Fire in a lunar surface base.
5o Release of fission products from the reactor after sustained full
power operation.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i_ Damage from Ejecta
Tug rocket engine plumes will impinge on the lunar surface during landing or
liftoff and give rise to ejecta from the surface which, in turn_ could strike
lunar vehicles parked nearby, the lunar base, or crew members in an EVA mode.
Such strikes could injure EVA crew members and/or damage the base, thus im-
periling life support for the crew.
Corrective Measures for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
i. Locate tug landing areas away from the ISB, the optimum distance to be
determined by study. Current studies suggest i to ll/2nautical miles.
2. Prepare landing sites for the tugs at lunar surface base sites so as
to prevent ejecta before and at touchdown or liftoff.
3. Forbid EVA activity near the base during tug landings or departures.
No remedial measures are identified for Hazard i.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
None are identified.
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Recommendations for Further Study
It is recommended that studies be conducted to determine the optimum dis-
tance that tug landing areas should be located with respect to the LSBo
Additionally, techniques should be evolved for assuring that there are no
lunar ejecta due to plume impingement whenever tugs land or depart. That is,
a method of preparing a permanent landing pad should be evolved. Minimum
landing distance should then be a function of landing pad preparation.
Effects of Hazard 2, Module Tip-over
At least one mode of providing an LSB involves the "assembly _ of a group of
modules landed on the lunar surface° These modules would have to be moved
to a common location, and this would be unnecessarily difficult if done un-
manned. Some sort of rover would have to be used, and as a consequence the
procedures of loading the modules, moving them to a selected location_ and
unloading them would present the potential hazard of tipping over and causing
injury or death to one or more crew members. Tipping over could result from
making too sharp a turn, striking and attempting to ride over a large rock,
entrapping a wheel in a small crater, or from wheel or rover structural failure°
If the ISB is brought to the surface in a single unit, there still remains
the task of locating and erecting scientific equipment, some of which is
physically large and heavy, such as radio astronomy and X-Ray and optical
telescopes. The modules for this equipment will also require location at
specific sites other than their respective landing sites.
hazard noted above will exist in these cases also.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures :
1.
The potential
The movement of modules once loaded aboard a '_rover" could be conducted
remotely by crew members traveling with, but not close to or aboard,
the module carriers. The crew members could ride a separate rover far
enough from the module to avoid it completely in case of tip-over, but
close enough (i.e., leading it) to guide it around hazards.
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e Modules landed already emplaced on a rover would avoid loading on the
Moon and would reduce the task to unloading only. If the modules
arrive mounted on the chassis of a tracked or wheeled vehicle, then
they can be driven to the set-up location and connected as required°
Differential ground heights can be adjusted through the use of jacks
which are mechanically fixed after adjustments to accommodate module
connection at the final site for the LSB.
Remedial measures:
If a module tips over and strikes a crewman, he will be injured and will need
a rover vehicle and stretcher to bring him to a safe haven where his injuries
can be treated. If he is pinned beneath the module, a winch and cable com-
bination or similar mechanism will be required to free him.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Should a module or other large piece of equipment tip over during its move-
ment to an operational site and injure or pin a crew member to the surface,
rescue will be necessary.
Effects of Hazard 3, Accident while Setting up Large Structures
The problems involved in setting up large structures for research purposes
while in an EVA mode are essentially the same as those in Hazard 2, with the
additional problem of avoiding entanglement with large structures like anten-
nas (whether Yagi-type, or dish wide-mesh type, or multiple helices), or large
solar arrays, or with wiring assemblies that form complex arrangements on the
surface, or close enough to the surface to pose the entanglement hazard.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 3
Preventive measures:
i. All of the preventive measures of Hazard 2 apply.
2. Operations in setting up complex structural networks such as antennas
should be designed so as to avoid having a crew member work (with his
PLTS or other devices attached to him) in a back-to-back mode in order
to avoid physical entanglement.
a
4&
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3- Laying out cable or wiring on the lunar surface in concert with set-
ting up equipment should be accomplished so as to avoid foot entangle-
ment. This maybe done by burying cables or wires, by laying equip-
ment and attached wires in a straight line or other pattern which
avoids any but simple crossing (of the cable, etc. ) during set-up/
conduct of the experiment, or by stringing vires on poles.
4. Working in (at least) pairs, fellow 8stronauts can avoid entanglements
by carrying equipment, cables, wiring between them, and so avoid drap-
ing these over one man with the inherent possibilities of becoming en-
snared.
5. When working at substantial distances from the LSB, a small shelter
with supplies and first aid equipment should be available on site.
This shelter could be a cabin rover.
Remedial measures :
Complex structures should be moved and set up by astronauts working in groups_
at least in pairs - the buddy system - in order that aid will be immediately
available in the event of a mishap.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 3
An astronaut entangled in cabling, wiring, or complex structure may need aid
to free him.
Effects of Hazard 4, Fire
During the course of conducting experiments, or of performing maintenance/repair
functions in the lunar surface base, inadvertent crossing of wires_ short cir-
cuits, accidental mixing of hypergolic chemicals, inadvertent detonation of
pyrotechnics, and similar incidents might lead to a fire.
A fire in the LSB is very serious since a fire of any consequence will leave
little time for remedial action before the affected compartment(s) is heavily
involved. The effects of a fire include injury or death of crew members, de-
struction of equipment vital to the life support of crew members, and failure
of the pressure shell of the compartment, thus exposing the crew to the vacuum
and a severe temperature decrease in the affected compartment.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
Preventive measures:
1. Very severe requirements for non-combustibility of materials used in
constructing the LSB should be imposed to the maximum extent possible.
2. To the maximum extent practical:
a. Relegate all handling and storage of hypergolic chemical com-
binations to a separate lunar shelter, or rule them out of use
in the LSB altogether.
b. Minimize handling and use of pyrotechnic devices inside the LSBo
Co Use "trays '_ to carry wiring and cables totally separated from
traffic so as to minimize damage by collision, entanglement,
wetting by chemicals, etc°
d. Use a two-gas atmosphere, oxygen and nitrogen, so as to have a
heat-abs orbin_ diluent.
e. In order to avoid the need for soldering wiring, all wire con-
nections should be arranged through the use of fasteners. This
general philosophy should be applied throughout the LSB to con-
necting plumbing, structures, etc.
fo Fluids used in the LSB cooling system should be totally non-
combustible, even in pure oxygen.
g. Smoking by any personnel should be completely forbidden.
h. If propellants are stored on the lunar surface, they should be
kept well removed from the ISB so that an accident (explosion,
etc. ) involving the stored propellants does not propagate to the
base.
Remedial measures :
1. The I_B should be designed so that it is divided into two or more
isolatable compartments. An optimum distribution of space suits and
portable oxygen masks should be determined° Then compartments involved
in fire can be vented or flooded with nitrogen (or CO 2 stored from meta-
bolic waste) while the crew takes refuge in a safe compartment and
attempts to control the fire and damage from this safe area.
(See note Page 2-26)
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2. A compartment involved with fire could be flooded with nitrogen and
simultaneously vented while keeping pressure at somespecified level.
This can be done with the crew wearing portable oxygen masks.
3. Developmentof special fire extinguishers which would minimize or
have zero contaminants resulting from use of such an extinguisher
is recommended.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
i. The crew of an LSB damaged by fire can leave it and return to lunar
orbit via a tug which is parked nearby on the lunar surface.
2. If crew members are in a closed isolated compartment without direct
access to the outside (i.e., without passing through the fire-involved
compartment) they will have to be rescued.
3o If the LSB has a fire, EVA astronauts will either be able to go to s
parked tug or, if they are needed, assist in extinguishing the fire
and aiding crewmen in the base.
4. Astronauts out on a rover or flyer traverse will have to be informed
of the fire; they then may:
a. Return (if they are close by) to fight the fire and render
as sistance
b. Return to the LSB and take the tug to lunar orbit.
c. Agree to rendezvous at some selected point for rescue.
m
Effects of Hazard 5, Nuclear Radiation
A lunar surface base may draw primary electrical power from a nuclear power
supply. The most severe nuclear power accident source which might be con-
sidered credible is the release of fission products from the reactor-shield
assembly after sustained, full-power operation (Ref. i). Such an event might
be initiated by a leak in the primary NaK loop which would result in NaK
boiloff. This could cause partial - and perhaps complete - meltdown of the
core due to afterheat generation. This would lead to fission products escap-
ing from the power plant. It is believed reasonable to expect that most of
the fission products would be confined to the immediate location of the power
plant o
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The consequencesof the postulated accident have been estimated, based on
occurrence after one year of sustained operation at a thermal power of 400 kw.
The gammaray source strength data were obtained from additional references
given in Ref. l, and the separation distance required to limit the integrated
dose to 50 REMin a 14-day period was calculated for various degrees of fission
product release. The results are given in Table I.
Table I
Postulated Accident Occurrence (Ref. i)
Case Separation distance req'd 14-day dose
for 50 REM in 14 days (ft) at 200 ft _EM)
i. All fission products released
from shield, but contained
with vehicle that landed the
power plant
2. Only gaseous fission products
released from shield, but con-
tained within landed vehicle
3- All fission products released,
but contained within shield
4. Only gaseous fission products
released, but contained within
shield
2,000 50
900 i0
900 i0
4oo 2
Q
The information in Table I is sufficient to indicate tha_ only lack of know-
ledge of the nuclear accident would endanger any member of the I_B crew to
any substantial degree, since he could conceivably walk into the irradiated
area.
A consequence as serious as irradiation is the loss of electrical power for
the LSB in the event of power source failure. The loss of many functions
will occur if power fails. Such a loss could place the LSB crew in jeopardy
because of the cascading effects on life support, communications, and other
subsystems.
8
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 5
Preventive measures:
1. A series of strategically placed counters and dosimeters (for gammas,
neutrons, and other possible particles) in an alarm circuit would
provide a constant warning system for the ISB so that radiation levels
just outside the nuclear power plant, and at selected distances from
it, could constantly be monitored and the crew warned of hazardous
conditions.
2. Delivery of the power plant as a unit permanently emplaced in a land-
ing vehicle and landed inside a designated crater is suggested as a
delivery mode to minimize hazards in both delivery and operation.
Alternately, a scraper blade on a large lunar rover could cut out a
ramp to a designated crater, and the palletized or skid-mounted power-
plant-in-vehicle could be towed down the ramp into the selected crater;
the breached crater wall would later be reconstructed before reactor
start-ups. Reference 1 states that a power plant emplaced on a lunar
landing vehicle can be designed so that only minor tasks remain before
startup of the reactor. The emplacement in a crater reduces the radi-
ation hazard to the crew of the LSB to a great degree.
3. In order that the crew not be faced with the consequences and hazard
of no electrical power in the event of power plant failure, a tug
should be parked near the LSB for evacuation and return of the crew
to the lunar space station.
An alternale to No. 3, a_ove, is the provision of secondary (emergency)
power sources usable until primary power is restored. The provision
of such second sources should be a certainty.
Another alternative, whose study ought to be considered, is the pro-
vision of not one, but two nuclear power plants for the LSBo If used,
these should be widely separated, and each run a_ half-power, whereupon
the immediate availability of one is at hand should the other malfunc-
tion. The costs implied, as well as the inherent advantages of such
a system, must be considered.
e
.
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Remedial measures:
io Remedial measuresfor serious radiation exposure probably implies
return to Earth for treatment, whereasminor exposure is likely to
be treated at the LSB or at the lunar space station.
2. Repair of a malfunctioned nuclear power source is discussed at length
in Reference i. Suffice it to state here that, at least in the early
years of operation, capability for repairs will be rather limited.
ADDITIONALINFORMATION
Someideas on lunar surface base configuration that improve safety are pre-
sented in Appendix E, Supplemental Data Report No. 3.
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i. Design Requirements for Reactor Power System for Lunar Exploration;
LMSC/677879,Vol. II: LMSC,Sunnyvale, Calif., September1967
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70MA5828_July 1970, pp 19 - 27
3- Lunar Base Synthesis Study - First Interim Progress Report; North
American Rockwell, October 1970
4. Lunar Staytime Extension Module; GoodyearAerospace Co., GER-12246
5. Internal Memo: NASAHeadquarters, Gangler to Goldberg, October 1966
6. LESADeploymentProcedures, LMSC/A665606; LMSC_Sunnyvale, Calif.
February 1965
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HAZARDSTUDY20
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
a
in
.
o
.
.
.
.
.
Landing pads should be prepared for tugs visiting a lunar surface base
at the earliest possible time after initiating LSB activity.
The movement of large pieces of equipment, or of modules, on the lunar
surface should be accomplished with the astronaut nearby and guiding
and controlling such movement, but not aboard the carrying vehicle.
Thus, in the event of module transport vehicle upset, tip-over, etc.,
he will not be trapped or injured.
The buddy system, or presence of a safety man, should be used in set-
ting up large equipment on the lunar surface, so that EVA astronaut
entanglement (e.g., wires) is minimized as a hazard, and so that im-
mediate aid is available if needed.
Very severe requirements for use of non-flammable materials used in
lunar surface base construction should be observed.
Enough tugs should always be available at a lunar surface base to
evacuate the entire crew to lunar orbit should the LSB have to be
abandoned.
The following items are forbidden in, or very close to, the LSB:
a. handling or storage of hypergolic fluids
b. handling or storage of pyrotechnic devices
c. combustible fluids in the thermal control system
d. dangerous chemicals
e. bacteriological experiments
A fire extinguishing system should be designed to flood any fire-in-
volved compartment with nitrogen or other non-combustible gas. A
fail-closed vent system should be used in concert with the fire ex-
tinguishing system to rid an involved compartment of contaminants.
Space suits and PISS's should be readily available at strategic
locations in the LSB for use in emergencies.
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Crew smoking shall be prohibited at all times on lunar missions.
A nuclear power source used to generate electrical power shall be
stationed at least 2,000 feet from the LSB -- preferably in a crater
whose walls are higher than the reactor container, and that have been
thickened by moving soil.
Secondary power sources should be available for the LSB in the event
of nuclear source malfunction. Such secondary sources should be
adequate to maintain all life support and essential communications
functions until repairs are made, or rescue or return to orbit effected.
Life support umbilicals for oxygen, communications, power, contaminant
and thermal control_ etc., shall be provided at selected areas of the
exterior of the LSB. These shall be adequately marked and lighted at
night. Moreover, an internal display panel shall indicate actual use
of each such umbilicalo
It is recommended that the LSB have provisions to permit shirtsleeve
transfer to and from the cabin rover.
The airlocks, doors, hatches, elevators, etc., for the LSB shall be
large enough to accommodate al least one stretcher case, plus one
crewman wearing a total EVA mobility unit°
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HAZARD STUDY 21
ACCIDENT OR IMPAIRMENT TO A ROVING VEHICLE
INTRODUCTION
J Major safety concerns associated with lunar surface operations occur as a
result of hazards imposed by critical roving vehicle subsystem failures.
Major subsystems that will be considered are mobility, navigation and life
support. Communications are discussed elsewhere. In addition to mechanical
or electrical failures of major subsystems, vehicle impairment due to acci-
dents will be considered, e.g., collisions or immobilization due to some
physical lunar surface "trap."
These hazards will be discussed for two major classes of lunar vehicles:
I. Small, non-cabin, rovers with short range capability where life support
is provided by portable life support backpacks.
2. Large, cabin type rovers with long range capability and life support pro-
visions which permit a shirtsleeve environment within the cabin.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. Small, non-cabin rovers will operate within walk-back range of a shelter.
2. Large cabin type rovers will operate beyond walk-back range of the lunar
base of operations.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. A lunar rover vehicle is immobilized due to a mobility subsystem failure
or physical entrapment, stranding the crew beyond walk-back distance.
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2. A failure associated with a lunar roving vehicle navigation subsystem
isolates the crew.
3. A system failure on a lunar roving vehicle deprives the crew of life
support.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard I, Crew Stranded Peyond Walk-back Distance
le Vehicle mobility failures affect astronaut safety differently as a func-
tion of distance from a safe shelter. If small, non-cabin vehicles are
incapacitated by a mobility failure, the astronaut(s) should be able to
walk back to the shelter, based on the assumption that lunar sorties for
these small vehicles are limited in range accordingly. Immobilization of
large, cabin type vehicles presents the danger of stranding two or more
astronauts beyond walking distance of a safe shelter. Furthermore, the
possibility shoald be considered that the vehicle immobilized due to an
accident may injure the astronauts, as well as the vehicle.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 1
Preventive measures:
i. Vehicle Design - The large cabin rovers should be designed to contain both
a primary driving station in the forward cabin area and an emergency re-
dundant driving station in the aft airlock area. In addition, the pri-
mary driving station should be designed for a two man "pilot/copilot"
operation with one man able to conduct all essential functions in an
emergency mode operation. Similarly, two man small non-cabin rovers
sheuld be operable by one man, but permit vehicle control takeover by
either of the two crew members.
Other safety design features include:
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a. Incorporation of a roll bar in cabinless rovers to prevent injury to
the astronaut in the event of vehicle overturn.
b. Incorporation of terrain slope warning indicators at the driver's
station to inform the astronaut that the slope being attempted is
approaching the limits of the vehicle's capabilities.
c. Seat and shoulder restraints for adequately securing the astronauts
to their stations over "rough" terrain.
Lunar surface hazard detection - The possibility exists that a rover
could become immobilized by dropping into a crater or through a weak
crustal surface. In the former case, preventing is largely accomplished
by providing adequate forward unobstructed visibility and illumination
aids, as required. The latter case may require hidden cavity sensors
installed on booms as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Cabin Type Rover
Sensor Head on
Retractable Bo?
Fig. I Hidden Cavity Sensor Concept
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. Planning traverses to reduce hazards - Traverse planning that makes
maximum use of the roving vehicle's capability to accomplish the scien-
tific goals of the mission must also consider ways to reduce the hazards
of exploration. Traverse paths can be designed to minimize distance
from a safe haven. For example, a circular traverse, starting from a
base located on the periphery of the circle, separates the vehicle from
the base for a much greater extent of the traverse than one in which the
base is located within the center of a planned circular traverse.
. Multiple vehicle expeditions - Another approach which reduces vehicle
distance from a safe haven is to employ two vehicles making simultaneous
traverses which complament each other. Although each vehicle would ex-
plore different territoritie_ the distance from one vehicle to the other
would be less than that of either vehicle to the lunar base from which
the expedition originated. In this manner each vehicle would serve as
a redundant support and rescue vehicle for the other in the event of an
emergency.
e Supply caches - Another means for reducing the risks of being immobilized
and isolated beyond a safe walk-back distance is to establish a series of
depots containing a variety of life support/mission extension equipment.
These depots could be strategically located at various points along the
lunar traverse so that at no point would the astronauts be beyond walking
distance from one depot to the other. Typical items that might be stored
in such depots would include: Food, water, spare backpacks, fuel cells,
batteries, medical supplies, radio and communication equipment, naviga-
tional aids, and critical vehicle spares.
Remedial measures:
i. Fmch crew on traverse should carry redundant communication equipment,
radio beacons, and visual signal devices to aid in rescue.
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Escape/Rescue Requirement for Hazard I
If a lunar rover crew is stranded beyond walkback distance, rescue will be
required.
Effect s of Hazard 2, Isolated Crew
Navigation system failures could lead to deviations from predetermined
traverse plans with a resultant lengthening of the mission beyond available
supplies of expendables, i.e., fuel and life support provisions. Lack of
"true" information regarding the position, heading and distance from a lunar
base of operations will also hamper rescue operations.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
b
The navigation back-up should be independent of the ability to communicate.
In addition, crewmen out on a lunar traverse should be provided with visual
and auditory signalling aids to help rescue parties locate their position.
These aids should consist of such items as rocket rescue beacons, deployable
emergency antennas, reflecting sphere (visual and R F) and position indi-
cator flags. Similarly, the base should radiate visual and auditory signals
to facilitate a correct and expeditious emergency return to base. Depending
on the point at which a navigation system failure occurs, and the available
fuel reserves, the most advantageous course of action may simply be for the
vehicle to retrace its path back to the lunar base. There should be no
problem in visually following tracks made on the lunar surface since lunar
surface characteristics (tracks) are very stable.
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Remedial Measures:
Each crew on traverse should carry redundant communication equipment, radio
beacons, and visual signal devices to aid in rescue.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
A rescue mission will be required to retrieve those astronauts who have been
stranded due to navigation errors.
Effects of Hazard 3, Loss of Life Support
Failures associated with the large rover cabin life support system will cause
an abort of a lunar traverse mission and may jeopardize the lives of crewmen
should backup systems be depleted before rescue or a return to base can be
effected. Failures associated with portable life support systems utilized
with small oabinless rovers are discussed in Hazard Study 23.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 3
Preventive measures:
Life support system failures may arise which lead to the contamination of the
cabin atmosphere, or loss of pressure or discontinuity in the supply of
breathing gases. In each of these cases, the astronaut should don his space
suit and rely on a suit loop supply for the abort mode return back to base.
A second level of redundancy would consist of utilization of available por-
table life support systems. An airlock, or dual safe compartment, is impor-
tant in allowing the astronauts time to don their space suits. Additionally,
if the airlock contains an emergency driving station, the astronauts can
seal off a main compartment which is contaminated or ruptured and proceed
back to the base by operating the large rover from the airlock emergency
statlon.
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Remedial measures:
i. Timely external assistance to provide life support.
,J
o
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 3
A subsystem failure which brings life support capability to less than that
required to reach a safe haven unassisted will have caused a requirement for
rescue.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
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Daytona Beach, June '70 - see Appendix
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HAZARD STUDY 21
SvJMM/kRY OF SAFETY GUIDELINE CANDIDATES
i. The use of two independent vehicles, each capable of assisting the other
should an emergency occur, is recommended for long traverses with cabin-
type rovers. Each rover must be capable of returning all crewmen to a safe
haven.
2. Non-cabin lunar surface rovers shall not operate beyond walk-back distance
to a safe haven, unless such rovers are operated in pairs with each capable
of supporting the other and returning all crewmen to a safe haven.
3. All lunar surface rovers shall be capable of operation_ driving, life sup-
port, communication, etc., with crewmen wearing pressurized suits.
4. Each roving vehicle shall be completely operable and drivable by a single
crewman.
5. It is recommended that an emergency driving station be provided in the air-
lock of cabin-type rovers.
6. Methods and devices for detecting hidden cavities in the lunar surface ahead
of a moving lunar rover should be developed.
7. A series of depots or caches where critical supplies are stored along a
planned lunar traverse route shall be considered in mission planning.
8. Navigation aids to lunar surface crews shall be capable of continuing oper-
ation even in the event of complete communications loss.
9. Lunar surface roving vehicle design features should include lap belts and
shoulder restraints, roll bars or similar protection from injury in the
event of vehicle overturn, and surface slope warning indicators.
i0. A rescue plan shall be available in detail prior to each operational sur-
face traverse mission.
ii. Doors, hatches, and airlocks on cabin-type roving vehicles shall be capable
of accommodating a stretcher case plus a fully suited crewman.
12. Lunar surface rovers shall carry redundant communications equipment radio
beacons, and visual and auditory signalling devices to aid in rescue.
13. Roving traverses should be planned to minimize distance from a safe haven
while making maximum use of the vehicle's capability to accomplish scienti-
fic exploration.
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HAZARD STUDY 22
PERSONNEL ACCIDENT OR IMPAIRMENT DURING SURFACE EVA
INTRODUCTION
The performance of tasks on the lunar surface associated with a transient or
permanent lunar base will involve EVA operations and there will be astronaut
interfaces with a wide spectrum of equipment and vehicles. These include:
a. Scientific equipment emplacement and operation, frequently at
distances exceeding two miles from the base.
b. Lunar base and lunar vehicle maintenance, servicing, and repair.
c. Deep drilling for subsurface cores in connection with seleneological
studies.
d. Operating open rovers and lunar flyers.
e. Loading modules and/or equipment onto or off of vehicles.
Potential hazards associated with the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) are
discussed in Hazard Study 23. Hazards due to the presence of lunar dust are
discussed in Hazard Study 32 while the problems of lunar surface visibility
and commnnications are discussed in Hazard Studies 26 through 30.
ASSUMPTI ONS
le
.
The buddy system in EVA is not considered to be limited to astronauts
in pairs.
A malfunction in one astronaut's primary com_Anication system (with the
base) during EVA will not be cause for returning to base so long as he
can communicate with his 'buddy' astronaut. Failure in both of their
primary communications systems will be sufficient cause for mandatory
return to base.
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3. For activity more than one mile from the base EVAastronauts will norm-
ally use a vehicle to take them to the site of the activity.
THEMAJORHAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. Malfunction of life support system.
2. Suddenillness leading to nausea and/or vomiting (this hazard is dealt
With in Hazard Study 35.
3. Entanglement with equipment (this hazard is dealt with in part in Hazard
Study 2O).
4. Injury resulting in bone fracture or flesh wound.
5. Rover or flyer accident leading to Hazard 4 plus unconsciousness.
6. Contamination by fluid that is corrosive to space suit or suit parts.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i, Life Support System Malfunction
The effects of a life support system (LSS) malfunction could include loss of
thermal control, denial of oxygen or metabolic water, failure to remove
contaminants, or a combination of any of these events. They are all serious,
although the loss of oxygen must be considered critical. The loss of any
of the functions for any length of time would result in illness, at least,
while the denial of oxygen would result in the loss of the astronaut.
Corrective Measures for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
i. Au emergency supply of oxygen should be available for each astronaut
to permit him to get to a safe haven in the event of malfunction of his
main supply. The option of manually activated supply for the emergency
oxygen should be given the astronaut.
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2. An emergency power supply should be available to run essential functions
for life support long enough for the astronaut to get to a safe haven
in the event of primary power supply failure.
3. An emergency contaminant removal supply should be available under the
conditions as for item i above.
Remedial measures:
i. The buddy system should always be used so that short term supplies are
available; that is, the astronaut whose system has malfunctioned should
be able to plug into his fellow astronaut's LSS.
2. Any failure in the LSS should require an immediate, mandatory return to
a safe haven.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard I
I. The buddy system provides an escape method from the LSS malfunction
although only for a limited time.
2. If anything but the oxygen portion of the LSS malfunctions there exists
some limited time for rescue.
Hazard 2 is discussed in detail in Hazard Study 35 and not repeated here.
Effects of Hazard 2, Entanglement With Equipment (See Photograph on following
page)
1. Setting up structures such as large antennas or working with deep drill-
ing equipment (e.g., depths of 200-300 meters) or erecting temporary
shelters during an extended traverse, or laying out many pieces of equip-
ment all connected to a single power source, thus yielding a wiring net-
work on or near the surface, all lead to the problem of keeping equip-
m_nt worn or the astronaut himself from becoming entangled. If the
astronaut is working alone, entanglement could lead to injury or worse
if the astronaut is isolated and trying to free himself. Depletion of
2-149
(THIS PAGELEFTBLANKINTENTIONALLY)
*&
t 2-149(a)
4 
Hazards of  Entanglement with Equipment - Apollo 14. Mission 
2-1L9( b) 
LMSC-A984262C
consumables is another danger faced if an astronaut is entangled and isolated;
this could cause illness, or injury or loss of the crew member.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive measures: D
i. Erection of all structures on the lunar surface should be made auto-
matic insofar as is reasonable.
2. Wiring should be laid out so as not to form a 'net'. Scientific instrument-
ation should be strung out and wiring buried where feasible.
Remedial measures:
i. By virtue of the buddy system one astronaut can disentangle another.
2. As a measure to be used when a danger is imposed by not disentangling
immediately, an EVA astronaut should have a pair of heavy duty wire
cutters with which to free himself.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
If an astronaut becomes entangled and is not working under the buddy system
concept, he will have to be rescued.
Effects of Hazard 4, Injury Resulting in Fracture or Flesh Wound
Involvement with the movement, emplacement, and/or erection of large and
massive structures or instruments could lead to tip-over or collapse with
resultant injuries to crew members involved in setting up these instruments/
structures. Fractures or flesh wounds are likely in such events. Although
suit rupture in such accidents is also possible, it should be recognized
that fractures and bruises could occur without suit damage.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
Preventive measures:
Io
2.
All of the preventive measures recommended for Hazard 3 are applicable.
The construction, erection, emplacement, etc., of all proposed lunar
structures/instrumentation should be practiced on Earth without omitting
any steps (i.e., a complete training program) in order to uncover any
difficulties that could arise on the moon and thus correct them before
the lunar mission is initiated.
Remedial measures:
i. A portable lunar shelter should be available in the event the subject
emplacements are distant from the base so that a fellow astronaut can
supply first aid in the event of accident. A cabin rover should be very
suitable in lieu of a portable lunar shelter. Splints and other first
aid items should be included as standard equipment in rovers and other
lunar shelters.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard %
i. If an astronaut is seriously injured he will have to be brought back
to the LSB or to the lunar space station or to Earth for treatment of
his injuries.
Effects of Hazard _, Accident Leading to Unconsciousness
I. The effects of adding unconsciousness to injury (as in Hazard 4) makes
it necessary to move the injured astronaut without his cooperation.
This procedure will place a burden on the other crew members engaged
in activity at the accident site. Should the astronaut happen to be
alone when injured and unconsciousness ensues, then he could be lost.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard
No preventive measures are identified.
Remedi al measure s:
i. A prime measure here is mandatory use of the buddy system so that an un-
conscious crew member can receive immediate attention and so that the
buddy can contact the base to prepare for receipt of the injured astronaut
and to possibly render aid.
2. A means for a single crew member to move an unconscious buddy is required;
for example, a stretcher that could be dragged or wheeled to the cabin
rover and hand-winched up a portable ramp into the rover. Such a measure
prevents the on-site loss of the astronaut.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
i. Should the on-site crew not be able to render first aid and/or move the
unconscious crew member to safety a rescue will be nesessary.
Effects of Hazard 6, Contamination by Corrosive Fluids or by Lunar Dust
i. Various corrosive fluids will be used in the lunar complex and particu-
larly at the LSB. Some of these fluids are hypergolic and may react
with spacesuit material or materials identified with nearby equipment.
These oxidation reactions are violent and therefore pose a danger to
any EVA astronauts engaged in handling these fluids. Skin, flesh, and
eye injuries are likely if contact is made with corrosive fluids. Should
the spacesuit be attacked by the fluids then the astronaut's life sup-
port system integrity will also be endangered with evident and serious
consequences.
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Whenlunar dust is kicked up by walking EVAastronauts the dust exhibits
a very strong tendency to adhere to the boots and spacesuits of the crew-
men. Suchdust gets into joints of the spacesuit and abrades their
seals thus leading to increased leakage of the suit-contained atmosphere.
If the dust is tracked into a lunar shelter or lunar vehicles it per-
meates the atmosphere and yields a considerable irritant to the respiratory
systems of the crewmen. In addition, it settles on display-control panels
and other equipment, posing an abrasive hazard to that equipment.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 6
Preventive measures:
i. Detailed consideration should be given to the substitution of passive fluids
in place of the corrosive ones, assuming that such substitution does not
compromise, to any serious degree, the functions of those fluids.
2. Hazardous fluids should be handled by EVA astronauts wearing protective
overgarments to ensure that neither fluid nor fumes contact his spacesuit,
boots, etc. The overgarment would be discarded before entering a shelter.
In order to protect against lunar dust 'invasions' similar overgarment
use should be initiated.
3. There should be a very strongly enforced rule indicating storage of all
corrosive fluids at a (determined) safe distance from the surface base
or shelter.
4. No EVA astronaut should be near any surface or space vehicle - unless
he is aboard - during the initiation of motive power in order to avoid
contamination by corrosive fumes.
5. Astronauts using the lunar flyer will need some protective garment to
keep the exhaust fumes from contaminating their spacesuits, boots, and
equipment.
Remedial measures:
1. An EVA astronaut injured by corrosive fumes will need immediate medical
attention, therefore, appropriate first aid kits should be available and
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a temporary lunar shelter in which to apply such first aid. The cabin
rover would serve as an excellent lunar shelter.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 6
le An EVA astronaut seriously injured by corrosive fumes that cannot be
treated out on some traverse will have to be rescued for treatment at
the base or shelter. If surface facilities are insufficient, return to
lunar orbit or Earth for treatment may be required.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
It is recommended that studies be conducted to consider alternatives to the
use of corrosive fluids in the lunar complex. The extent of functional com-
promise and delta costs should be considered in such studies as well as the
safety advantages to be gained in the use of such alternate fluids.
RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL STUDY
In the event of nausea accompanied by vomiting it would be critically impor-
tant to be able to reach past an astronaut's face plate to remove solids
from the area in and around his mouth and nostrils. The kind of device sug-
gested constitutes a flexible, globular (when inflated) glove box that could
be fitted over the affected astronaut's head and made pressure tight at his
neckband. It is suggested that further studies be conducted in this area to
ascertain the value and form of such a device.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
i. Mimosa Data Sheet, 3111-04, LMSC/A847943, April 1967.
2. F_nplaced Scientific Station, Westinghouse, Report No. SD-240, April 1966.
3. Lunar Escape Systems, North American Rockwell, Report No. SD 69-593,
June 1970 and NASA CR-1619, June 1970.
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4. Apollo 12 Mission Report, MSC-01855.
5. OneManLunar Flying Vehicle, Bell AerosystemsReport No. 7335-950012,
july 1969.
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HAZARD STUDY 22
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. Emergency oxygen supplies should be readily available to an EVA astronaut
in the event of failure of his primary system.
2. The buddy system_ or presence of a safety man, should be mandatory for EVA
astronauts under normal conditions unless they are within a few tens of
meters of the LSB or of the cabin rover or of the landed tug_ and standby
help is immediately available.
3. All EVA spacesuits should be designed to permit a fellow astronaut to plug
in on another's life support system in the event of failure of his own ISS.
4. Failure or degradation of his life support backpack should make return to
a safe haven mandatory and immediate for an EVA astronaut.
5- Erection of large structures/instruments should be automatic insofar as is
reasonable without seriously compromising function or costs for the lunar
complex.
6. For long distances or long-duration traverses_ a temporary lunar shelter
should be available for EVA astronauts in which to take refuge in the event
of accident_ injury, or other undesirable incident. Among supplies in such
shelters should be - as a minimum - splints and first aid kits.
7- A means shallbe provided for a single astronaut to move an unconscious
EVA astronaut from an accident location to a nearby safe haven.
8. All corrosive fluids should be handled by EVA astronauts wearing a pro-
tective overgarment and protective boots or boot covers.
9. No EVA astronaut should be outside and in the immediate vicinity of any
vehicle on the lunar surface during the initiation of motive power.
10. EVA astronauts using the lunar flyer should wear a protective garment
during the interval that the flyer's engines are turned on in order to
prevent contamination from engine exhaust.
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ii.
12.
Repair kits, analogous to the tire repair kit_ should be available for
all EVA astronauts (in general_ for all suited astronauts) in order to
be able to repair minor and medium suit leaks. Means should be provided
for determination and location of leaks.
Decals that can easily be read by EVA crewmen should be provided to iden-
tify equipment function. Identification should also be provided for each
EVA crewman so that he can be 'recognized' in video transmission.
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HAZARDSTUDY 23
HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS WITH EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNITS
INTRODUCTION
This section considers hazards to the astronaut associated with failures of
the EMU on the lunar surface. These hazards can be generated from three
sources: failure of space suit/back-pack components, deleterious lunar en-
vironmental effects on the EMU, or operational astronaut accidents which
inflict damage on the EMU.
AS SUMP TI 0NS
For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that lunar surface extra-
vehicular operations will be conducted in three basic contexts:
a. In the immediate vicinity (walking distance) of a lunar base.
b. Small excursions from a lunar base by means of a small cabinless
lunar rover.
c. In association with a large lunar roving vehicle with mobility and
habitability provisions.
The time frame for this analysis is the 1980-90 period. Certain advances in
the suit/back-pack state-of-the-art, explained below, are postulated.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. Suit rupture. Suit integrity may be compromised by the following factors:
me Operational accidents - falling off boarding/debarking ladder, vehicle
overturning, tripping over natural object or emplaced scientific
equipment, rupture of glove or suit due to harsh contact with system
hardware.
2-158
LMSC-A984262C
b. Suit deficiencies: e.g., oxygen leaks through defective seals,
breakage of cable connecting EVA glove to wrist (Apollo 14).
c. Inadvertent disconnection of back-pack hoses.
d. Environmental hazards such as meteorite penetration.
2. Back-pack failure
a. Communications or telemetry
b. 02 supply/pressurization
c. Thermal control including either the oxygen circulation system in
the PGA or water circulation system in the LCG.
d. Carbon dioxide removal
e. Odor and contaminant removal
f. Humidity control
g. Power failure.
3. Interruption of Life Support Provisions during Back-Pack Switching
Back-pack switching in the lunar vacuum environment involves the poten-
tial threat of interrupted life support provisions if the transition is
not effected properly.
4. The loss of the face mask's heat/glare reflective coating which is essen-
tial for eye protection.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i, Suit Rupture
Small suit ruptures may cause mission interruption at most and constitute a
minor hazard only - as discussed below. A medium leak, as defined below,
does demand immediate attention. A large rupture, however, would be very
serious. Depending on the particular rupture and concurrent leak rate, loss
of consciousness can occur in 20 seconds. The death of an astronaut could
occur in 3 to 5 minutes, depending on the size of suit rupture and the
ability of the back-pack to sustain oxygen supply and pressure.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
Prevention of potential catastrophic suit damage requires a consideration of
two approaches:
1. Improvements in space suit design which can be expected to take a number
of forms:
a. The greatest current need is for increased capability in mobility in
a suited astronaut. Additionally, astronauts must have improved
visibility and decreased suit encumbrances. At present, the protec-
tive envelope provided by the suit negates most cutaneous sensitivity
cues. Consequently,the astronaut is not aware of objects brushed
against until he is snagged or comes into hard contact with such
object. Means for providing contact cues to the suited astronaut
should be investigated.
b. Other suit improvements to be considered for the future include self-
sealing concepts for coping with small suit tears or punctures, com-
partmentalizing of suit segments so that a tear in one segment seals
off a given compartment without depressurizing the entire suit, and
protective cocoons for immediately enveloping an astronaut subsequent
to a sudden pressure drop. The use of an emergency pressure garment
donned over the liquid cooled garment (LCG) should also be considered.
c. Development and application of new materials will make the suits in-
creasingly more resistant to scuffs, abrasions, snags and tears. An
amalgamation of "hard" and "soft" suit concepts may also occur to
provide increased micrometeorite protection as well as general re-
sistance to "wear and tear."
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dm Ultimately it would be desirable to design an integrated back-pack
and space suit. The back-pack to be attached to the suit so that
upon completion of donning the integrated pair are immediately in an
operational mode. Since current hoses hang loose and are in danger
or being snagged or inadvertently disconnected, a future suit would
have them integral and take up less volume than the current clumsy
hoses do. A rectangular cross section hose, flexible but not collap-
sible, would be a step in the correct direction.
It would be desirable to have such a suit fail-operational, fail
operational, fail-safe and require a simple checkout procedure. Care
should be taken that variations in turn-on or shut-off sequences for
operation of such an integrated suit-backpack will not pose any
dangers to the wearer. The gold, heat-reflective layer in the face
mask might be emplaced between layers of plastic to ensure its pro-
tection against abrasion, peeling or scratching.
ee
It would be advantageous to have a readout system for the oxygen
flow rate so that a suit wearer would be informed on either excessive
or insufficient oxygen usage as well as time-to-go in the EVA mode
as a function of such flow rate.
It is desirable for EVA astronauts to always use the buddy-system
(ability for mutual plug-in capability - suit to suit - and use of
al___lbackpack consumables) so that feasible repairs can be made on
the spot for accidental suit penetrations. A kit analogous to a tire
repair kit would be desirable for such a function.
2. _le second approach to suit damage prevention involves detailed safety
attention to the design of lunar hardware systems and mission activities.
The following recommendations are made so as to improve astronaut safety:
me Development of shelter/vehicle ingress/egress provisions that avoid
failing or snagging of suit or back-pack connections.
2-161
LMSC-A984262C
b. Systematic review of all hardware surfaces that the astronaut may
comein contact with to eliminate abrasive edges, unstable standing
platforms (planned or unplanned) and protrusions.
c. Design of vehicle deployment systems that preclude manual involvement
of the astronaut with the possible consequenceof objects falling on
the astronaut.
d. Provisions to adequately guard against lunar vehicle overturn; e.g.,
indications of excessive slope beyond the capability of the vehicle,
roll bars and seat restraints.
e. Developmentof scientific equipment hardware and emplacementproced-
ures that precludes astronaut tripping over wires or components.
f. Design of appropriate illumination aids for lunar night operation.
P
Remedial measures:
le Actual use of the available suit repair kit noted in preventive measures
under l(e) is a remedial step. The buddy-system increases the feasibility
of such kit use. Hazard Study 15 should be referred to for measures
taken concerning vehicle overturning, equipment emplacement. Hazard
Studies _ and 22 deal with the meteoroid penetration phenomena for EVA
astronauts.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
Rescue options are a function of oxygen loss and a function of the distance
of the disabled astronaut from a habitable shelter or source of replenishment
supplies. The following provides the rescue measures or options appropriate
for various conditions of suit leak rates and operational factors:
le Large oxygen flow rate from suit, e.g., hose disconnected or torn.
This type of suit failure is catastrophic with state-of-the-art suits
even if the astronaut is close to a lunar shelter or spare PLSS on a
lunar rover. To cope with this class of suit failure new design features
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are required such as automatic sealing of the hose port if the hose is
disconnected as well as a method of eliminating hoses hanging loosely
on the suit. The latter is discussed above in corrective measures 1(d).
Medium Suit Leak
This situation is defined as one in which the astronaut is losing oxygen
supplies at such a rate that he has a relatively short time (say, about
1/2 hour to return to a habitable shelter.)
e If a medium suit leak occurs while the astronaut is on a non-cabin rover
sortie he has the following options:
.
a. Ride back to shelter as quickly as possible.
b. If ride-back distance is too far, plug into spare back-pack or
vehicle-mounted life support system.
c. Call for rescue by means of a lunar flying vehicle.
d. If a second lunar rover is available,have it meet returning rover
half way with spare back-pack.
e. The remedial measures noted above suggesting a tire repair type kit
is also recommended for the medium leak situation.
Small leakage
A small leak would normally allow the astronaut conducting EVA operations
in the vicinity of a shelter or cabin rover to walk back to the shelter
or rover. For non-cabin rover operations, the astronaut could either
ride back unassisted depending on the time into the mission and the dis-
tance from the shelter or extend his life support supplies by connecting
to a vehicle mounted life support reserve or a spare back-pack.
_b Recommendations:
I. Because the face mask is plastic and because techniques have been de-
vsloped to ascertain strains brought upon plastic forms when stresses
are put upon them it may be possible to adapt this technique to detecting
imminent mask failure. This method depends upon the fact that the appli-
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.
cation of force to the plastic yields a series of diffraction patterns
that can be photographed. No doubt these patterns can be detected by
other sensor techniques. It is recommended that studies be conducted
in this area to determine the adaptability of the methodology for this
use. It may be possible to have the astronaut continually wear a flex-
ible, plastic, folded emergency cover which can be pulled over his head
and sealed at the neckband as an interim measure. This technique should
be studied and its value ascertained.
A repair kit analogous to the tire repair kit should be developed, after
appropriate study, for on-the-spot remedy of small and medium suit leaks.
A 'clock' should be developed to inform the wearer of a PLSS how much
EVA time remains for him as a function of his remaining oxygen supply
and as a function of its instantaneous use rate.
Effects of Hazard 2, Back-pack Failure
The effects of the loss of use of the back-pack are catastrophic and lead to
the loss of the astronaut unless sufficient countermeasures are instantly
available. The effects of communications/telemetry and power failures are
discussed in Hazard Studies 7 and 20 and will not be repeated here.
Primary system failure leads to switching to the emergency back-up oxygen
purge system. Power failure as well as all other failures listed in the
major hazard list will have the effect of (temporarily, at least) terminating
the operation and require an immediate and mandatory return to a safe haven.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures :
1. i thorough and complete checkout before each EVA sortie should be manda-
tory for the back-pack, the suit, and all related equipment.
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. It is highly recommended that an integrated suit and back-pack be de-
veloped (as discussed in corrective measures for Hazard I) that can be
operated without concern as to the order of activation or inactivation
of the hardware.
.
In designing such a suit-backpack all possible anticipated modes of
operation must be considered so as to negate the need for any "procedural
workaround" sequences resulting from deficiencies in the original equip-
ment design.
The following list of items are preventive in the sense that the avail-
ability of the hardware of procedures listed will prevent loss of the
astronaut if his primary system fails. In the sense that the use of the
hardware and/or procedures becomes necessary the list can be considered
remedial. Back-pack Failure - Reduction of the hazards associated with
back-pack failure beyond the backup oxygen purge system (OPS) capability
should include:
a. A backup power system with a minimum capability of 30 minutes.
b. A backup communications system.
c. Mandatory use of the buddy system for all EVA except within lO0
meters of the LSB.
Incorporation of "buddy system" features into back-pack design to allow
an astronaut in distress to share a good back-pack with another astro-
naut. These features should be designed to allow for the overload im-
posed by two astronauts or insure that the degraded performance caused
by two astronauts sharing the back-pack will not impair rescue success.
Desirability of making an emergency pack available during EVA excursions
or umbilical backup supply from the base or roving vehicle as long as
astronaut operations are in their proximity.
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Remedial Measures:
i. Size all emergencyand backup systems to all primary systems so that
both survivability and rescue requirements are consistent with the rescue
equipment available for the mission.
2. Emergencysystems, like the primary system, should be redundant in de-
sign to provide fail-operational, fail-operational, fail-safe conditions
to the overall system.
3. Use of a fellow astronaut's back-pack; that is, use of the buddy-system.
4. Availability of an extra back-pack at the operations site.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Failure of a primary backpack generally entails the same rescue/escape op-
tions as described for suit penetrations or leakages.
In these cases, the astronaut within walking distance of a shelter would
return immediately to the shelter with the assistance of a companion astro-
naut. For the case of a non-cabin rover sortie, the lunar rover would
return directly to base with the "buddy" astronaut driving the vehicle.
Recommendations:
It is recommended that studies be conducted to ascertain minimum power and
communications requirements for use as backups in the event of failure of
these functions in a back-pack.
Effects of Hazard 3, Back-pack Switching Accident
Should the act of back-pack switching not occur smoothly the astronaut's
life support system would be lost to him and the result would be catastrophic,
leading in the worst case to loss of the crew member. The effect here is
the implied threat of interrupted life support functions and its conse-
quences.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 3
Preventive measures:
i
i. Backpacks should be designed for "buddy system" operation. In this
manner an astronaut with a defective backpack could connect himself to
the backpack of his companion or his buddy could perform this function.
This multiple use of a single backpack would obviously deplete remaining
expendables at a much faster rate and emergency walkback capability would
be accordingly reduced. In the event of vomiting this would not be done
- see remedy measures below.
The buddy system is defined as that operational mode of activity wherein
at least two members of a space mission crew perform tasks with both (all)
members conducting tasks while near each other at the same site. The
buddy system necessarily includes the capability for each crew member to
use the subsystems of his fellow crew member by the existence in their
equipment of hardware which permits such mutual (multiple) use.
t
Thus, if each of two crew members carries N subsystems (life support,
communications, power, etc.) there are then 2N subsystems for their
mutual support. The psychological comfort of having a fellow crew member
immediately available in the event of accident, equipment malfunction,
illness, or any other irregularity serves to greatly increase the confi-
dence of the buddy system crew.
e
By no stretch of the imagination can the buddy system be considered to
be in effect if one member of the team is outside a spacecraft or lunar
base while h_ monitor(s) is inside the spacecraft or base; no matter
whether the latter is suited-up or not.
Small cabinless lunar rovers could provide extra or spare backpacks and
back-pack switching aids. Backpack switching aids conceived of to date
have been cumbersome to use and far from foolproof when operated by an
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unassisted astronaut. Suit/backpack interfaces have not been designed
to insure an efficient and safe mating that can be managed by a single
astronaut on the lunar surface. Therefore, back-pack switching requires
assistance from a second astronaut or improvements in the suit/back-pack
mating design and/or the aids for accomplishing this operation.
Small lunar rovers could be equipped with ECS provisions for either re-
plenishing expended backpacks or for emergency plug-in for an emergency
return to a lunar base.
Remedial measures:
Backpack switching in the lunar vacuum as a means for extending normal
mission duration should be avoided until foolproof techniques are available
and easily effected by the space suit encumbered astronaut. Emergency switch-
ing of backpacks can be effected with the assistance of a companion astronaut.
In addition, backpacks should have the capability of simultaneously sup-
porting two astronauts for emergency assistance purposes.
1. In the event of vomiting the concerned astronaut must be taken to a
safe haven immediately before he chokes on his regurgitated food and
before the debris clogs his suit functions. The length of time to choke
on food particles trapped in the trachea is a function of the percentage
of obscuration of the air passage. For total blockage the time is about
2 minutes - about the time a good diver can hold his breath under water.
Recommendations :
It is recommended that a study be made to determine techniques of opening an
astronaut's faceplate to help him clear his suit of regurgitated debris and
to aid in clearing his mouth and throat of this debris. A totally enclos-
ing, inflatable, zipper closed 'balloon' is a possible approach to this
problem.
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HAZARDSTUDY23
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
I. Back-pack switching in the lunar vacuumenvironment shall not be re-
quired as ameans for normal extension of mission duration.
2. Back-pack switching aids shall be provided only for emergency-switching
of backpacks.
3. Back-pack design shall permit buddy system attachment and operation for
all life support functions and power and communications.
4. Emergencylife support shall be provided in the form of spare back-backs,
vehicle mountedsystems or strategically located supply caches distributed
along a mission route. Specific requirements shall be mission peculiar.
5. The "buddy system_ using astronauts at least in pairs for all EVAopera-
tions, or the presence of a safety man, should be mandatory.
6. Space suit design efforts should continue to stress increased astronaut
mobility performance capabilities, integrations of separate suit elements
into one garment, increased resistance to tear and abrasion and emergency
corrective measuresto prevent catastrophic suit leaks.
7. Lunar hardware systems must be designed to preclude accidental damageto
suits and backpacks. Suchmeasures include development of safe vehicle/
shelter ingress/egress provisions and aids, avoidance of abrasive hard-
ware edges and protrusions which can snag suits or hoses.
8. Scientific mission activities shall be organized to avoid tripping over
emplaced scientific equipment and its connecting cables.
9. Repair kits, analogous to the tire repair kit, should be available for
all EVAastronauts (in general, for all suited astronauts) in order to
be able to repair minor and mediumsuit leaks.
i0. All back-packs and interrelated equipment should be designed to fail-
operational, fail-operational, fail-safe.
ll. All hose connections should have automatic, self-sealing ports for the
eventuality of inadvertent hose-disconnection.
rp
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12. External protuberances such as hoses, electrical lines, etc., on all space
suits should be eliminated by improved design.
13. The gold plated, heat reflective layer on the spacesuit face masks should
be sealed between two layers of plastic in order to protect that layer
from scratching, abrasion, or peeling.
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HAZARD STUDY 24
LUNAR FLYING VEHICLE HAZARDS
INTRODUCTION
A lunar flyer may be used for the scientific investigation of areas of the
Moon that would be impossible to reach with surface transportation. Such
areas as crater walls and ridges, central crater peaks, the uppermost pro-
montories and cliff faces may involve theuse of the flyers. The flyers
considered here are the non-cabin type, with life support and communication
provided by personal life support systems (PLSSs). They can carry at least
two men.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. The lunar flyer preferred crew is two or more, but a flying investi-
gation could be conducted by one man.
2. The flyer will have a limited range capability which is considered to
be about 13 km (8 nm).
3. Sites selected for lunar flyer investigations will in general have been
photographed from orbit and perhaps from the lunar surface in order to
obtain topographical knowledge for the scientific investigations and to
permit planning for escape/rescue should that become necessary.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
1. A lunar flying vehicle impacts the surface at excessive velocity
following malfunction of a critical subsystem or through control
iuput error.
2. Loss of communications.
3. A PLSS malfunction during the course of a lunar flying mission.
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4. Poor visibility of the lunar surface during landing, considering
lunar dust and sun-lighting effects.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i, Excessive Impact Velocity
A high velocityimpact will result in the loss of the lunar flyer crew. Other
crew members of the lunar complex would investigate the accident
but not in a rescue mode if the impact at high velocity was 'seen' on radar or
by other means.
Should the lunar flyer and crew experience a low velocity impact the expecta-
tion is that the crew will suffer some injury and the flyer will be damaged
so that it would at least be in need of repair before it could be used again.
A major concern involves the sudden isolation of the crew in the event of an
impact. If astronaut injuries are of a serious nature the isolation problem
is compounded. Should the crew's PLSSs be damaged the severity of the prob-
lem increases further.
t
Corrective Measure_ for Hazard I
Preventive Measures:
1. Duplicate the propulsion and control systems, except for tankage and
propellant, so that either system is capable of operating the flyer.
Fail-operational, fail-operational, fail-safe philosophy should be
observed.
2. Limit the altitude and velocity of the lunar flyer so that the highest
impact speed or fall from highest operating altitude will not likely
result in serious injury to the crew.
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3. Special protection for the PLSSshould be designed for use with the
lunar flyers to prevent loss of integrity in the event of low velo-
city impact. In addition, an emergencyoxygen supply, capable of
withstanding the impact without impairing its function, should be
available for each crew member.
4. A crash-survivable communications beacon and voice transmitter should
be aboard every flyer.
5. To further limit isolation the use of a preferred modeof lunar flyer
operation is suggested. This involves towing the flyer on a trailer
attached to a rover (preferably cabin type) to near the site of
interest. The lunar flyer is then used to get to the desired site.
A total rover-flyer crew of three is suggested as a minimumfor this
operation.
Remedial measures:
I. If injuries and PLSSdamageare such that the crew membersare ambula-
tory and life support available, rescue assistance should be requested
from the surface operations base. The flyer crew could then walk on a
prescribed path to meet the rescuers. This situation implies that the
lurain of the impact site can be negotiated by the crew on foot.
2. Alternately the crew would have to makeuse of their first aid equipment
and communicationscapability until outside aid wasavailable.
E_ape/Re_ue Requiremen$_ for Hazard I
I. If the crew is ambulatory after their accident they would contact their
operations center and proceed on foot on a prescribed path maintaining
radio contact throughout while a rescue party got underway.
2. If injuries are too severe to permit movement, the crew members would
have to be rescued within the time limits bounded by PLSS supplies.
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Effects of Hazard 2, Communications Loss
This hazard is discussed in Hazard Study P_ and will not be repeated here.
Effeg$_ of Hazard 2, PLSS Malfunction During a Lunar Flyer Mission
This hazard is dealt with in detail in Hazard Study 23 and will not be re-
peated here.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
I. NASA-MSC Surface Transportation PDD, June 1970
2. One-ManLFV, SD69-419-I, Final Report
3. One-ManLFV, 7335-950012, Summary Report
4. Lunar Escape Systems, SD69-598, Tech Report, NAS Space Division, Oct 1969
5. Lunar Escape Systems Summary, NAS CR-1619
6. Manned Lunar Flying Machines, Meyer/Kitchens, paper to SAE, May 1968
7. Lunar Flying Vehicles, 7266-950001, Bell Aerosystems, January 1967
8. Apollo12 Mission Report, MSC-01855, March 1970
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HAZARDSTUDY24
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES
I. Lunar flying vehicles shall have fully redundant propulsion and control
systems, except for propulsion tankage and propellant. Fail-operational,
fail-operational, fail-safe philosophy shall be observed.
2. Each lunar flyer vehicle shall carry a communications beacon and voice
transmitter capable of withstanding any crash survivable by a crewman.
3. Special protection from low velocity impacts should be provided for EVA
backpacks used on lunar flyer missions, and an additional emergency
oxygen supply capable of withstanding the impact without impairing its
function should also be provided.
4. Lunar flyers shall be prohibited from landing in any area which cannot
accommodate a second flyer.
5. All solo lunar flyer missions shall have a crew of at least 2 men with
the vehicle flyable by one man.
6. All lunar flyers shall be capable of carrying at least one pilot, plus
one passenger who may be incapacitated.
7. Use of two flying vehicles on each flyer mission, each capable of re-
turning the crewmen of both vehicles, is strongly recommended.
8. Continuous communication with the base is required for the entire period
of all lunar flyer missions.
9. In planning flying missions into potentially dangerous locations a rescue
plan shall always be determined beforehand. The range/time capability
of the rescue mode shall determine the maximum allowable range/time-away-
from-base of any lunar flyer mission.
10. Mission planners must have a precise knowledge of the limitations in
performance of the flyer/crewman combination and detailed information
on landing site topography prior to initiating a lunar flyer mission.
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11. Lunar flyers shall be operated only whensolar lighting conditions
will be favorable for both the outbound and inbound legs of a
mission, except in an emergency.
12. Immediately after landing a lunar flyer at a remote site the crew
shall determine the status of their vehicle and report findings to
to the base.
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HAZARDSTUDY25
TOTALDESTRUCTIONOFA PRIMEVEHICLE
INTRODUCTION
This study area considers the hazards generated as a consequenceof the total
loss of any one of the prime program equipment elements. These prime elements
include transport vehicles, lunar lander tugs, orbiting lunar stations, lunar
surface bases, roving vehicles, and flying vehicles.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. The total loss of a program element is assumedto occur suddenly and
without prior warning. Causative factors are not considered a part of
this study.
2. Nominal mission activities are assumedto be in progress at the time of
the loss event.
THAMAJORHAZARDS
The hazard generators are considered to be:
a. Loss of a chemical or nuclear prime transport vehicle (PTV)
b. Loss of an orbiting lunar station (OLS)
c. Loss of a lunar lander tug (LLT)
d. Loss of a lunar surface base (LSB)
e. Loss of a lunar roving vehicle (LRV)
f. Loss of a lunar flying vehicle (LFV) w
The loss of one of these prime equipment elements is considered to generate
the following hazards.
I. Vehicle debris, and perhaps contaminating particles, are left in lunar
orbit or on the lunar surface following destruction of a program element.
2-178
LMSC-A984262C
2. Crewmenare stranded and/or deprived of metabolic needs and a safe haven
following destruction of a prime vehicle or base.
3. Hazardous survivor search, extraction, and recovery is required following
destruction of a program element.
4. Rescue capability is lost following destruction of a program element.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard I, Vehicle Debris
Vehicle debris or contaminating particles left in lunar orbit or on the lunar
surface, following destruction of a program element, constitute a collision
hazard and perhaps a nuclear radiation hazard. These hazards may be present
for long periods unless action is taken to eliminate them.
Corrective Measure _ for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
None identified.
Remedial measures:
I. Manned or unmanned space tugs might be used to capture and dispose of
non-radioactive debris in orbit, through deorbiting to a safe area on
the lunar surface, boost to escape velocity, or hold for return to
Earth.
2. Unmanned space tugs might be used to capture and dispose of radiation-
contaminated debris in orbit through boost to escape velocity.
3. Impact of radiation-contaminated materials on the lunar surface may
require quarantine of a considerable surface area until the specific
debris location can be identified and either cleaned up or enclosed.
Escape/Rescue Requir_ment_ for Hazard 1
None identified.
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Effects of Hazard 2, Stranded Crewmen
Destruction of a prime vehicle may create hazards of isolation or deprivation
of life support needs for crewmen dependent on that vehicle, but spared from
the initial destructive event. These situations may include:
a. Crewmen are in a tug in lunar orbit when their orbiting lunar
station is destroyed.
b. Crewmen are in an orbiting lunar station when their stand-by
tug is destroyed.
c. Crewmen are in a lunar surface base when their stand-by tug
is destroyed.
d. Crewmen are on surface EVA from a solo lunar lander tug when
that tug is destroyed.
e. Crewmen are on EVA from a roving or flying vehicle traverse
whentheir rover or flyer is destroyed.
f. Crewmen are on local EVA when their lunar surface base is
destroyed.
g. Crewmen are in an orbiting lunar station awaiting resupply and
crew rotation when the incoming prime transport vehicle is
destroyed.
The effects of these situations may range widely, from imposing a need to wait
in relative comfort for rescue or delivery of a replacement tug (situations b
and c) to urgent need for additional life support and rescue (situations d and
e). A very sizeable study would be required in order to consider the full
matrix of situations, conditions, and hazard effects possible following loss
of prime program elements. This cannot be accomplished here, and the follow-
ing corrective measures are therefore of a very general nature.
Corrective Mea_u_e_ for Hazard 2
No preventive measures are identified.
Q
2-180
I_4SC-A984262C
Remedial measures: _
1. Provide a rescue capability and rescue planwhich considers all
credible combinations of loss of a prime element with mission phase,
mission timing, and crew activity.
Escaoe/Rescue Reauirement_ for Hazard 2
See remedial measures statement above.
Hazards 3 and 4 are beyond the scope of this study, but will require careful
attention in detailed future mission planning.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
D
Much of the analysis required to properly analyze and cope with the hazards
identified here is beyond the scope of the present effort. It is nonethe-
less evident that loss of a program element could have serious consequences
that must be considered in planning for advanced lunar operations. The
following studies are therefore suggested:
I. In the planning of future missions a study is required to determine
the credibility of total loss, individually, of each prime item of
lunar exploration equipment proposed.
2. It is recommended that a position study be accomplished relative to
the disposition of non-nuclear vehicle debris which may be generated
in lunar orbit.
3. It is recommended that a joint NASA/AEC position study be accomplished
relative to the disposition of nuclear debris which may be generated
through accident or failure in lunar orbit.
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HAZARD STUDY 25
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINE CANDIDATES
1. Prior to the initiation of advanced lunar missions, methods and a plan
shall be devised for disposing of nuclear and non-nuclear debris in
lunar orbit. Use of a space tug in both manned and unmanned configu-
rations shall be considered for use in debris removal.
2. Prior to the initiation of advanced lunar missions a rescue plan which
considers all credible combinations of loss of a prime element with
mission phase, mission timing, and crew activity, shall be developed.
q
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HAZARDSTUDY26
THEHAZARDIN LUNARROVEROPERATIONCREATEDBY LIGHTINGCONDITIONS
ANDGEOMETRYONTHELUNARSURFACE
INTRODUCTION
After the initial lunar base has been firmly established, well stocked, and
is in the expected operating mode,explorations of the surrounding lurain
will commence. Lunar rovers of various types will be used to support this
exploration with distances from the base growing as capability and confi-
dence of the lunar base crew increases.
The explorer's ability to see on the lunar surface is strongly modified by
the Sun elevation angle and by the azimuthal direction of travel for a given
Sunelevation angle. The loss of "landmarks" (i.e., shadowsvanish) due to
increased elevation angle is well demonstrated by the simnlation studies -
and resultant photography- in Ref. (a). Lunar illumination at high Sun
elevation angles (viz., above 17° for fairly flat lurain) is harsh, glaring,
and wipes out all shadowsthoroughly. Unless preparation is madeduring the
course of each early sortie, so that a network of artificial landmarks are
emplaced, difficulties in navigation will ensue leading to serious acci-
dents and/or death of the rover crew.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. Exploration of the lunar surface will lead to lunar rover sorties
at increasing distances from the lunar base. The open rover at
distances up to 8 nm (13 km), the cabin rover at distances measured
in hundreds of kilometers. Both of these extended types of sorties
are evidently beyond walkback capability for astronauts.
2. Exploration distances will increase to the extent that the full
range of lunar surface lighting conditions will be encountered on
many- and eventually almost all - lunar rover trips. TiLls
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.
excludes local travel to newly landed tugs, etc., in the immediate
vicinity of the lunar base.
Crevasses and weak-roofed "holes" exist in various parts of the, as
yet, unexplored lunar surface.
Location of all crevasses and "holes" will not be known for many
decades, if ever.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
S. Failure to see a crevasse because of poor lighting conditions
with subsequent entrapment of the rover and crew.
2. Inability to navigate because natural landmarks are unseeable
in poor lighting caused by high sun elevation angles - above
17° from either the eastern or western lunar horizons.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Because the two hazards are so interrelated they will be treated simnltane-
ously in the analysis.
Entrapment of the rover and its crew in a crevasse could occur far enough
from the lunar base so that walking back to the base is out of the question.
Entrapment could have occurred because rover motion during poor lighting
conditions obviated seeing the crevasse beforehand. The Sun elevation
angle is assumed to be greater than 17 degrees for this event.
Effects of Hazards S and 2
Loss of entire crew if not rescued. Oxygen will run out.
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Corrective Measures
Preventive measures:
I. Develop method for locating, marking crevasses' locations.
2. Information presently is insufficient for preventing rover
entrapment by weak roof cave-in except by 'hole' detector.
This would severe lylimit rover rate of travel on lunar sur-
face unless an unmanned device preceded the manner rover
over the path.
3. Navigate via stars, if visible. Emplace lunar surface buoys
during good seeing conditions. Buoy design must be indepen-
dent of lighting conditions on lunar surface.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
Escape/Rescue requirements cannot be presently established for this case
because of lack of information and data on lunar surface lighting condi-
tions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made to alleviate this lack of knowledge
noted above.
1. In general, not enough is known about navigation during high-Sun-
elevation-angle-derived, poor lunar surface lighting conditions.
Remaining Apollo lunar missions should incorporate experiments
to collect data on lunar surface lighting and seeing conditions
as functions of:
a. Sun elevation angle independent of azimuth of travel.
b Sun elevation angle for various fixed azimuth angles.
c. Gross roughness of the lunar surface.
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Crevasse detection techniques must be developed as well as methods
for detecting 'weak-roofed holes' - if they exist. Suggest
experiment for Apollo rover lunar missions•
Navigation methods should be developed to circumvent poor lighting
conditions and permit seeing of obstacles in any lighting geometry.
Use should be initiated on Apollo-rover lunar missions. Presently
navigation without visual contact with the lunar surface - or using
video - does not seem to be possible allowing, however, for one
special type of case. In the latter, the rover crew has laid out
lunar buoys (beacons) along its path while moving away from the
base in a manner such that the straight line path between two con-
secutive beacons has no obstacles of consequence to the passage of
the rover. With each beacon coded so as to present a unique path
and set of directions for the rover, the crew could return along
this path without any external visual contact. This method might
be termed a homing technique for navigation.
Velocity techniques for navigation which include computing range,
range to go, and position coordinates, or inertial or celestial
methods are all equally useless navigation techniques since they
do not account for obstacles in the rover traverse pathway.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
I • Apollo Illumination Environment Simulation and Study, Vol. II,
W. K. Kincaid, Jr., S. Seidenstein, J. A. Janousek, NAS 9-7661;
Biotechnology Organization, LMSC, for NASA/_C.
J
q
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HAZARD STUDY 26
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
1. A device, analogous to mine detectors, must be designed in order to
determine hidden crevasses and roofed holes on the lunar surface.
This device, if needed, should be attached to the front of all lunar
rovers on a long enough extension (truss) so that the rover may be
stopped in time, at its highest speed, if such a hazard is detected.
2. Navigation techniques must be developed for use on the lunar surface
with lunar rovers, and_ith lunar flyers, which are independent of
any and all lighting conditions on the surface.
3. As aids to navigation on the lunar surface, 'buoys' should be developed
containing coded radio beacons and flashing lights, and powered by radio-
isotope power sources of at least five years' lifetime. Radio beacons
should be detectable at a distance of at least 50 miles using omni an-
tennas on the lunar rovers.
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HAZARD STUDY 2T
VISIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN DOCKING TWO VEHICLES (SPACECRAFT)
IN LUNAR ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
During the course of prior activity in the Apollo program and Space Shuttle
studies the phenomena of lighting/visibility in Earth orbit was recognized
as an area for investigation as reflected in docking procedures. Because
of the lack of light-scattering dust and atmosphere and because of lack of
penumbra in shadowing, spacecraft are either in complete darkness or are
illuminated by bright sunlight. Reflections from spacecraft surfaces are
harsh and blinding.
Visibility for docking is based on three factors:
I. The geometry relating target spacecraft, docking spacecraft,
e
e
the
Sun and the Moon determines the illumination of objects within
the field of view of the docking crew.
The nature of the spacecraft surfaces and shapes which reflect the
ambient illumination incident on those spacecraft. This determines
contrasts within the field of view, particularly glare highlights
and obscuration by shadow.
Window position and field of view size and shape which interface
with the first two factors and determine "Sun-shafting" through
the window-vie_ports and scene veiling effects caused by scatter
within the window media.
Visibility considerations may constrain docking port location and orienta-
tion and can effect the design requirements for the docking port area and
its associated mechanisms.
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ASSUMPTIONS
a. Docking between any two spacecraft, in normal circumstances,
can occur with:
1) Both roll axes parallel and coincident.
2) The roll axis of the active spacecraft is perpendicular
to the roll axis of the orbiting lunar station.
b. During routine operations the solar arrays of the orbiting lunar
station are normal to the Sun's rays and the station roll axis is
parallel to the Sun's rays.
c. Docking is normally accomplished in daylight.
d. Docking is performed with the station in a zero-g flight mode.
e. External station surfaces highly reflective (say _ 50%),
solar arrays 20%reflective.
f. Sky or dark lunar surface backgroundwith docking port illumi-
nated by the Sun and somelunar reflection, or by the Sun only.
g. Prior analysis for the shuttle docking-lighting geometry is
used here while observing that the lunar soacecraft shapes
will lead to different but closely related results.
THEMAJORHAZARDS
%
The Major hazards identified are:
1. Docking attempts in daylight with spacecraft-Sun geometry not proper
leads to multiple docking attempts, possible minor collisions.
2. Side docking attempts with incorrect lighting relationships could lead
to collision with solar arrays. This, in turn, would deny someor all
solar-array generated electrical power to the orbiting lunar station.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazards Nos. I and 2, Docking attempts with incorrect lighting
geometry
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Solar I Orientation:
The hazard of collision exists because of attempts to dock whenlighting
geometry leads to poor seing conditions. During the course of contractual
studies for NASA,lighting geometry was examined for Apollo docking and for
the Launch and Reentry Vehicle (Shuttle to Space Station) docking procedures,
Ref. 1, 2. A current study to examinedocking/lighting geometry for the
Skylab program is also underway (Ref. 3).
The results of these initial studies define a Sun angle, viz., the angle
boundedby the docking (roll) axis of the active spacecraft and the inci-
dence line of the Sun's rays (see Figure 1); the positive angle being
measured from the establish + X axis. It is assumedhere that the roll
angle for each vehicle is fixed with respect to the Sun line.
Results of these studies - conducted as simulations using scale models -
indicate that for Sun angles of less than 60 degrees, Sun shafting through
the docking vie_port or Sun incidence causing veiling (light scatter due
to the viewport media) occur in present spacecraft. For Sun angles greater
than 140 degrees, obscurance of the orbiting lunar station docking target
and port by the shadowof the active spacecraft (e.g., a logistic tug)
will occur.
The effects of the simplification calling for a constant Sun angle for all
spacecraft angles (roll angle with respect to Sun line) have not been ex-
amined to date in the contractual simulation activities. Consequently,
the effects of varying the spacecraft angle on lighting geometry are
presently unknown.
End-Port Docking with Orbiting Lunar Station in Normal Sun Orientation:
Since the light geometry is very poor for end-port docking under normal Sun
orientation - it is either too dark or too bright - any attempt to dock
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under these poor seeing conditions will lead to either collision or multiple
and therefore fatiguing attempts to dock (viz., Apollo 9 McDivitt/Schweikhart
in LM, multiple tries to dock in bright sunlight with D. Scott in CSM). Ea-
tigue again presents the hazard of collision.
Vie_port filters or sunglasses do not aid the docking visibility becausemany
of the (visibility) problems are derived from the extreme brightness varia-
tions present in the visual scene. The eye adapts to the average brightness
value of the visual field resulting in lack of visibility in the extreme
(darkness orbright glare). Attenuation of light to the eye reduces the
glare extreme, but results in proportionately reduced visibility at the dark
extreme by reducing the energy reaching the eye to below its absolute sensi-
tivity threshold. Docking lights have no significant effect within the
feasible energy ranges (for such lights) because the amountby which they
raise the luminous reflection from the dark areas is not sensed by the eye
because the eye is adapted to a muchhigher brightness band in this
situation.
%
If the space station cannot bereoriented during docking, the dark-end docking
port is unacceptable on the daylight side of the orbit while the Sun-end port
is unacceptable because the Sun angle is 180 degrees. Both of these cases
are outside of the Sun angle envelope; both give bad seeing conditions, the
former literally leaves the pilot in the dark while the latter not only
places the pilot in the glare due to reflection of Sun-light from station
surfaces, but also may expose him to the glare envelope resulting from
highly specular solar array cells.
Corrective Measure_ for Hazards I and 2
Preventive measure s:
I. Reorient the orbiting lunar station as necessary during docking to
yield acceptable Sun angles.
2-191
LMSC-A9842620
2. Limit docking at end ports to the dark side of the orbit, and use
floodlights for illumination, since here the eyes can becomefully
dark adapted and the range of brightness in the visual scene is
substantially reduced.
3. Dock only at the side ports (90 degree Sunangle is fully accept-
able) whenon the daylight side of the orbit.
4. A design alternative would be to have the end docking port - on the
dark end of the station - angled at 45 degrees to the station center
line. This yields a 135 degree Sun angle which is acceptable on the
daylight side of the orbit.
Escape/Re_cue Requirement _ for Hazards S and 2
No escape/rescue requirement exists for this hazard.
DATA SOURCES RF2ERENCES
1. Apollo Illumination Environment Simulation and Study, W. K. Kincaid, Jr.,
and L. M. Glasser, Biotechnology Organization, LMBC, NAS 9-7661, for
NASA/MBC.
2. Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle, NAS 9-9206, LMBC-A959837, dated
22 September 1969, for NASA/_FC.
3. Solar Illumination Environment Simulation (currently in progress at
LMSC, Biotechnology Organization) NAS 9-11237, for NASA/MSC. Subject
of this study is Skylab docking.
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HAZARDSTUDY27
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
1. During daylight docking with an orbiting vehicle, the Sun line should
be maintained within the limits shownon the accompanyingsketch
(Fig. 1). Specific geometry maynarrow these limits in order to avoid
glare or veiling.
2. Problems of Sun orientation during docking maybe avoided by completing
the maneuveron the dark side of the orbit while using artificial light-
ing.
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The limits shown were obtained
from lighting simulation studies
at Lockheed Missiles & Space
Company under contract to NASA.
Fig. 1. Definition of Docking Sun Angle for a Space
Shuttle/Space Station Configuration
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HAZARDSTUDY28
LIGHTINGANDVISIBILITY DURINGLANDING
(WITH LUNAR DUST EFFECTS)
INTRODUCTION
The dust layer on the surface of the Moon varies widely during LM landings
based on the limited evidence from the three landings that have occurred to
date. Armstrong's remarks just before touchdown to the effect that .... 'we
are raising alittle dust here,' amd Conrad's remarks about great obscuration
while still several tens of feet above the surface serve to support that
early conclusion (Ref. I, 2)
The discussion in Ref 3 indicates that a veiling luminance can exist, due to
sunlight striking the dust plume formed during landing, between the lunar
surface and the viewer inside the LM. The sun also illuminates the lunar
surface beneath the dust plume but such illumination is strongly attenuated
by the dust plume leading to a decreased surface luminance. As the LM de-
scends to a point close to touchdown the shadow of the LM and light trans-
mission loss due to the dust plume yield poor viewing conditions. At a
height from five feet above the surface down to two feet the lighting condi-
tions deteriorate very rapidly until at two feet the surface is badly obscured.
In addition to problems raised by sun illumination of the lunar surface at
undesirable sun angles, there may be situations in which no sun illumination
exists at all, that is, a night landing. The latter requires floodlights on
the tug for use during landing. The optimum location of such floodlights is a
tug design problem.
The hazard of poor visibility when very close to the surface really focuses
on whether or not a lunar rock (or deep hole) exists, where any of the foot-
pads touch down, which will be sufficient in height (or depth) to cause the
spacecraft to overturn or land at an angle precarious for lift-off procedures
2-194
L_C-A984262C
later on. It is assumedthat sufficient information exists beforehand to
preclude any landing on so steep an incline that the tug will topple over
upon landing.
ASSUMPTIONS
I. The dust layer conditions at any new landing site on the lunar surface
will be essentially unknown.
2. Eventually, at the 'permanent' lunar base a prepared landing site will
be available so that little or no dust will be raised on landing at the
base.
3. At the time that space tug landings commenceon the lunar surface the
lunar vertical indicators carried aboard the tug will be accurate to a
small fraction of a degree. It is assumedthat two such instruments
are aboard, each independent of the other, and that tug pilots will
believe their instruments.
4• Wheneverthere are more than two crew membersmaking a descent at least
one of the crew will be assigned as an observer to aid the pilot during
the last one hundred feet or so and to search for surface hazards•
5. Given the choice, landings will occur under preferred sun lighting condi-
tions. However, because of the possibility of rescue operations occurring
at any time, landing capabilities must be independent of sun lighting
conditions.
MAJORHAZARDS
I • During the last few feet of the landing procedure the thruster(s) plume
impinges on the lunar surface. This leads to visual obscuration of the
landing site by virtue of the copious quantity of dust raised. The
apparent (visual) landing geometry is therein distorted which may lead
the pilot to set an incorrect attitude into the spacecraft resulting in
the potential hazard of overturning on landing.
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ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard I, Visual Obscuration by Dust
The discussion in Ref. I includes a description of visual obscuration due to
dust during the landings on the Apollo 11 and Apollo 12 Lunar Modules.
Conrad's landing appeared to be precarious because he had great difficulty
in seeing the lunar surface during the last 50 feet (approximately) of descent.
(Ref. 2) He also stated that he had considerable doubt about his lunar verti-
cal indicator's reading during that final landing interval, which suggests
poor visual information since the indicator proved to be correct. The visual
problem is a function not only of the dust cloud raised per se but also of
sun lighting/elevation angle effects and spacecraft orientation with respect
to the sun's rays.
If the spacecraft touches down at incorrect attitude or velocity, it may over-
turn or be damaged. Some of the crew may be injured. A lander footpad touching
down on a large rock could also cause overturning or a precarious attitude for
liftoff.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 1
Preventive measures:
I. Visual conditions are improved by conducting landings at relatively low
sun angles with surface features in high contrast. A landing approach
with the sun at the pilot's back should also be selected if possible.
2. Great reliability should be built into the lunar vertical measurement and
indicator system such that the pilots can have faith in the information
displayed and have less need to depend on clear visual information.
3. Since most tug landings will be conducted with more than two crew members
on board, it should be advantageous to have one or more members acting as
observers from the time the tug reaches 100 feet (approx.) altitude until
touchdown. Essential 'landing adjustments, to avoid obstacles can be made
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by the pilot as a result of receiving information from his observers.
Remedial measures:
I. Measures to correct damageresulting from a bad landing charged to visi-
bility will be no different from corrections for landing damageresulting
from other causes. Somemeansfor leveling a tilted lander should be
provided. This maybe accomplished by using jacks built into the landing
legs or carried as auxiliary equipment aboard the tug. Rescueassist-
ance may be required if the vehicle cannot be safely flown back to lunar
orbit.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard I
If, despite full attention to corrective measures noted above, the tug over-
turns or is rendered inoperative on landing then the crew must be rescued.
Some members may be injured.
Effects of Hazard 2, Landing at a Precarious Attitude
The spacecraft can set down in a deep hole or on a large lunar rock even
with good visual observation of the landing site. The LM in the Apollo 14
flight did set down with one leg in a shallow crater; the situation was not
identified until the astronauts came out for their first EVA, (Ref. 4).
With or without good visibility, 'roofed' holes or a crevasse obscured by
loose lunar surface material are hazards not discernible by visual observa-
tion. As a consequence, some other detection technique will have to be de-
veloped if this phenomena presents itself. The roofed hole and covered
crevasse is fairly common in Antarctica where much equipment and several
lives have been lost in encounters with these hazards. The effects of this
hazard are similar to Hazard I in that the spacecraft may overturn or be
damaged as one footpad settles in a roofed hole or covered crevasse; some
crew members may be injured. The spacecraft may be left in an undesirable
attitude for liftoff.
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Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
I. Methods for detecting and avoiding 'roofed' holes or local surface areas
with low bearing pressure capability may need to be developed.
2. It is recommended that dynamics studies of landing be performed in order
to determine whether an abort or hovering maneuver can be automatically
programmed to occur at any time the lander tilt attitude exceeds a pre_
selected safe angle.
Remedial measure for Hazard 2 are identical to those for Hazard I.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
If, despite full attention to corrective measures noted above, the tug over-
turns or is rendered inoperative on landing then the crew must be rescued.
Some members may be injured.
Effects of Hazard 3, Night Landing Accident
Because the actual occurrence of rescue situations cannot be predicted, and
because any given rescue operation may take place independent of prevailing
lighting conditions, the tug and its crew must be prepared to make night
landings. When landing at night the tug crew will be dependent upon their
instruments and artificial lights for guidance. Error may result in damage,
overturn, or disabling of the tug on the surface and crewmen could be injured.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 3
Preventive Measures:
1. Multiple flares used for night landings could be fixed so as to cast light
on the landing area while the tug is still hovering and preferably used
for several minutes before hovering itself ensues.
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2. Floodlights should be mountedon the tug and oriented to provide optimal
lighting of the lunar surface.
3. It is suggested that portable lighting equipment be provided on all t_s
so that the crew of a disabled tug on the surface - someof whosemembers
are presumably uninjured - can lay out lights in a safe landing area.
Remedial measures for Hazard 3 are the sameas for Hazard 1.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
If the tug makes a faulty night landing which disables the tug, then its
crew in turn will have to be rescued.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
]. Log of Apollo 11, NASA EP-72, Page 4, "4:05 PM (EDT) ... picking up some..."
Aldrin/Armstrong at 30 ft. altitude at Tranquility Base).
2. Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 24, 1969, Page 22, "...lot
dustier then..." (Conrad commenting on dust in Oceanus Procellarum;
altitude - 50 ft.)
3. LM Soil Erosion and Visibility Investigations, Part S, Summary Report,
R. E. Hutton, 11176-606-R0-00, TRW for NAS/_C, August 13, 1969.
4. Communications via CBS from Astronauts Shepard and Mitchell at beginning
of EVA I during Apollo 14mission.
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HAZARD SIIIDY 28
SUMNARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. Provision shall be made in the design and planned operations of manned
lunar lander vehicles to have crew members acting as observers commen-
cing at i00 ft altitude to advise the pilot of surface conditions and
obstacles.
2. Routine lunar landings shall be planned with a preference for times of
low angle sun lighting. In particular, landings at unexplored sites
during lunar night, or times of high angle sun lighting, should be avoi-
ded except for emergencies.
3. Methods for detecting and avoiding 'roofed' holes, or local surface areas
with low bearing pressure, during lunar landing shall be developed, un-
less it can be shown that such hazards do not exist.
4. Rescue landers shall be provided with flares and floodlights for use dur-
ing night landings.
5- Surface crews shall be provided with lighting equipment, signal devices,
and radio beacons, as well as voice communication equipment for assisting
a manned landing at their surface site.
6. Surface crews shall aid incoming landers by site preparation and/or se-
lection, identification of obstacles, lighting, and steering information
where possible.
7- The dynamics of landing should be studied to determine whether an abort
or hovering maneuver can be automatically programmed to occur at any time
the lander tilt attitude exceeds some preselected safe angle°
8. Means for leveling vehicles following landing on the lunar surface shall
be provided.
W
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a The use of various optical filters in lander viewing ports should be
tested in an effort to find mesns for reducing the effects of glare
on vision.
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HAZARD STUDY 29
COMMUNICATIONS ON THE LUNAR SURFACE
INTRODUCT ION
During the course of lunar surface exploration various activities will occur
outside of the base itself (i.e., out on the lunar surface). Lunar surface
operations will involve landings from and departure to lunar orbit, opera-
tions in small and large b_ses, surface EVA either in the base vicinity or
from a rover or lunar flyer out on a traverse. The success of all of these
operations is a strong function of the ability to maintain good communica-
tions among all the elements of the system including those on the lunar sur-
face, in lunar orbit and at the Earth.
The communications system will provide the following functions:
1. Navigation aid and position reporting
2. Status monitoring of all elements
3. Data/Information flow
4. Engineering aid requests for experiments, vehicles, etc.
5. Provides assurance of safety and well being for the crews.
ASSUMPTIONS
For small bases (e.g., Lunar Lander Tug)
a. One or more men will be inside the base at all times.
b. One or more men may participate in activity within 1 nm (less than
2 km) of the landed tug in an EVA mode.
c. Two or more men may be out in a small rover or lunar flyer a dis-
tance of up to 8 nm (13 km) from the base.
For the extended lunar surface base, similar conditions will hold along with
the increased capability of this larger base:
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d. One or more men will be inside the b_.se at all times, except in
emergency situations.
e. One or more men may participate in activity in the immediate vicinity
of the lunar b_se; they may not b_ further away than one nautical
mile (less than 2 km) from the base at any time.
f. Two men may be out on a long traverse, in the cabin rover 270-400 nm
(435-645 km). Alt0_rnately, two men may b_ out in the small rover or
lunar flyer a distance up to 8 nm (13 km) from the b_se.
g. Either lunar b_se will have voice contact with mission control at
Earth at intervals of one hour every day.
h. Rovers and flyers will be based in pairs in the interest of having
vehicles to go after crew members in a rescue or other situations.
i. The lunar space station or an orbital tug will be able to provide
communications relay services when the geometry involving it and
the rover or flyer concerned is appropriate.
j. Earth stations are available for communications relay at all times.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
i. Failure of communications (receiving or transmitting or both) in flyers,
rovers, or in the equipment of an EVA astronaut in the vicinity of the
base, leading to isolation of the crew at a location not well estab-
lished. This in turn results in the following:
a. A lack of vital support and direction from the lunar b_se
b. No ability to call for aid, if needed
c. Insufficient information at the lunar b_se to carry out a rescue
mission if that is required
d. This could lead to initiating an unneeded rescue mission.
Effeccs of Critical Communications Failure
i. Critical communications failure is assumed to be loss of ability to
transmit or to receive or both. A crew on traverse is deprived of com-
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munication support from the base for navigation, function monitoring,
and advice, while the b_se may be unable to receive a call for assist-
ance. The base may lack information concerning crew location, particu-
larly if the crew has continued to move since the last report or has
headed b_ck for the b_se following the failure.
Corrective Measures
A b;_sic philosophy that is proposed for communications is that, except for
operations where outside help or a safe haven are very near at hand (e.g.,
EVA within 1 nm of the base), a surface mission will be aborted following
any failure reducing communication capability to one normal mode plus a
backup. Thus a traverse mission beyond 1 nm would never start with less
than one primary, one secondary, and one backup communication system. For
the exception where help or haven are near at hand a primary system plus a
backup would suffice, with the activity aborted following failure of either
system. Contact may be direct or through orbital, Earth based, or lunar
surface based relays as appropriate. Failure detection and warning must be
provided.
In the event of partial or total loss of communications while on a traverse
with either type of rover or the flyer, plans shall exist concerning actions
to b_ taken _y the crew on traverse, bj_ the lunar b_se, and by lunar orbital
spacecraft and/or the Earth mission-control. In general, the loss of pri-
mary or secondary communications will automatically lead to an abort of the
mission.
For a situation where communications are totally lost, plans will exist to
ascertain whether or not a crew on traverse stays at a fixed location to
await rescue or starts hack to the lunar b_se under directions preplanned for
that eventuality. Similar planning will exist for an EVA astronaut in the
immediate vicinity of the base.
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Escape/Rescue Requirements
i. If the primary or secondary communications systems fail, the flyer's or
rover's mission must be aborted.
2. If all communications fail for an EVA astronaut on a rover or flyer
mission, rescue is required.
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HAZARDSTUDY29
SUMMAEYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
1. Each EVAastronaut in the vicinity of a lunar base shall have primary,
secondary, and emergencybackup communication systems.
2. An EVAastronaut shall start a return to the base immediately following
a failure of either primary or secondary communications.
3. Each rover and flyer shall have independent primary and secondary com-
munication systems. For traverses beyond 1 nmfrom the base, an emer-
gency system shall be added.
4. Rover and flyer traverses beyond 1 nmfrom the base shall be aborted
immediately following any communications failure which reduces the total
capability to two transmitters and two receivers.
5. Plans for action to be followed in the event of partial or complete com-
munications failure shall be prepared prior to any mission. Plans will
be revised as necessary during the mission.
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HAZARD STUDY 30
COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SPACECRAFT IN LUNAR ORBIT
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of high grade, reliable communications is basic to the
operation of manned spacecraft in lunar orbit. Such communications will be
carried not only among spacecraft in lunar orbit and to Earth stations but
also, once surface missions start, with vehicles and bases on the lunar
surface. Eventually, surface traffic will appear on the far side of the
Moon. This will then increase the need for communications facilities in
lunar orbit and/or require a comsat at the L2 libration point.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. Early communications following manning of an orbiting lunar station will
be carried out among lunar orbital spacecraft and Earth stations. After
about 6 months of activity in lunar orbit, sorties to the lunar surface
will be initiated at regular intervals and communications will be ex-
panded to include the surface activities.
2. Each orbital spacecraft has a minimum of two independent communications
systems, following past and current practice for manned spacecraft sys-
tems. Additionally, astronauts that engage in EVA from the spacecraft
will have a primary and a secondary communications system.
3. No situation ever exists which causes all lunar orbital spacecraft to
lose all of their communications simultaneously.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. An EVA astronaut has a malfunction of his primary and secondary communi-
cations system leading to isolation of all information about him from the
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lunar space station or other spacecraft from which he egressed. The
astronaut cannot call for aid if he needs it, except by the use of hand
signals if he is in sight of personnel aboard his monitoring spacecraft.
One of the space tugs in lunar orbit loses all of its communications
capability; as a consequence other lunar spacecraft whether on the sur-
face or in orbit can no longer send or receive information to or from
that tug. The tug cannot call for aid or information if needed. This
would be a crucial situation should a rescue be underway.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
W
Effects of Hazard I, EVA Astronaut's Communications Loss
Loss of communications leads to a lack of information exchange between EVA
astronaut and the spacecraft from which he is operating. The information in-
cludes both voice communication and monitoring of the vital signs (life func-
tions) of the astronaut, thus knowledge about astronaut well-being is not
constantly available. Nor can the astronaut call for aid if he should have
such a need. Hand signals could occasionally alleviate the latter problem.
Corrective Measures for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
i. Provide two independent, highly reliable, communications systems for
each EVA astronaut.
2. Communications should be continually monitored by crewmen in tug or
space station.
3. Use the EVA buddy system.
4. Check communications at frequent, fixed intervals.
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Remedial Measures:
i. Provide an automatic alarm in case of circuit failure in either voice
or vital signs monitoring.
2. The EVA astronaut should return to the station immediately following
knowledge of failure of either primary or secondary communications.
3. Separately powered blinker light signals should be used to indicate
distress.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
Primary measure is for EVA astronaut and monitoring spacecraft to recognize
lack of communications and to get a signal to the astronaut to tell him to
return to his spacecraft immediately. If astronaut's alarm does not work,
and a light signal or jerk on the tether does not alert him, then another
astronaut is required to go out and get the crew member whose system has
failed.
q&
Effects of Hazard 2, Loss of Communications in a Space Tug in Lunar Orbit
Communications are lost by a space tug due to a hardware failure within the
subsystem or a failure generated by a meteoroid strike. As a result, the
tug crew is isolated from all other personnel in the lunar complex so that
the crew's well being is in doubt. The crew can neither ask for nor receive
directions for the activity that they are engaged in during the communica-
tions blackout. Should this particular tug suddenly be needed for an urgent
operation it will not be available since it cannot be called via the com-
munications net. If such a loss occurred during a rescue mission, the
rescue itself will be endangered.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
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I. Provide independent, highly reliable primary, secondary, and tertiary
communication systems o_ each space tug.
2. Check communications at frequent, fixed intervals.
3. Carry critical spare parts, and schedule preventive maintenance
and replacement.
Remedial measures:
4
1. Provide on-board repair or replacement capability.
2. Return the tug to the orbiting space station for repair following
failure of any one communication system, if on-board repair capa-
bility is not adequate.
3. Provide coded external light beacons on the tug for emergency backup
signals.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
None required.
Further Discussion
A communications loss for the lunar space station is not deemed to be a major
hazard because of the following:
i. The station will have a multiplicity of communications systems aboard
which are independent of one another.
2. The antennas for these communications systems are expected to be widely
separated on the station and there is expected to be duplicate antennas.
3. All communications systems (as is true for other subsystems) are expected
to be checked out on a regular basis with preventive maintenance applied
as required to keep all subsystems operational.
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4. The lunar space station is expected to have multiple spares aboard for
all critical parts of the communications system. Somerepair capability
is expected to be available in the station as well.
5. In the unlikely event that all of its radio communications fail, the
station could operate its communicationsfrom a tug docked to it.
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HAZARD STUDY 3O
SGMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
i. Each EVA astronaut shall have independent, highly reliable primary,
secondary, and emergency backup communications systems. Loss of the
primary system yields an immediate and mandatory requirement for the
astronaut to return to his spacecraft°
2. For circuit failure of his primary communications system, it is recom-
mended that an independent alarm be set off for the EVA astronaut.
3. It is strongly recommended that EVA activity be carried out using the
buddy system, or the presence of a safety man.
4o Communications with an EVA astronaut shall be monitored and checked at
frequent fixed intervals by a crewman in the nearby tug or space station.
5- Provision shall be made to signal an EVA astronaut that his communications
have failed. Suggested signals are lights and jerks on the tether.
6. Each communication system shall be checked at frequent fixed intervals.
7. Each space tug shall have a minimum of three independent, highly reliable
communication systems.
8. All space tugs shall have external beacons (lights) for use as a backup
signalling device.
9- Each space tug in lunar orbit shall be able to dock to the space station
in order to re-establish communications by using the station facilities,
or by having repairs made to its own system, or by a combination of these
methods.
lO. The tug shall be returned from an orbital mission to the orbiting lunar
station for repair following any communications failure that cannot be
corrected on board.
ll. The lunar space station shall have some capability to perform scheduled
maintenance, and repairs and replacement for communications subsystems.
12_ Space tugs should be designed to be able to act as the emergency communi-
cations center for the lunar space station.
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13. For each specific type of failure a 'flight' plan shall be prepared
giving the course of action to be followed for each eventuality. These
plans shall be a function of the kind of failure (e.g., lifetime ex-
ceeded, meteoroid strike, collision with orbital debris, etc.), the loca-
tion of the spacecraft, the operational scenario, the degree of avail-
ability of external assistance, etc.
q&
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HAZARD STUDY 31
RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS - NATURAL AND MAN-MADE
INTRODUCTI ON
The innate curiosity and inquisitiveness of man, which, through the ages has
driven him into the exploration of regions beyond his local horizon and
sphere of knowledge, has also continually exposed man to new and often
hazardous environments. Sometimes, when the new environment and acquired
knowledge are useful he carries it with him into further quests and ventures,
as in the case of new energy sources upon which he can rely for survival and
transport. Thus, he must often reassess the sum total of his hazard burden,
the hazard potential of the things he takes with him and the potential
hazards he faces in a region that is new and of which he has only very
limited knowiedge.
This study area considers the natural and man-made radiological hazards
associated with manned exploration operations in the lunar environment.
ASSUMPTIONS {
i. The natural primary radiation environment in lunar orbit and on the
lunar surface is taken to be as defined in NASA TM X-53865. Solar
particle event data is to be taken from the same reference work (Ref. i).
2. It is assumed that the man-made sources of hazardous ionizing radiation
employed in lunar exploration will consist of the following:
Microwave equipment
Laser equipment
X-ray equipment
Radioisotopic power generators
Nuclear power plants
3. It is assumed that for the normal operating situations, all man-made
sources of hazardous ionizing radiation are adequately shielded,
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contained, or oriented, such that essentially no dose is delivered to
operating personnel or personnel in the vicinity of the operating device.
For a given crew, it is assumed that solar flare dose effects (where
applicable) are accrued in the first several days of the crew tour of
duty.
Crew exposure limits utilized for the analysis are the "anticipated crew
radiation limits" currently being considered by the NASA-Radiation Con-
straints Panel as a revision to the "Provisional Radiation Dose Limits
for Manned Space Flight Beyond Apollo." (Ref. 2)
The hazard generators considered in this study area are necessarily restricted
Theas to energy type and are discussed only in terms of general attributes.
generators of concern are as follows:
I.
.
Natural sources:
a. Galactic cosmic radiation
b. Solar flare particle radiation
The characteristics of (and the distinction between) galactic cosmic
radiation and solar flare particle radiation is given in Table 1.
Man-made sources:
a. Electromagnetic radiation- as encountered from microwave, laser,
and x-ray radiating equipments.
b. Nuclear Radiation - consisting of high energy slpha, beta and gamma
emissions from unstable isotopes, whether the product of a fission
process or simply the decay of a radioisotope species.
c. Radiological Contaminants - as characterized by the release to the
environment of nuclear isotopic materials either as mixed fission
products (gases and/or solids), or, as specific isotopic species.
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THE MAIOR HAZARD
O
The major hazard which can potentially be generated by the natural space
radiation environment and man-made nuclear energy conversion devices is the
exposure of man to levels of high energy radiation which could expend or ex-
ceed established crew radiation exposure limits. The magnitude of the po-
tential hazard ranges from small incremental increases in crew total radia-
tion exposure to large dose burdens which could be physiologically intoler-
able to the crew's health and well being.
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR HAZARD
The major hazard of concern then is the exposure of man as a biological en-
tity to ionizing radiation which is known to degrade and produce injury at the
basic molecular and cellular level in the human organism. The most singular
attribute of the radiation exposure hazard is that the presence of a radia-
tion field is normally not apparent to man. In fact, its presence carmot
usually be sensed by man until the energy input involved is well into regions
where exposure has already begun to fatally injure the man. Fortunately,
however, man has learned to detect the presence of radiation with a wide
variety of detection instruments which can sense and measure the type and
intensity of the radiation field. _n is therefore very much dependent upon
such instrumentation to keep him aware of the radiation environment around
him. A second and very significant attribute of the radiation exposure hazard
derives directly from the practically instantaneous rate changes which can
occur in exposures from malfunctioning or breached man-made sources. A
similar attribute is characteristic of solar flares, although the rate changes
are a matter of minutes rather than milliseconds.
The principal exposure mechanisms which present a potential radiation hazard
are the following:
1. Natural Sources -
a. Galactic Cosmic Radiation - a relatively constant flux of low intensity
and isotropic distribution.
2-217
LMSC-A984262C
.
b. Solar Particle Events - sporadic proton showers resulting from sudden
and sometimes unexpected solar flare activity. While sun activity
cycles are generally known, specific flare activities within the
cycle are unpredictable. A worst case situation would be a prolonged
flare exceeding 1-2 days with unexpected intensity magnitudes.
Man-Made Sources -
a. Microwaves - exposures to beam power densities close to or exceeding
.1 watts/cm 2 producing a thermal biological response.
b. X-Rays - Faulty shielding of high power electron tubes (Klystrons,
etc.). Cumulative stray exposure from x-ray type analytical tools.
c. Laser Beams - inadvertent exposure to high energy beam or pulses of
laser type equipments. Exposure of eyes to moderate energy beams of
low intensity laser equipment.
d. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (Ref. 6) -
(i) Alpha Emitters (Plutonium-238, Curium-242, or Polonium-210) -
Burns resulting from inadvertent contact with heat capsule
during assembly; or, Alpha contamination resulting from rupture
of heat capsule.
(2) Beta Emitters (Strontium-90) - Exposure to gamma radiation if
RTG shielding is breached. Beta emitter contamination if
source capsule is ruptured.
e. Nuclear Electrical Power Systems (Ref. 7) -
(i) Ambient radiation environment around reactor compartment.
(2) Loss of Reactor compartment shield integrity.
(3) Leakage of fission products into heat transfer system outside
of reactor shield.
The Hazards Effects
The effects of the major hazard upon man have been extensively studied for
a number of years. A recent work (Ref. 5) has rather thoroughly examined the
effects of radiation upon man as such effects relate to manned space flight.
The authors concluded that, practically speaking, a "threshold of damage"
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concept for radiation effects upon mandoes not per se exist, and further,
that any amount of radiation contributed in someextent to "life shortening"
for man. Hence, any "exposure limits" criteria would have to reflect the
concept of - "the price you want to pay for the activity you want to accomp-
lish"-type of philosophy. While this is probably true in the absolute sense,
there is also available other data which indicate that for select populations
working to controlled radiation exposure limits, there has been no notice-
able difference in general longevity or general health.
Based upon available information from many sources, the NASA-Radiation Con-
straints Panel has set forth a table of values for allowable crew exposure
limits published as the "Radiation Dose Limits for MannedSpaceFlight in
Skylab, Shuttle, and Space Station/Base Programs" (Ref. 9).
TABLE2
RADIATIONEXPOSURELIMITS ANDEXPOSURERATE
CONSTRAINTSFORUNITREFERENCERISK (rem)
EXPOSEDAREA I YR. AVG.
DEPTH DAILY 20 DAY qUARTERLY EARLY CAREER
SKIN (0.i MM) 0.6 75 105 225 1,200
EYE (3 MM) 0.3 37 52 ll2 600
TESTES(3CM) 0.i 13 18 38 200
MARROW(5 CM) 0.2 25 35 75 400
P
i
Table 2 provides the measurement basis for evaluation of the radiation exposure
rate-time effects upon the crew in terms of total exposure accountability.
le Natural Sources Effects:
The exposure of lunar exploration personnel to the lunar ambient cosmic
radiation fields and the effects of solar flares upon cumulative crew
dose burden may be estimated utilizing data from the NASA TM-X-53865
(Ref° 1). Figure 1 presents a plot of the Ref° 1 data superimposed upon
the crew exposure limits taken from Table 2. The data are given for the
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nominal cosmic radiation field and for the nominal cosmic radiation field
plus a solar flare event. The curve assumes that the solar flare occurred
on the first day of crew residence in lunar orbit. The effects of two
different shielding densities are included in the data. Figure 1 rather
pointedly illustrates the necessity for a well shielded "storm cellar"
for limiting crew dose from solar flare events. It is quite likely that
shielding in excess of lO gm/cm 2 will be required for the "storm cellar"
shelter area as a guard against multiple successive solar flare occurrences.
Electromagnetic Radiation Effects:
Devices such as microwave and laser generators are normally capable of
beam power output values greatly in excess of safe human exposure limits
even when operated at low power levels. For example, a value of .1 watt/
2
cm for microwave will produce thermo-biological effects (cooking) in the
human body from beam absorption. The normal allowable exposure is .O1
watts/c 2 for an unshielded man. For lasers operating in the visible
light range (0.4 _m to 1.4 _m), the threshold for eye damage is 1 x lO-5
watt/cm 2 ( CW mode ) and 1 x lO-6 joule/cm 2 for the pulsed mode.
High Energy Radiation Effects:
Devices which generate radiative energy at wavelengths smaller than lO-4mm
produce ionizing radiation of increasing energy content as the frequency
gets smaller. This phenomena begins with UV, and becomes more pro-
nounced as the x-ray and gamma ray wavelengths are approached. Since the
wavelength becomes miniscule it is customary to refer to penetrating ion-
izing radiation in terms of its energy. The only real difference between
x-rays and gamma rays is the photon energy content and the fact that x-rays
can be produced by electron bombardment of a heavy metal target and gamma
rays are normally the product of a nuclear state decay or disintegration
event. For both x-ray and gamma ray emitters the amount of shielding re-
quired is dependent upon the photon energy and the device is shielded
against the strongest photon it emits.
The effects of x-ray and gamma ray exposure have been studied extensively
and accurate dosimetry techniques are readily available for sensing and
measuring h_man exposure in terms of any part of the energy spectrum.
I
2-220
LMSC-A984262C
,t
m
\
\
\
\
\
!
a_
4_
o
.r_
ID
"_ 0
0N
0
_'_nc_
o_
.el
2-221
LIV_CA-984262C
m_
co
v
w#
H
tt_
oo
oA
CD
E e_ _
O ea o
_ _c: Jc:
es _'-
"o'_.
_oc_
_oos_
6A_
__=_o_
e3_ o
i5=
_-_
wo o_ _--_ c_ _ _._ _0°c_ _ _o.- _
__u' .' . _ _a _ , _
t_ _ ' _ _ _3 o -- =- o _.- .
°_o
e_ _ _.).__.
.._ m.-_.
_.o_
,,e,o-_-- .=
_W _,_
.,-, ,_.-
_, -_ .,,,,
8_8
AdVW3H1
(]3ON3_N_NOD3_
_,_
o
_" •
&°
2-222
LF_C-A984262C
b
O_
H
H
H
_o
i
E-4
o
H
LAS
z
m
C.D
O z
1,0
o
"_ _ V V _ _
_ __V V
_., o o
o
._ _ _ o° o
F--
n,
',' I--
_._ .c_ 5_D _ "' "' _ "'
_D r_ 0 ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,,I.A.I
0 "'
0
0
z
._ ._ n.- r._ 0
0 0 "-t-
o 0
_ _' V V "_" _ "-'
_ _ _ _ V V V
o
, o o O
O • o o O
o o O o o
I.A-
u,,
z
z
O
i,i
O
X
_A.
O
_D
..Z
n,,
n,,
2 -223
LI_C-A984262C
I
/
/ i"
/////// / /////////////// / /
OW
Ou_
0 w
Z
1111 I ; Itttt, , _ , lltttl I I I lilll l I
SI_IOH - SD_DO S_IIlS"O_ l,IDK¢ S],LII
/
P-4
>-
I.-
• -..I
.<
D_
.<
.I--
-_-_o
04
v
!
//i
'I=,
(1)
o
N
o
o
+_
o
,<
(D
.H
,%
Od
4_
.H
2-224
LMSC-A9842620
.
Exposure accounting techniques are also well developed which provide for
each crewman his total exposure burden at any time based upon his sensor
badge and dosimeter readings.
Particle Radiation Effects:
For devices such as radioisotope thermal generator sources and nuclear
fission sources there are additional energy sources to be considered. A
radioisotope may decay by the emission of an alpha particle (helium nuclei),
a beta particle (positron) and/or gamma rays. Normally the source en-
closures are sealed and of sufficient thickness to stop or absorb alpha
or beta particles. However, should the enclosures be damaged or breached
it is possible to release the isotope source material into the local en-
vironment with serious contamination and exposure problems ensuing.
.
The problem of radiation exposure associated with a nuclear power gener-
ator (employing a fission reactor) have been examined in another study
area and the reader is referred to Ref. 7 for study details.
Gross Exposure Effects:
The major impact of ionizing radiation upon living cells of the human body
is the fact that some degradation of the collective cell structure will
occur each and every time an exposure occurs. The collective cell struc-
ture tolerates and adapts to the low radiation levels found over the
Earth's surface. Exposure to higher levels of ionizing radiation over
periods of time has been demonstrated to be deleterious to human health
as evidenced by numerous medical studies (Ref. 5). Exposure to very
high radiation levels even for short periods of time can place the human
organism in dire jeopardy as indicated in Tables 3 and 4. The generalized
effects of large radiation exposures to crew personnel may be inferred
from the data presented in Figure 2. The figure presents the radiation
dose versus time since exposure occurrence and provides a rough measure
of the degradation of personnel capability with time after exposure.
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Corrective Measures
Preventive Measures:
i. The principal means of controlling crew exposure to the natural sources
of radiation Will be the shielding afforded by the orbiting lunar station,
the crew modules, the lunar surface base and the cabin-type rover for
surface activity.
2. Protection from the man-made radiation sources must be afforded as an
inherent part of the source design. For those sources employing isotopes,
fission products, or fissionable materials, double containment must be pro-
vided to preclude spillage, leakage, and the contamination of the local
environment. (Ref. 9)
3. It must not be possible for crew personnel to activate or energize micro-
wave, laser, or x-rayequipments from positions which expose them to the
output of such equipments.
Remedial Measures:
i. Remedial corrective measures for countering the effects of overexposure
to the several types of ionizing radiation are largely of a medical nature.
Hence, the Orbiting Lunar Station will be required to maintain in the
medical kit an adequate minimum supply of emergency treatment drugs and
reagents.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
In view of the lack of established guidelines for action to be taken in the
event of sudden overexposure to high energy ionizing radiation, the following
tentative guidelines are proposed for consideration:
1. For individual crewmen involved;
a. Up to 25 REM- Station duty only and Earth return at end of normal
duty tour
b. In excess of 25 REM but not over 75 REM - Under medical surveillance
with possible light duty and Earth return at next opportunity
c. In excess of 75 REM - Emergency treatment and prompt return to Earth
via tug°
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me For more than two crewmen involved;
a. For exposures in excess of 75 REM- Requires immediate return of
exposed perso,mel.
J
Q
SOURCE DATA REFERENCES
i. "Natural Environment Criteria for the NASA Space Station Program," Second
Edition, NASA TM X-53865, D. K. Weidner, Ed., NASA-MSFC, Aug 20, 1970.
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7059, General Electric Co., Nov. 24, 1970.
3. "Air Force Systems Command, Design Handbook 1-3, Personnel Subsystems -
(Design Note 302)," First Ed., Rev. 3, 1 Jan. 1969.
4. "Air Force Systems Command, Design Handbook 3-2, Space Vehicles, Cahpter 2 -
Natural Environments, Section 20 - Space Environments (DN-202), First Ed.,
Rev. 2, 20 March 1969.
5. "Radiobiological Factors in Manned Space Flight,", W. H. Langham, Editor,
(Report of the Space Radiation Study Panel), National AcademF of Sciences,
National Research Council, Washington, D. C. 1967.
6. "Guidebook for the Application of Space Nuclear Power Systems," Atomic
Industrial Forum, January 1969.
7. "Hazardous Operations In and Around The Orbiting Lunar Station - Nuclear
Power Plant," Study Area 4.5, Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue Study, LMSC,
ll December 1970.
8. Air Force Systems Command, Design Handbook 1-3, Personnel Subsystems,
Chapter 3, Section 3-D- , Radiation (Design Note 3D2). 1st Ed. Rev. 3
1 January 1969.
9. "Radiation Dose Limits for Manned Space Flight in Skylab, Shuttle, and
Space Station/Base Programs", NASA- R. G. Rose, Chairman, Radiation
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10. The applicable sections of Title lO, Chapter I of the Code of Federal
Regulations, (viz Parts 20, 32, 33, 40, 70, and 71) shall be considered
as basic source data.
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HAZARDSTUDY31
SUMMARYOF SAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
i. Consideration of "crew radiation-exposure accountability" must be in-
cluded in the administrative procedures devised for lunar exploration
mission planning. It must be possible to update each crewman's exposure
record at least once each 24 hours.
. Serious consideration shall be given to the implementation of a mission
planning function which will thoroughly evaluate the "crew radiation
exposure potential" for each phase and activity of the planned missions.
e Specific crew safety studies shall be required for each item of mission
equipment capable of emitting ionizing radiation. The studies shall be
conducted in the context of the mission(s) for which the equipment use
is intended. Where several such equipments are to be employed, the
study shall account for the sequential and/or simultaneous use of the
involved equipments.
e All nuclear and isotope source units shall have been demonstrated to be
safely contained against impact, weldment leakages, or containment melt-
through, prior to flight qualification. Where the unit is to be employed
continuously in close proximity to crew quarters and shelters, the unit
shall be doubly contained to avoid all possibility of leakage and local
environment contamination.
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HAZARDSTUDY32
LUNARSURFACEPHYSICALCONDITIONS
INTRODUCTION
The subject of lunar surface physical conditions as a source of hazards to
lunar exploration personnel is one in which the desk-bound analyst is con-
siderably at a disadvantage. The only humanbeings to experience first-hand
the impact of such physical conditions are the Apollo astronauts. Andneed-
less to say, while the lunar samplesreturned have been priceless as sources
of basic composition information, it is impossible to extrapolate from a
box of rocks to surface structure. However, we do have an immensequantity
of photographic data from the Ranger, Orbiter, Surveyor and Apollo missions
which has provided coverage of various kinds of quality for all but a small
percentage of the lunar surface. Thus, it is primarily this photography and the
the Apollo descriptions (Ref. I) from which we can at least visualize some
of the problems which surface explorers may encounter.
ASSUMPTIONS
le
me
Photographs which are currently available reasonably represent the
seleneology of the lunar surface.
Considering the limitations of the seleneological data available to date,
including soil mechanics and characteristics observations, it is possible
that other lunar regions may exhibit characteristics entirely different.
The possibility of surface crust-like formations, sub-surface cavities,
vent-gas blow holes, etc., cannot be presently ruled out. Nor is it
possible to confirm or rule out, as yet, the existence of active venting
sites where lunar outgassing maybe observed.
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THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards to lunar exploration personnel associated with lunar sur-
face physical conditions considered to be of significance are as follows:
i. Lunar Dust
2. Lunar Lighting Phenomena
3. Lunar Soil Mechanics Variation
4. Topographical Natural Barriers
5. Meteoroid Strike Frequency
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of Hazard i, Lunar Dust
The impact of lunar dust in manned exploration of the lunar surface has
already gained prominence as a troublesome hazard as recorded in the mission
reports of the Apollo ll and 12 crew manhours. That the problem will become
more severe with the advent of larger landing vehicles, large rovers, and
dual landing requirements, etc., is a foregone conclusion.
Specific effects noted to date have included suit contamination, experiment
contamination, and landing craft contamination including cabin atmosphere.
The dust, further, was carried into the command module. (Refs. 1 and 2)
A concomittant train of contamination is evident and applicable to the pro-
posed tugs and orbiting lunar station (0LS).
The ingestion of lunar dust in any appreciable quantities is likely to be
serious from a health standpoint considering the accumulated findings of
dust inhalation studies conducted for various earth mining and ore smelting
operations. The impact of lunar dust upon rotating and moving machinery is
certain to affect rover and surface mobility aid equipment design in the
protection of mechanical parts and in providing assurance of visibility for
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the operation. Until more is knownof the dust depth over various regions
of the lunar surface, it must be assumedthat deep dust pockets could occur
which might contribute to the engulfing or entrapment of personnel or equip-
ment.
%
The employment of large landing vehicles having multiple engines has been
postulated as being capable of creating veritable lunar dust storms in the
immediate area of the landing site. Postulated separation distances for dual
or sequential landings are currently on the order of one to one and a half
miles in order to protect the other vehicle from the sandblasting effects
of thrust plume impingement, ejected dust, and small rocks. If such is the
case, then a tug rescue of exposed suited crewmen would be further compli-
cated by the tug landing separation distance requirement.
Corrective M4easures for Hazard i
Preventive measures:
1. A design requirement exists for the development of a dust collector ap-
plicable to cleaning dust from space suits, equipment surfaces, etc.,
in external lunar environment conditions. The principle upon which to
base such a collector (electro-static, etc.) is not readily apparent,
therefore a development requirement also exists. It would be advantageous
to improve the design of equipment so that it is not affected _j lunar
dust. However, establishing a rule for vacuum cleaning of suits and
equipment in airlock before entry into main areas would appear to be
more cost-effective and safer. Suits and equipment must be cleaned in
any case before entry, and dust in the atmospheres of the LSB, tugs or
surface vehicles would be, at the very least, an irritant to membranes
of the respiratory system.
2. A design and development requirement also exists for dust seal applica-
tions on both stat_c and moving equipment components and assemblies em-
ployed in lunar surface experiments and mobility aids.
2-231
L_C-A984262C
e The effects of dust cloud size, dispersion distance, and density result-
ing from large lander landings must be evaluated in terms of potential
constraints imposed upon surface rescue missions.
Remedial measures:
I. Provision of small atmospheric vacuum cleaner in atmosphere containing
shelters, air locks and crew compartments to trap surface dust from suits
in a self-closing contained filter bag or chamber.
2. Provision of two 100 ft. rolls of 3 foot wide highly visible foil with
anchor pins or weights to serve as rescue location marker (X) providing
reference point for landing separation distance estimation by lander
crew in a daylight landing.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 1
None are postulated due to exploratory nature of study.
Effects of Hazard 2, Lunar Lighting Phenomena
The effects of lunar lighting conditions upon personnel activities have been
noted in some detail in the reports of the Apollo ll and 12 missions. The
importance of sun elevation angle for lunar landings is discussed in Ref. 2
and in Hazard Study 28.
The effects of sun elevation will strongly influence not only landing opera-
tions but surface activities as well. It has been reported that the opera-
tors of Russis's Lunokhod-1 have experienced visual difficulty at sun angles
less than 30° when long shadows tended to obscure small craters and crater
depths (Ref. 4). It may also be expected that the exploration of large
craters such as Tycho or Copernicus are going to be lighting-condition con-
strained and will require photographic coverage to obtain sun angle versus
crater floor obstacle definition data prior to any attempted landings on the
floor.
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Rescuemissions will also be constrained by lighting conditions prevalent in
the vicinity of the attemped rescue. Particularly, if somesearch effort is
required to find the distressed personnel. For periods of direct overhead
sunlight (90°) , it will be extremely difficult to find either vehicles or men
in the "wash-out" created by lunar surface back reflectance of light.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive measures:
1. The potential use of polarizing filters to attenuate reflected light
from the lunar surface.
2. The potential application of heliograph type* signalling devices for
distressed surface personnel use as a beacon or even for communication.
3. The use pf simplified radar ranging equipment to aid in surface rover
navigation during unfavorable sun angle periods.
Remedial measures:
i. Provision of a mirror, flare gun, and emergency radio transponder beacon
in all emergency kits for parties on surface sortie of any type.
2. Provision of radar reflecting deployable foil in all emergency kits for
surface sortie personnel utilization.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
None postulated for this study area.
Effects of Hazard _, Lunar Soil Mechanics Variation
The variation of lunar soil types and condition over the surface of the Moon
are largely unknown. However, certain kinds of lurain formations such as
* An instrument for telegraphing by means of the Sun's rays reflected from a
mirror. It has been adapted for use in the dark with its own lamp.
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steep banks, slumpedsoil areas and rocky mountainous or hilly regions do
have familiar counterparts on Earth. The obviously slumped soil formations
lining the crater ruins of Tycho, Copernicus, and other great craters may
well behave like avalanches if sufficiently disturbed by the rocket engine
vibrations of a landing tug descending to the floor of the crater. Or, if
disturbed by a moonquake having its origin in nearby regions. The steep
banks of most craters and somerilles are likely places also to encounter
engulfing avalanches of sliding soil if untethered descent were to be at-
tempted.
The exploration of mountainous regions by suited crewmenis likely to be
limited only to those sites where a lander can be set down, since current
suit technology permits neither long time sorties nor the high metabolic
rates associated with mountain climbing. Hilly regions may be navigable by
a large rover at least to the extent that the winding valleys can be pene-
trated. The problem of unknownvariations in surface soil structure will
only becomeknownby surface exploration. Such phenomenaas surface crust-
ing with variable load support strength, and the possibility of sub-surface
cavities, mayexist in the regions which are thought to be volcanic in
origin. The detection of these soil surface and sub-surface formations re-
quires both seismic and sounding equipments as well as surface penetrometer
measurements. Visual evidence of such phenomenamaywell be obscured by
lunar dust layers. Evidence of fault bridging, a form of crusting, may only
becomeapparent whenthe exploring vehicle falls through the bridging soil
crust, unless suitable detectors are available.
Corrective Measures for Hazard
Preventive measures:
None postulated due to lack of specific soil problem data.
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Remedial measures:
Nonepostulated due to lack of specific data.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard
None identified due to the general nature of this study area, hat soil
mechanics may well generate a situation requiring rescue.
Effect_ _f Hazard 4, Topographical Natural Barriers
The natural b_rriers which are of importance to surface travel are readily
apparent from lunar maps which include elevation measurements. Most of the
major craters appear to be in the group requiring lander operations for
accessibility to _th rims and floor areas. Surface equipments simply could
not scale the heights on such rugged terrain. Other lunar prominences in-
clude mountains which on the near side of the moon reach up to 39,500 feet
in altitude. No doubt there are equivalent heights or higher on the far
side. Such mountains could pose a hazard if a planned landing trajectory
were to cross the region at low altitude.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 4
Preventive measures:
le Operational planning for both descent from orbit and for surface activi-
ties must include detailed information relative to the natural lunar
surface formations with respect to elevation, shortest path around
barriers, and regions where accessibility is restricted.
Remedial measures:
Not applicable to this study area because of lack of mission data.
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Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 4
Not considered for this study area.
Effects of Hazard _, Meteoroid Strike
This hazard requires further study due to the lack of definitive data. The
relative frequency of surface meteoroid strikes could well be different for
definable regions of the Moon and may well be influenced by the regions of
meteoroid origin. Therefore, the hazard is only set forth as a subject re-
quiring further study prior to the initiation of a lunar exploration pro-
gram. Relevant data available is summarized in Ref. 5. No corrective
measures are postulated and no escape/rescue requirements are specified.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. A study is required leading to the selection of a technique for the col-
lection of lunar dust from the exterior of space suits and equipment
surfaces. The collector (vacuum sweeper equivalent) should be capable
of working in space vacuum conditions.
2. A study is required for the design and development of improved dust
seals for static and moving equipment components exposed to lunar dust.
3. A study is required to determine the effects of lunar dust dispersal
created _y larger lunar landers. The effects of the dust dispersal upon
adjacent vehicles and/or parties to be rescued is to be evaluated.
4. A study is recommended for the development of polarizing filters for the
attenuation of lunar surface reflected light. The filters would be
attachable to windows or suit visors.
5. A study should be accomplished on the use of a heliograph type device
for beacon and communication signalling applications on the lunar surface.
6. A specific study is required that involves the planning of early lunar
experiments to ascertain the relative frequency of meteoroid strikes to
the lunar surface. Further, the study must determine if the relative fre-
quency is constant over all areas or varies with lunar latitude and longi-
tude.
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HAZARDSTUDY32
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINECONDITIONS
i. Specifically designed atmospheric vacuumcleaners shall be installed in
shelters, airlocks, and crew compartmentsto be used in final cleanup
of suits after entry and repressurization following lunar surface EVA.
2. Lunar surface sortie parties are to be provided with foil panels (sug-
gested as lOO ft x 3 ft and highly visible in color) which can be un-
rolled to provide a rescue location visual marker (X).
e
e
Surface sortie emergency kits shall include at least a mirror (or helio-
graph), flare gun and emergency radio beacon or transponder for emer-
gency si£maling purposes.
Mision activity planning shall consider detailed information relative
to topographical formations (elevation, etc.) as a necessary part of the
0LS data b_nk. Such information is vital to all landing trajectories
in the avoidance of impact with lunar formations which can have eleva-
tions of approximately 40,000 ft.
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HAZARDSTUDY33
LEAKSIN CABINWALLS
INTRDDL_3TION
4_ Leaks in cabin walls can be caused by a variety of circumstances such as a
meteoroid hit, secondary ejecta from the lunar surface, failures due to over-
loading structural components causing cracks and punctures, degradation of
elastomeric seals in vacuum, distortion of sealed surfaces due to heat, ex-
plosion, collision, vibration, etc. The result in each case is loss of cabin
atmosphere at a rate dependent on the size of the opening and the internal
pressure.
ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that all manned cabins have a certain inherent leakage rate
which has been accounted for in the design of the vehicle, for which make-up
atmosphere is provided; non catastrophic leakage over the prescribed allow-
able is what we are concerned with here. Catastrophic rapid decompression
caused by violent rupture is not the subject of this study area.
THE MAJOR HAZARD
V
The major hazard identified is a serious loss of cabin atmosphere through
a cabin pressure wall.
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Effects of the Hazard
Loss of cabin atmosphere will lead to illness or death due to shortage or
absence of breathing oxygen, unless timely corrective action is taken.
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Corrective Measures
Preventive measures:
1. Provision of a leakage detection system which provides audio and visual
warnings to the crew to enable them to quickly locate the source of the
leak and concurrently make a rapid determination of the leakage rate.
The latter consideration is a parameter the crew needs to know very
quickly in order to decide whether there is sufficient time to repair
the leakwithout having to don space suits. The amount of time avail-
able to the crew, for a typical space cabin of 1000 ft 3, can be seen in
Fig. 1 which shows available time to decompression for 7 and l0 psia
cabin pressures with holes varying in diameter from .10 inches to 2.0
inches. Table 1 lists some leak detection methods suggested in Refer-
ence a.
2. It is estimated that meteoroid strikes on a cabin wall producing a 1/16"
diameter hole will be readily detectable by eye due to the local deforma-
tion of the surrounding sheet metal structure; therefore, detection of
the location of a strike would be made simpler and quicker if cabin walls
are kept clear of equipment.
3. Provide a minimum of two separate living volumes each large enoughto
accommodate the entire crew.
4. Consider providing a self sealing wall.
Remedial measures:
me Repair the damaged walls. Depending on the type and size of the damage
a variety of repair methods have been suggested. Most of the methods in-
volve the application of a room temperature setting, fire proof rubber
or plastic sealant alone or in combination with plugs, patches, tapes
applied to the pressure side of the wall. Other ideas include the use
of self-sealing walls or self-brazing plugs. For awkward corners a
repair patch of sheet-metal customized to fit the damaged area and with
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Table i
LEAKAGEDETECTIONMETHODS
METHOD
PN2decay on N2 utilization
(Requires location detector)
Acoustic (requires large
numbers of detectors)
Ion Gauge(requires large
numbers of detectors be-
tween cabin wall and
bumper)
DESCRIPTION
Determine leak rate by turning off the N2 make
up supply & measuring partial pressure drop
Acoustic pick-ups located in cabin wall, to
detect the sound of air escaping
The ion gauge measurespressure changes in the
cavity of a double wall structure. It can
determine size of leak and approximate loca-
tion
Visual inspection (requires Use of grid lines would help identify loca-
visual access) tion of bulge or damage
Acoustic sniffing Scan cabin walls with ultrasonic detector
Helium sniffing Scanwalls, seals with helium Jet and measure
electrical current change in detector
Stress coat paints Paint distorts in an easily observed manner
Dyes Paint suspected areas to expose cracks
sealant all around it would do the Job. For larger holes i/2" or more, a
patch should be installed with sealed blind mechanical fasteners, using a
sealing compoundbetween faying surfaces. (Ref. a)
It is recommendedthat research be conducted to determine methods of signal-
ing the crew that repairs are needed for walls punctured by a meteoroid.
For example, a paint such that exposure to meteoroid shock would change its
colo_, would be desirable. Equally important is research to ascertain punc-
ture repair methods that are easy to institute and which require minimal
time to execute.
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Escape/Rescue Requirements
No escape/rescue requirements are identified for repairable leaks in cabin
walls.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
a. Repair of Leaks in an Aerospace Environment, ASD-TDR-62-1015.
Feb. 62. J. Withey. General Electric, Philadelphia, Pa.
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HAZARD STUDY ..33
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
I.
.
.
Instantaneous warning and detection/location information for cabin leaks
above nominal shall be provided.
Maximum feasible access to the cabin pressure walls, ceiling, and floor
shall be provided in all space vehicles in order to expedite repair of
leaks. Insofar as it does not seriously compromise equipment functions,
all equipment should be mounted away from vehicle, spacecraft, and base
pressure-containing walls in order to permit such access as will be
necessary for repairs.
Provide capability for supplying emergency oxygen, within seconds, to
all cre_ members, in the event of excessive leaks in a space vehicle
cabin.
4. Kits and procedures for repairing damaged cabin walls shall be provided.
.
It is strongly recommended that, where technically feasible, a minimum
of two separate but interconnected pressure volumes, each capable of
accommodating the entire crew, be provided on all space vehicles.
6. The development of self-sealing walls should be considered.
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HAZARD STUDY 34
HANDLING OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
INTRODUCTION
In any exploration type program the equipments and materials required to
obtain useful information will include a quantity of a so-called hazardous
materials. This group of materials may range from pyrotechnics through
explosives and from water to acids, bases, and cryogenic liquids, and may
include quantities of elemental gases and radioisotopes (Ref. 1). Simi-
larly, the lunar exploration program will involve the use of a great many
materials which basically may be classed as hazardous (Ref. 2). Addition-
ally, some of the materials used and not considered hazardous on Earth may
well prove to be hazardous when employed in the lunar environment and/or
under zero-g conditions. For example, in zero-g water tends to form a
thin layer on surfaces and penetrates spaces amongst electronic equip-
ments causing short circuits. Therefore, water floating free in a cabin
is hazardous.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. Mission exploration and science requirements include necessity
for stores of ordnance, cryogens, chemicals, fuel, and life
support items such as high purity cryogenic oxygen. (Ref. 2).
2. Emergency safety equipment largely is adapted from NASA and
USAF experience for safety equipment and procedures. (Ref. 3
and 4).
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
I. Improper procedures in handling of materials or accidents in
such materials handling.
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2. Unsecuredcargo and equipment including hazardous materials.
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
Effects of Hazard 1, Improper Handling or Accidents With Hazardous Materials
The hazards occasioned by improper handling are applicable to all stores and
specifically applicable to hazardous materials.
The improper, abusive, or careless handling of such materials ranges from
storing fuel and oxidizer materials in the same compartment to the storage
of seismic ordnance at the end of a passage way where it can be rammed by
cargo being moved. Improper handling also includes the failure to store
life support materials away from hazardous chemicals, gases, and propellant
materials in order to avoid contamination (Ref. 5), and loss by fire or
explosion.
The consequences of failing to understand and follow specific handling
instructions based upon the known physical and chemical properties of
various stores could lead to fire, explosion, emission of toxic contami-
nants and metabolic deprivation, usually in rapid order. An event such
as the emplacement and connection of seismic ordnance charges with suit
transmitter energized could result in loss of a crewman.
The hazards effects resulting from improper safeguards in the handling of
hazardous materials are closely related to improper handling effects but
carry the connotation of carelessness and negligence rather than inadver-
tent oversight. The employment of safeguards is a deliberate step inserted
into a procedure to enhance the safety of an operation, and the implied
purpose is to establish a safety action which flags the operation as
dangerous. Therefore, the omission of a safeguard action may be defined
as a conscious or unconscious willful disregard for the safety of the
specified operation. Examples of simple safeguards are signs which read
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"do not stack" or "vent before opening." More sophisticated safeguards may
involve the installation of a specifically designed safety vaSve prior to
rupturing a safety seal to obtain access to a toxic material, or, the con-
nection of an overboard venting device prior to refueling a satellite.
The consequences of failure to observe safeguard requirements range from
endangerment of the crewman and other personnel to outright catastrophe.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 1
Preventive Measures:
I. The following control measures must be implemented in planning
for the handling of hazardous stores:
(a) Specific container design for each type store - clearly
marked.
(b) Specific location in OLS, Tugs and LSB for each type of
store material - clearly marked.
(c) Specific handling instructions and training for all lunar
personnel.
(d) Specific mission activity study to ascertain optimum safe
location for stores in each vehicle.
(e) Establishment of mission stores check list and accounta-
bility list for supplies control.
2. Perform vehicle, station and base design reviews specifically to
examine the stores storage safety features and to assess the
hazards effects countermeasures incorporated (i.e., fire, leakage,
explosion, vapor corrosion, contamination, etc.).
3. Early initiation of design and development of specific stores
containers affording maximum protection and shelf life to various
hazardous stores.
i. Early initiation of development of zero-g lab equipment for
handling of toxic, corrosive and ordinary fluids without loss
or escape of fluids and gases into closed atmosphere of orbit-
ing stations.
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5. Specific training of personnel in the use and purpose of all safeguard
procedures and equipments.
6. Incorporation of safeguard devices into design of equipment and con-
tainers requiring such devices. (This eliminates possibility of device
not being used.)
7. Require "buddy system" in handling and use of hazardous materials to
insure compliance with safeguard procedures and assure aid if an
accident does occur.
8. Require mandatory review of all hazardous material applications for
program needs to insure:
(a) Necessity of material use.
(b) All hazard aspects are known.
(c) Safeguards are more than adequate.
(d) Procedures for use are documentedand thoroughly understandable.
Remedial Measures:
1. Medical equipment should be maintained in all areas of the lunar complex,
where hazardous materials are handled, to treat injuries.
2. Personnel of the lunar complex should be trained to treat injuries due
to mishandled hazardous materials. Medical handbookson such treatment
should be readily available in the lunar complex.
E_cape/R_s_ue Requirements for Hazard I
Escape/Rescue requirements are not specific, but may range from needing
assistance in cleaning up a leaking container to escape or rescue from a
disaster.
Effects of Hazard 2, Improperly Secured Hazardous Material
The hazard effects arising from unsecured or improperly secured cargo and
equipment containing hazardous materials range from simple broken or damaged
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outer containers to fire and explosion caused by released hazardous materi-
als. The exposure of personnel to loose containers in zero-g can result
in physical injury or fatality from impact and crushing. Structural damage
from impact is also quite likely where the mass of the container is suffi-
ciently large.
Q_
The failure to properly stack containers or adequately secure them when
transferring cargo on the lunar surface can result in a falling object
injury even under the acceleration of I/6 Earth gravity.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive Measures:
I. The following control measures must be implemented in the planning
for cargo stowage involving hazardous stores.
(a) Specific bulk cargo containers must be designed to permit
ease of handling and securing in all stacking configu-
rations.
(b) Containers must provide adequate protection from shock,
impact and vibration of hazardous contents.
(c) Specific studies of mission activity sequences must be con-
sidered when planning bulk cargo location and ease of avail-
ability in the respective station, tug vehicles, and surface
base designs.
2. Vehicle, station and base design reviews should be performed specifically
to examine methods of bulk stores stowage and to assess the hazards ef-
fects countermeasures incorporated in the design.
3. Periodic checks of bulk stowage areas should be performed to assure
security of cargo.
Remedial Measures
I. Remedial measures are the same as stated for Hazard 1.
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Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Not applicable in this study.
SOURCE DATA REFERENCES
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American Rockwell, Space Div., Downey, Calif., Oct. 1970.
3. Air Force Manual 127-I, Safety, Missiles and Space Safety Hand-
book, Dept. of the Air Force, Wash., D.C., 10 March 1967.
4. Air Force Manual 127-100, Ground Safety, Explosives Safety Manual,
Dept. of the Air Force, Wash., D.C., 12 June 1968.
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HAZARD STUDY 34
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINE CANDIDATES
D
1. Primary containers for hazardous material shall be designed to permit
safe storage and transfer of the contained material under all conditions
of use and storage in lunar orbit and on the lunar surface. Ascertain
the conditions of safe stowage, handling and use of all materials con-
sidered to be hazardous both in lunar orbit and on the lunar surface.
2. Secondary bulk cargo storage containers shall be designed to permit
safe transfer and handling of primary hazardous material containers
under all conditions of transport to lunar orbit and the lunar surface.
3. The tug vehicle, Lunar Orbiting Station and Lunar Surface Base design
reviews shall specifically examine the stores stowage safety features
and assess the hazards effects countermeasures incorporated (i.e., fire,
explosion, vapor control, contamination control, etc.).
4. Considering mission activity sequences, the optimum manner of stowage for
hazardous stores shall be ascertained, consistent with safety and avail-
ability for use.
5. The actual need for hazardous materials in achieving mission and program
objectives shall be established. For each hazardous material needed,
alternate materials shall be reviewed to ascertain the possibility of
reducing the hazard potential by alternate selection. Alternate techni-
ques for achieving desired program objective and eliminating the more
hazardous materials are extremely desirable.
6. For hazardous materials required, insure and certify (prior to flight
approval) :
(a) Necessity for hazardous material use.
(b) That all hazards involved in materials use are known.
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(c) That safeguards provided for material use are adequate
for personnel safety.
(d) That procedures for material use are accurately documented
and thoroughly understandable.
(e) That disposal of hazardous material in lunar orbit or on
lunar surface can be safely accomplished if necessary.
Personnel shall be experienced and trained in the handling of hazardous
materials both in zero-g and on the lunar surface.
Hazardous materials shall be stored in specially designated remote area
wherever practical.
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HAZARDSTUDY35
HAZARDSASSOCIATEDWITHNAUSEADURINGEVAOPERATIONS
I NTRODUCTION
_a A potential hazard to the space suited EVA astronaut is associated With nausea
induced by motion effects or illness. Adverse motion effects may occur as a
result of vehicle motions associated with lunar rovers or through accidental
impartment of undesired motion to an EVA astronaut on a lunar orbital mission.
Motion sickness has been of constant concern throughout the space program.
Ever since the C-131 zero gravity or weightlessness facility was placed in op-
eration in 1958 at the Aerospace Medical Laboratory, motion sickness has been
a recurring problem. The Russian Cosmonaut Gherman Titov was the first to
report motion sickness in space flight.
ASSUMPTIONS
For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that nausea due to illness or
motion within a habitable cabin environment with the astronaut in shirt-
sleeves is a relatively minor problem to cope with. Of primary concern is the
astronaut who is nauseated and vomits within the confines of a space suit dur-
ing lunar traverses with a small lunar rover or during lunar orbital EVA oper-
ations.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
Vomiting in a space suit introduces the following hazards:
1. Aspiratlen of expelled particles into the breathing systems.
2. Clogging of exhaust ports of the helmet with consequent impairment of
CO2 removal gas circulation and pressure control capability of the PLSS.
3. Partial or total obscuration of visibility through the helmet visor.
4. Decreased effectiveness in the performance of essential operations required
to return the affected astronaut to a safe condition.
2-253
LMSC-A984262C
ANALYSISOFIDENTIFIEDHAZARDS
A wide spectrum of physiogenic and psychogenic factors contribute to the motion
sickness phenomenon. Although astronaut selection and training programs are
designed to screen out candidates that are relatively susceptible to motion
sickness, there is no foolproof technique for preventing or predicting nausea
and its undesirable end effects. Even experienced aircraft flight crew per-
sonnel have reported nausea during weightless or zero-g simulation flights.
Further, a majority of personnel who have experienced motion sickness diffi-
culties on such flights have indicated a willingness to participate in further
flight tests. This brings up the concern that the over-zealous astronaut may
similarly disregard the possibility of vomiting in the suit whenhe is feeling
indisposed prior to or during EVAoperations.
Forceful and involuntary expulsion of vomitus in the suit may result in the
following undesirable consequencesin varying degrees:
1. Vomiting is accompaniedby rapid and involuntary inspiration of air through
the mouth. This mayintroduce particles of varying sizes into the lungs.
2. Suit/PLSS functions maybe impaired. Clogging of the circulation system
can affect thermal and humidity control, pressurization and C02 and odor
removal capability of the PLSS.
3. Expulsion of vomitus in the space suit helmet maypartially or totally ob-
scure astronaut vision by coating the visor.
4. Motion sickness is accompaniedby a feeling of incapacitation which can be
expected to degrade astronaut performance in effecting safety measures,
e.g., driving lunar rover back to a lunar shelter or maneuvering an EVA
work platform back to an orbital lunar base.
EFFECTSOFTHEHAZARDS
The effects of nauseaand vomiting during EVAoperations are as follows:
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i. Curtailment of mission and return to shelter due to impaired vision,
general feeling of incapacitation, odors and safety hazards associated
with aspiration of expelled food particles or clogging of suit exhaust
ports.
2. Death of astronaut if breathing system is impaired by congestion with
vomitus.
3. Death of astronaut if CO2 build-up is caused by clogging of exhaust ports.
Inlet ports will remain open due to positive pressure of supply gases.
4. Loss of astronaut cooling if the thermal control system is impaired.
This could result in further discomfort, unconsciousness, and possibly
death.
5. Loss of pressure control or relief. This could cause over pressurization
which mayresult in suit or PLSSrupture. This failure could further
jeopardize astronaut safety.
ALTERNATIVECORRECTIVEMEASURES
i. Continue and refine selection process of screening out astronaut candidates
who are susceptible to motion sickness.
2. Continue the development of drugs to counter onset of motion sickness.
3. Design lunar vehicles for a "smooth ride."
4. Control diet of astronauts prior to EVAactivities to preclude large
particles of ingested food.
5. Design space suits to provide collection traps to preclude depositing
in undesirable locations.
6. Indoztrinate astronauts relative to the hazards of nauseaduring EVAand
caution against participating in EVAoperations whenindisposed.
7. Incorporate secondary or redundant features to minimize the failure possi-
bilities. For example, a redundant relief valve, located in remote or
less vulnerable locations could back up the primary relief valve to pre-
vent over-pressurlzation.
8. Provide capability to switch to a spare or buddy PLSSif the failure occurs
within the PLSS.
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ESCAPE/RESCUEREQUIREMENTS
The possibility of nausea followed by vomiting in the EVA space suit is a
serious concern. The most effective step in coping with this problem is to
observe the "buddy system" during both lunar orbital and lunar surface opera-
tions. In this manner an incapacitated astronaut can most expeditiously be
escorted to a shelter so that the space suit can be removed.
The "buddy astronaut" could retrieve the disabled EVA astronaut in lunar orbit
by means of a maneuvering work platform or comparable mobility/cargo trans-
port aid. On the lunar surface, the "buddy astronaut" could drive a small
lunar rover back to a shelter. In cases of severe distress, a lunar flying
vehicle, if available, might be dispatched to rescue the disabled astronaut
out on a lunar sortie.
For cases where the EVA astronaut became disabled within walking distance of
a shelter or MOLAB typs vehicle, the "buddy astronaut" would walk the ill astro-
naut back to the base and assist his ingress activities.
The "buddy astronaut" can share his PLSS with the astronaut in distress if
the failure is isolated within the PLSS, and if the distressed astronaut has
not vomited. If the latter has occurred then it may be necessary to get past
the face mask in order to clear the astronaut's mouth of debris. His suit may
need clearing as well.
The astronaut may switch to a spare PLSS.
DATA SOURCES P
le
.
Symposium on Motion Sickness with Special Reference to Weightlessness,
Technical Documentary Report No. AMRL - TDR-63-25, June 1963.
Kellog, R. S., Kennedy, R. S. and Graybiel, A. "Motion Sickness Symptomol-
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J. Aero. Med. V. 36, No. 4, Apt 1965, pp 315-318.
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HAZARD STUDY 35
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
1. Astronaut candidates must be carefully screened to eliminate personnel
who are susceptible to motion sickness or nausea.
2. Training and simulation programs should continue to acclimatize astronaut
personnel to the types of extreme motions anticipated with lunar rover
traverses or abnormal EVA motions.
3. Lunar vehicle suspension systems should be designed for a "smooth" a
ride as possible.
4. The diet of astronauts prior to EVA operations should continue to preclude
large food particles.
5. The "buddy system," or presence of a safety man, should be practiced for
all EVA activities.
6. Astronauts should continue to be indoctrinated relative to the hazards of
nausea within the confines of a space suit and enjoined to refrain from
EVA activities when indisposed, regardless or mission priorities, unless
required by an emergency condition.
7. Suit design progress should evolve in the following directions:
a. Provide increased astronaut mobility.
b. Incorporate redundant features to preclude catastrophic failure of
any suit/PLSS element.
c. Include a positive collection method including a debris/vomitus trap
or bag.
d. Investigate the feasilility of including a backup system within the
suit or PLSS.
e. Provide means to open the face mask to render aid.
f. Provide higher suit pressures to eliminate need for denitrogenization.
g. Provide integrated suit-backpack design.
9
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HAZARD STUDY36
RADIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR FLIGHT VEHICLE OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The utilization of a reusable nuclear flight vehicle as the basic prime
transport vehicle for lunar logistics shuttle service is being considered in
two of the alternate advanced program plan study approaches currently being
evaluated by the NASA (Ref. i and 2).
The nuclear f]Jght vehicle as currently conceived is essentially a cryogenic
monopropellant propulsion system. Propulsive thrust is provided by a rocket
engine, designated as the NERVA engine system, which derives its thermal
energy from a flight-operable nuclear reactor. The cryogenic monopropellant
fluid is liquid hydrogen stored at a low pressure in the insulated stage
tankage. The fluid is converted to gaseous hydrogen in the NERVA engine at
pressures and temperatures sufficient to develop the required thrust at a
reasonably high specific impulse.
The simple significant characteristic of the nuclear rocket engine which
presents the greatest hazard to man and creates the largest amount of diffi-
culty in the use of the nuclear vehicle is the intense radiation field
associated with engine operation. Once activated the engine becomes
intensely radioactive and remains so until the fission process has been
shut down. Following shut-down the numerous species of fission products
generated in the nuclear fuel decay (at various rates) causing a dropoff in
radiation intensity with time. This process is amply described elsewhere
in classical texts and literature (Ref. 3). The concern of this study area
analysis is the assessment of the radiological effects occasioned by man's
repetitive exposure to a nuclear flight vehicle in the lunar operations
environment.
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Basic radiological data developed in this Hazard Study is based on radiation
source data presented in Supplemental Data Report No. i, presented in Appendix
E (Ref. 4). This reference contains several figures which should be con-
sidered a part of this Hazard Study.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. The nuclear vehicle considered, for purposes of this study_ is a reusable
nuclear shuttle (RNS) as generally defined and described in the Reference
5 documentation. The RNSmissions and lunar shuttle duty definitions are
taken as given in References 2 and 6.
2. The nuclear rocket engine considered is the NERVAengine rated at 1575 Mw
thermal power and 75_000pounds thrust. The nominal specific impulse is
taken to be 825 seconds.
3. The study assumesthat an orbiting lunar station (0LS) is operational and
mannedin a 60 nmpolar orbit. It is further assumedthat on-going pro-
gram events such as surface activities_ etc. are in progress. An active
model is assumedto permit an examination of the widest spectrum of
possible interfaces with the radiation exposure hazards.
The normal operation of a nuclear prime transport vehicle (N-PTV) in the
performance of its mission functions in the lunar vicinity could potentially
result in the exposure of lunar exploration personnel to measurable and
possibly significant radiation levels, under certain operational circum-
stances. The operational events leading to such exposure encompasspracti-
cally the entire N-PI_ operational sequencefrom lunar approach through
lunar departure. Additionally_ any non-nominal operations on the part of
the N-PI_ tend to enhance the potential for significant personnel radiation
exposure.
For analytical convenience_ the N-PI_ operational events considered to be
significant hazard generators are treated in the following order:
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i. N-PTV Lunar Orbit Insertion
2. N-PTV Lunar Orbit Residence
3. N-PTV Lunar Orbit Departure
4. N-PTV NERVA Engine Exhaust Plume
5. N-PTV Off-Nominal Performance
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The significant major hazards generated from nominal and non-nominal nuclear
prime transport vehicle operation in and around the lunar vicinity may be
stated as follows:
1. The potential exposure of lunar exploration personnel to excessive
amounts of nuclear radiation.
2. The potential contamination of lunar program elements, personnel and
exploration area with radioactive particles or debris material.
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The analysis of the major significant hazards for this study area can best
be accomplished through a systematic examination of the interface between
the lunar exploration personnel activities and the nuclear prime transport
vehicle operational event sequences as it proceeds through a typical
logistics mission. Consequently, the hazards description and hazards
effects aspects of the analysis will be treated within each of the hazards-
generating-N-Pl_/-operational-event discussions which follow.
i. Nuclear-PTV Lunar Orbit Insertion:
The nuclear prime transport vehicle (N-PTV) upon lunar arrival is
required only to inject into the reference orbit in the near vicinity
of the orbiting lunar station (OLS). Payload transfers to and from
the N-PTV will be conducted by manned tug vehicles. N-PTV coplanar
lunar arrival opportunities occur twice each lunar month although
normal logistics trip frequency would probably not exceed one every
54.6 days.
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The Radiation Source:
For the arriving N-PTV, the most severe radiation environment will exist
during the period in which the NEKVA engine is operating, when both neutron
and gamma radiation will be present. The intensity will depend on the
engine/reactor power level, distance from the source, and intervening mass
such as engine shielding or components. From Figure i of Ref. 4 it can be
seen that significant dose rates may be encountered hundreds of miles away
in the vacuum of space during periods of full power (1575 mw) operation.
The radiation environment about the N-PTV, during engine operation may be
inferred from data presented in Figure 2 of Ref. 4 which illustrates the
neutron and gamma radiation dose rate to a receptor for a separation dis-
tance of i00 ft. The sharp reduction in dose rate in the forward sector of
the vehicle C0°-15°) is related to the nuclear engine internal shield con-
figuration. Distance effects can be extrapolated using the inverse square
relationship of dose to distance.
When the engine is shut down and the source of neutrons eliminated, the
radiation environment is considerably diminished, consisting primarily of
gamma radiation due to fission product decay in the reactor core. Unlike
the operating dose rate, which can be considered constant during periods of
constant power operation, the post operational fission product source term
is decaying with time after shutdown as well as distance and view angle.
Figure 3 of Ref. 4 presents the fission product gamma dose rate versus dis-
tance from the unshielded NERVA engine following shutdown in lunar orbit.
The data are plotted for a wide range of time-after-shutdown values.
Figure 4 of Ref. 4 presents the shut down gamma dose - time profile for a
100 m separation distance and 90° view angle. The curve illustrates the
_ominant influence of the decaying shorter half-life fission products. The
dose rate decreases by 3 orders of magnitude in 30 hours.
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The LOI Exposure Hazard and Hazard Effects:
a. Orbital Hazard and Effects
The integrated neutron and gamma dose levels which would be received by
personnel at the orbiting lunar station (0LS) during the nuclear prime
transport vehicle (N-PTV) lunar orbit insertion (LOI) has been evaluated
in Ref. 4 for two normal insertion conditions; (i) final insertion at
i0 km ahead of the 0IS and (2) i0 kmbehind the OLS.
During the NERVA engine LOI burn the separation distance (N-PTV to OIS)
and view angle for both conditions are virtually the same. The total
radiation dose delivered to the OIS during the period from startup to
shutdown was computed to be 0.194 mRem, of which 0.144 mRem was attrib-
utable to neutrons and O.050mRem to gamma radiation.
Almost coincident with engine shutdown the view angle becomes less than
15 ° for both conditions and remains so during most of the normal cool-
down insertion. Thus, even though the N-PTV - 0LS distance is diminish-
ing, the protection provided by the engine internal shield effectively
eliminates any radiation problem at the OLS. The variations in separa-
tion distance and vlew angle for the case in which final LOI occurs
i0 Km behind the OLS are shown in Figure i0 of Ref. 4. The view angle
for the alternate case is also shown in the same figure.
For N-PI_ arrival I0 Kmbehind the OIS a total fission product gamma
dose of 7.03 mRem, roughly 36 times the dose received during the LOI
burn, will be received at the OIS. Most of this dose will be delivered
during the time interval from about 38,000 to 39,000 seconds when the
N-!_I_/ is making a close passage with the OLS and the view angle is in
the 60 ° to 140 ° range.
For the alternate N-PTV arrival condition, i0 Km ahead of the OLS, the N-PTV
would always remain oriented such that the OLS is within the engine shield
cone, effectively eliminating any measurable dose at the OIS.
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Thus for nominal (by-the-book) N-PTV lunar orbit insertion maneuvers
the expected exposure of personnel in the OLS would range from 0.2 mRem
up to 7.0mRem for the conditions evaluated in Ref. 4.
Lunar Surface Hazard and Effects
Radiation exposure to lunar exploration personnel or installation on the
lunar surface along the incoming trajectory trace could occur during
periods of nuclear engine operation for the lunar arrival of the N-PTV.
The most severe arrival situation would involve a single burn LOI maneu-
ver in which a minimum recovery of aftercooling impulse was planned.
This type insertion would result in the lowest altitude during the burn.
The situation is represented pictorially in Figure 13 of Ref. 4. The
N-PTV altitude at the beginning of steady-state operation is about 85 nm.
Neutron and gamma doses delivered to various positions along the surface
track were evaluated using the separation distance and view angle data
given in Ref. 4. The total neutron and gamma dose received along the
ground track number a maximum of about 26.5 mRem at position 3 vertically
below the N-PISf at shutdown as shown in Figure 16 of Ref. 4. For a
normal LOI approach with engine start up at an altitude of 125 nm the
surface dose at the reference ground track position would decrease to
one-half or one-third of the low altitude insertion value. A further
discussion of this exposure problem will be found in Ref. 4.
2. Nuclear PIV Lunar Orbit Residence
On arriving at the moon the nuclear _ will be divested of its inbound
payload by lunar tugs or by using propulsion units in the payload
itself. Sometime prior to departure_ an Earth-return payload will be
delivered to the N-PlY and docked to it. At all other times, the N-PTV
will simply stand by in orbit waiting either to receive a payload or
for the desired TEl opportunity to occur. If the N-PI_f is near other
space elements, it can be commanded to maintain a "nose-on" attitude
toward the particular element to preclude any dose to crews or equipment,
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thus eliminating any accumulation of radiation dose during normal N-PTV
standby operations. It would be parked during such standby periods
sufficiently distant from the 0IS to permit unrestricted arrivals and
departures of lunar tugs or other vehicles.
Except for an event involving an N-PI7 system malfunction, essentially
no hazards would normally be associated with this standby period.
3. Nuclear PTV Lunar Orbit Departure Orbital Exposure Hazards and Effects
The lunar orbit departure operation may be accomplished by using a single
burn or a 3-burn maneuver, depending on the amount of plane change
required to satisfy the trans-Earth injection (TEl) conditions. During
the B-burn departure the second and third burns will occur at such high
altitudes that no effective dose will be received at the 0IS.
The neutron and gamma radiation dose received at the OIS was evaluated
(Ref. 4) for three departure startup conditions:
N-PTV at I0 Em Behind OIS
N-PTV at i0 Km Ahead of OLS
N-PTV at 20 nm Ahead of OLS
The integrated neutron and gamma radiation dose at the OLS for the three
conditions were found to be:
Position at Startup
i0 Kmbehind OLS
i0 Km ahead of 0L$
20 nm ahead of OI_
Neutron Dose Gamma Dose
42.9 Rem 5.41 Rem
2.52 Rem .139 Rem
.266 Rem .015 Rem
The high dose for the case where startup occurs i0 Km behind the 01S
results from the very close 0LS passage (about 0.29 nm) during the
engine operating period.
The high neutron dose for startup behind the 0LS is eliminated if the
initial distance is increased to about 30 nm, however, a close OLS
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passage whenfission product gammarates are near maximumis still
required. The risk of collision during the flyby represents another
undesirable hazard.
The analyses (Ref. 4) support the conclusion that if startup near the
0LS was required_ a position ahead of it in orbit would be favored. A
distance of at least 20 nmwould be desirable. However, since the
N-PI_ requires no direct OLSsupport for the TEI maneuvera more desir-
able condition for startup would be with the N-PTVbeyond the lunar
horizon (about 680 nmfor 60 nmorbit altitudes) such that the engine
burn could not be seen at the OLSand none of the low altitude operation
would occur near the 01S.
Surface Exposure Hazards and Effects
The most severe dose to the surface would probably occur for a single
burn lunar departure with the N-PTV carrying maximum payload. Burn times
of 300 to 400 sec. would be required most of which would occur at or near
60 nm altitude. The picture would be similar to the low altitude arrival
with the exception that altitudes and relative velocities during the full-
power interval would be lower, suggesting higher peak doses perhaps on the
order of 50 mRem. While the resulting conditions on the surface should
not be considered as indicative of a major problem, they should be care-
fully considered in planning surface activities if nuclear lunar shuttles
are employed.
If any event surface doses from the nominal TEI burns would normally cause
little concern for ground positions. However, if experiments with sensi-
tive scientific measurement instruments were involved it may be necessary
to provide some form of protection for those systems if they are to be
situated in locations which could be directly beneath the N-PTV during
periods of full-power operation.
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4. Effect of NERVA Exhaust Plume on Orbiting Lunar Elements
During nuclear engine operation fission products can be ejected from the
core either in particulate matter produced by corrosion of the fuel ele-
ments or as gaseous material diffusing through the fuel matrix. Since
these fission products will be carried along in the exhaust, they could
theoretically represent a hamard to systems such as the OLS or Lunar Tug
which subsequently pass through the expanded exhaust plume.
A potential hazard to crewmen could possibly arise from a situation in
which radioactive particulate matter were to be captured by the exterior
surface of the OLS or other vehicle system. Subsequent EVA activities
involving contact with the contaminated surfaces could result in a trans-
fer of particles to the crewman's space suit or equipment and a potential
direct skin contact or ingestion if the suit were handled after return
to the spacecraft cabin. While a theoretical exposure route can be
postulated, the potential for significant exposures is considered remote.
@
However, the possibility of radioactive particulate matter being intro-
duced into the OLS or Tug closed life support system is one that must be
considered and the consequences defined. For example, a catastrophic
failure of the N-PTV engine system, such as loss of coolant to the engine
causing destructive disassembly of the reactor could result in hazardous
conditions at or near the OLS or other space elements. Depending on the
location and concentration of the radioactive debris it is conceivable
that manned activities at the 0LS might have to be restricted or even
discontinued until sufficient dispersement of the debris had taken place.
5. Off-Nominal N-PTV Operations and Their Hazard Potential
Some consideration should be given to the possibility of the N-PTV
operating in an off-nominal manner and the impact such operations might
have on the safety of the N-F2V or other orbiting space elements. For
convenience off-optimum operations will be constrained to those
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operations which result from humanerror or system malfunctions which
do not result in mission abort. Three conditions were considered which
fall into this class; (1) lunar approach guidance errors which cause
low altitude L0I burn and/or operation close to the OLS, (2) guidance
errors during the pulse cooling orbit insertion which could threaten
the 0LSwith collision or close passage radiation exposure and (3) reduc-
tions in thrust at L0I which could alter burn duration and location
relative to the OLSwith final orbit insertion in other than the intended
orbit.
Approach Guidance Errors
Approach asymptote errors would require an adjustment in the scheduled
full-power engine operation at L0I and if the error was on the low
altitude side, could result in performing the L0I burn close enough to
the OLS to be of concern. 0ff-nominal approaches might be discovered
too late to correct, but would be known far enough in advance to permit
evaluation of the potential hazard which could result if insertion into
the planned orbit was attempted. In the event an unacceptable hazard
was predicted, injection into the planned orbit would be abandoned. A
delayed L0I burn could be substituted, providing improved separation
and view angle, injecting the N-PTV into elliptical orbit with later
transfer to the 0LS orbit. In this manner, radiation hazard to the OLS
could be avoided although a performance penalty for the Earth-return leg
would be encountered.
Guidance Errors During Pulse Cooling L0I
Guidance errors during the cooldown orbit insertion phase are probably
the most likely area where off-nominal operations are apt to be en-
countered. Such errors could accidently place the N-PTV in an orbit
which could cause a collision or very close passage with the OLS. Pre-
venting a catastrophic event of this type will require frequent updating
of the N-PTV orbital parameters to insure prompt discovery of such a
condition. Effect of close passage can be minimized by maintaining a
nose-on attitude of the N-PTV during the period of concern.
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Reductions in Thrust During L01 Burn
Reduction in thrust may be encountered during the main lunar orbit in-
sertion burn due to malfunctions in either stage or engine systems. If
the situation were unanticipated (no prior warning that full thrust could
not be achieved), insertion into the planned orbit in a single burn could
not be accomplished. Instead the reduced thrust arrival burn would brake
the N-PTV into elliptical orbit. Near apocenter an idle mode NERVA burn
could be used to reduce the pericenter altitude to 60 nm and finally a
third burn near pericenter would be required to circularize the orbit.
Additional phasing of the N-PTV in circular orbit might be required after
circularization unless the elliptical orbit period was carefully synchron-
ized with the 0LS (Ref 4).
Alternate Corrective _asures
8
Preventive measure s:
a. The principal means of controlling N-PTV radiological hazard threats
to lunar exploration crewmen will be the rigorous control of N-PTV
spatial position in lunar orbit relative to the other operating ele-
ments of the lunar exploration program. The nuclear vehicle oper-
ations at and about the Moon must be so planned that N-PTV contributed
radiation exposure to crewmen in orbit and on the surface does not
significantly increase the radiation dose above that expected from
natural (cosmic) radiation sources (see Hazard Study 31).
Remedial measure s:
Not applicable to this study area.
Escaoe/Re scue Requirements
Th_ escape/rescue requirements are not specifically considered in this
study area since the subject is primarily concerned with examining
problem areas requiring future study. However, the requirements given
in Hazard Study 31 may be considered to apply.
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HAZARDSTUDY36
SUMMARYOF SAFETYGUIDELINECANDIDATES
I. Consideration of "crew radiation-exposure accountability" must be
included in the administrative procedures devised for lunar exploration
mission planning. It must be possible to update each crewman's exposure
record at least once each 2%hours.
2. Serious consideration shall be given to the implementation of a mission
planning function which will thoroughly evaluate the "crew radiation
exposure potential" for each phase and activity of the planned missions.
3. Specific lunar exploration crew safety studies shall be conducted which
explore the radiation hazards to manassociated with nuclear lunar
shuttle trajectories for L01 and TEl maneuvers. Hazard-minimizing
trajectories and orbits shall be selected for the N-PTVwhich prevent
the best trade-off of performance and safety. The studies shall be
conducted in t_e context of the intended logistics missions for which
the N-PTVis scheduled.
4. Specific studies are required to identify and characterize the off-
nominal performance conditions and situations which may occur in the
employmentof a nuclear prime transport vehicle in the lunar exploration
program. The impact of the off-nominal performance situations in terms
of radiological hazards of lunar exploration personnel is to be defined
such that the development of suitable operational remedies is possible.
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HAZARDS STUDY 37
HUMAN ERROR
INTRODUCTI ON
The potential hazards engendered by the unintentional or inadvertent depart-
ure from established plans or procedures is the subject of this study area.
While the subject itself can be expanded to great length, this particular
study Will consider only the significant major hazards, deriving from human
error, which have critical program implications.
Human performance failures chargeable to human error have been an area of
study and concern by human factors groups for many years. Basically, the
occurrence of such performance failures, which can be classed broadly as
human error, appear to be relatable to unawareness, fatigue and/or distrac-
tion of attention. The classic phrase - "Pay attention to what you are
doing" - uttered in many forms by concerned associates and mission controllers,
is a universal reminder that human error is viewed by all as a distinct
hazard of serious proportions. The extreme concern is warranted by more
than ample evidence available in terms of documented consequences of error.
The significant hazards aspects of human error occurrence in the advanced
lunar exploration program are of great interest in planning for the safety
of personnel likely to be engaged in exploration activity.
ASSUMPTIONS
I. The lunar exploration personnel complement comprises a mixture _of highly
trained astronauts (pilots and station commander) and skilled scientists
and engineers who will receive thorough astronaut training aimed at
providing a full capability to function effectively in the lunar eniron-
ment (Ref. 1). Because the complement of the lunar complex will be rela-
tively small for several years after its initiation it is expected that
8
W
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2_
all personnel in the complex during those early years will be trained
fully in the handling of all abnormal or emergency situations.
The critical and significant areas of concern are those operations in-
volving the initiation, control and termination of all flight maneuvers
and the execution of orbital or surface personnel activities where per-
sonnel loss could result from human error.
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
i. Judgment errors
2. Reaction errors
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
t
Effects of Hazard i, Judgment Errors
Judgment errors perhaps constitute the most significant hazard within the
human error classification. A basic reason for the emphasis upon computer-
ized guidance and control stems from the fact that the decision time con-
straints involved in high velocitymaneuvers are so short that there is
literally no time for correcting a judgment error and still achieve a correct
maneuver. Further, there are many instances where the human senses are negated
by external physical phenomena such as light wash-out of visual cues, or
dust clouds generated by plume impingement which give seriously degraded
visibility below a 50 ft altitude (Ref 2). Under such circumstances judg-
ment errors have a high probability of occurrence.
Typical consequences of judgment errors in lunar operations which can be
critical or catastrophic in nature are:
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Docking:
Landing:
Ascent:
Orbital
Operations:
Closure velocity errors
Angular misalignment
Reliance on visual cues instead of instrumentation data
Disregard of checklist sequencein prelift-off checkout and/or
omission of critical checks.
Disregard of approach restrictions established for:
a. Protection of station equipment
b. Crewprotection from nuclear-PTV radiation field
c. Crew safety at propellant depot
d. Protection from collision in satellite orbit
@
Disregard of warning instrumentation indicating:
a. Life support problem
b. Vehicle system operating parameter out-of-tolerance signal
Surface
Operations:
Disregard of procedures without prior approval
Authorizing or performing EVA without backup in a non-emergency
situation
Deviation from sortie plan without approval
Disregard of prcoedures without prior approval
Performing of unauthorized experiments
A
Failure to notify associates and base of suspected hazardous
condition or situation
W
Causative factors of primary importance in the generation of judgment errors
in otherwise nominal situations involving well trained personnel are the
following:
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I.
.
Fatigue induced errors - primarily resulting from a long and somewhat
arduous series of demanding tasks such as might be encountered on an
extended lunar surface sortie. Fatigue build-up even in well trained
personnel can produce degradation of mental alertness.
Impaired Awareness - this condition may result from several causes in-
cluding the excessive fatigue discussed above. Of more significance,
however, is the fact that impaired awareness is a rapidly occurring mani-
festation of C02 buildup (or toxicity). It also results from the buildup
of other gases which poison or cause oxygen starvation in the human organ-
ism. Thus a suited crewman, or crewmen in a small volume such as a
cabin rover, could rather rapidly be subject to this condition if a
failed detector system went unnoticed.
A further aspect of impaired awareness would be "unawareness" itself.
This could arise from a failed or malfunctioning detector system (radar,
radiation detector, I.R. device, etc) which left the crewmen completely
unaware of an impending or approaching hazard.
Corrective Me_ure_ for Hazard 1
Preventive measure s:
i. Flight operations shall require at least two crewmen at the flight station
during all critical maneuvers such as docking, landing, ascent and orbit
change burns. The second crewman shall monitor the checklist, monitor
critical operating parameters, and assist the pilot in the execution of
the maneuvers.
2. The buddy system shall be required for all activities where a crewman
may be jeopardized by an equipment or environment induced or self-induced
fu!iction failure.
3. A specific study is recommended to ascertain and define the most probable
source of human error likely to be encountered in the operations, events,
and activities of a lunar exploration program. The study should consider
the define program elements involved and should consider defined mission
2-275
LMSC-A984262C
events, and activities in the logical sequential order in which they
oc cur.
4- Specific work-rest ratio studies should be conducted to ascertain (by
simulation and activity mockup) the total fatigue buildup characteristic
of all planned lunar surface sorties and traverses.
5. Specific design and development effort is recommended in the region of
toxic atmosphere detection to provide maxinmun assurance that the level
of toxic contaminants in the life support equipment of any station compart-
ment, tug crew compartment, suit, surface base or rover installation shall
never be high enough to degrade crew awareness in their activities.
6. All primary sensors necessary to provide awareness data to the crew
(approach radar, radiation detectors, I.R. detectors, etc) should be
fail-operational for two levels of failure and fail safe for the third.
@
Remedial Measures:
Potential remedial measures for judgment errors can only be defined when the
capabilities of the vehicles or specific activities considered are known in
considerable detail. At this time meaningful remedies cannot be provided.
Escape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard i
Judgment errors can produce requirements for both escape and rescue, however,
in this study area neither will be specified since the study treats the gen-
eral hazards or group of possibilities.
Effects of Hazard 2, Reaction Errors
Reaction error as a major hazard is in itself both a hazard and a hazard
generator. Reaction error includes improper procedure, such as the inad-
vertent or accidental activation of a system via button pushing, switching,
or bumping as well as the accidental misreading of gauges, dials and digital
displays. Reaction error may result from haste, conditioned reflex, tactile
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encumberance(space suit gloves), or even lurching of the spacecraft due to
unplanned motions or accelerations.
The effects of reaction errors my range from the simple nuisance of resetting
a system to the generation of critical or even catastrophic hazards and their
consequences.
Typical examplesof the range are:
i. Inadvertent fuel cell feed cutoff requires reset, reactivation of feed,
placing fuel cell "on-line", and an electrical readings check taking about
30 minutes.
2. Inadvertent activation of a large rover vehicle while other crewmanis
preparing to board vehicle causing personnel accident.
3. Accidental activation of "emergency" docking latch release while hatch
door is unsecured. (Assumes"emergency" latch release overrides normal
hatch release interlock.)
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive Measures:
I. Human factors and engineering study of all system activation devices
(buttons, switches, knobs and handles) should be performed to insure
that such devices are protected, properly spaced, properly sequenced
and interlocked, accessible, and placed according to sequential require-
ments. Specific attention must be given to devices which must be oper-
ated by suited crewmen in order to provide adequate hand grip and
movement distance (Ref. 3). Crew preference should be considered in
this respect to the greatest extent possible consistent with design
constraints and system operational requirements.
2. Fill size mockups of planned control stations should be provided for
meticulous review and simulation exercises to permit evolution of final
configurations having the least potential for reaction errors or for
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inducing judgment errors. "The detection and elimination of potential
sources of humanerror shall be an integral part of this activity." (Ref 4)
Remedial Measures:
Not applicable to this study for the samereasons given in Hazard 1.
Excape/Rescue Requirements for Hazard 2
Not applicable for same reasons as given in Hazard 1.
SOURCE DATA REFERENCES
1. "Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue Study, Statement of Work", Contract
NAS 9-10969, dated June 15, 1970.
2. "Lunar Soil Erosion and Visibility Investigations", Part l: Summary
Report, Task ASPO 73B, Report No. 11176-6060-R0-00, TRW Systems, Redondo
Beach, Calif., 13 Aug 1969.
3. "Apollo 12 Mission Report," MSC-01855 Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,
Texas, March, 1970.
4. "An Introduction to the Assurance of Human Performance in Space Systems",
NASA Sp-6506, dated 1968.
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HAZARD STUDY 37
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINE CANDIDATES
1. Lunar flight operations shall require two crewmen at the flight station
during all critical flight maneuvers such as docking, landing, ascent,
and orbit, c_e burns. The second crewman shall function as a Judgment
error monitor and shall assist the pilot in the execution of the maneuvers
as necessary.
2. A "buddy-system" mode of operation, or presence of a safety man shall be
implemented for all hazardous activities where a crewman may be Jeopardized
by an equipment or environment induced or self-induced malfunction or
mishap.
3. The probable sources of human error likely to be encountered in the
expanded lunar exploration program should be identified. These sources
should be considered in program element design refinement for safety
enhancement. The effort should include as necessary, work-rest ratios,
fatigue buildup, reaction error studies and such other human factors
and engineering aspects as may be required to suppress the potential
for human error to minimum levels.
4- Specific efforts are recommended to enlarge upon the use of simulators
and full scale mockup equipments for the configuration evolution of
program element control and work stations.
P
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HAZARD STUDY 38
METEOROIDS
INTRODUCTION
Meteoroid strikes can cause damage ranging from surface abrasion to destruc-
tion of a space vehicle, depending on particle size and velocity. A thorough
discussion of the meteoroid flux in the vicinity of the moon and commensurate
particle sizes and velocities is given in Ref. (a). All three of the cited
references deal with meteoroids from the point of view of the spacecraft
designer and offer bases from which one can select protection against
meteoroid penetration.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. The meteoroid flux, particle size, and particle density are as stated
in Ref. (a) in the vicinity of the moon.
2. All other pertinent effects such as those due to shielding of the space-
craft by the moon, the presence of various meteoroid showers as a
function of the yearly season, etc., are also as given in Ref. (b).
THE MAJOR HAZARDS
The major hazards identified are:
I. A meteoroid penetrates into the manned cabin of any lunar spacecraft in
orbit or on the lunar surface leading to a vaporific flash and damage
to subsystem hardware. In addition the crew is endangered by loss of
oxygen by a continuing fire after the flash and by physical injury.
2. A meteoroid penetrates the suit of an EVA astronaut in orbit, on the
lunar surface walking or in an open rover or flyer causing loss of
atmosphere and possible injury.
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ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
I&
Effects of Hazard I, Meteoroid Penetration of Pressure Cabin
A vaporific flash is the r_ It of very rapid oxidation of a meteoroid
which has penetrated a cabin wall. Such a flash produces flame, a tempera-
ture and commensurate pressure increase which in turn yields damage to the
contents of the cabin. Penetration is then followed by decompression and a
severe temperaturedecrease. Pure oxygen atmospheres at an initial level
to satisfy respiration needs for man - 3 psi - or greater - up to say,
5.5 psi - yield much more violent reactions than an atmosphere that contains
a diluent such as nitrogon along with oxygen. The characteristics of the
flash depend on the kin tic energy of the meteoroid at cabin penetration,
the cabin atmospheric constituents, and the hardware in the cabin itself
together with the crew. Because of their very high velocities - 20 to
30 km/sec are widely accepted averages - any meteoroid that penetrates a
cabin wall presents a considerable danger to man and his supporting equip-
ment. The fluxes of meteoroids have b_en well bounded for the smaller
particles up to sizes of the order of a large grain of sand. The frequency
of meteoroid strikes for larger particles -- where the danger really lies --
are much less well known.
Effects of vaporific flash in manned cabins cover a spectrum from super-
ficially burned clothing and skin to third degree burns, lung searing and
death.
The effects on man and his equipment will be, as discussed above, a strong
function of the pressure and percent of oxygen in the cabin atmosphere.
Specific injuries and damage cannot b_ ascertained without providing a
reasonably accurate scenario with respect to cabin volume, numbers of crew
members present, clothing worn, atmospheric constituents and their partial
pressures, materials in the cabin other than the crew, and the kinetic
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energy of the meteoroid transmitted into heat. The potential hazard is,
however, evident and the lunar crews must be protected against meteoroid
penetration of their cabins or EVA suits.
Corrective Measures for Hazard I
Preventive measures :
I. Meteoroid shields should be designed for all lunar spacecraft, bases,
and vehicles that have manned cabins. Such designs should afford the
protection required to meet acceptable risk probability criteria.
2. The atmospheres of manned cabins should preferable consist of 2 gas
systems, oxygen with nitrogen as the diluent in order to suppress the
fire-damage potential in the event of a meteoroid penetration.
3. Optics or such hardware as is critical in the support and protection of
crew members should be protected from meteoroid damage through the use
of iris-like shields during all times except when optics are in actual
use. When feasible, optics shades should be provided to extend pro-
tection during the time the optics are being used.
Remedial measures:
I. Meteoroid strikes that have sufficient energy to penetrate a cabin wall
but which do not cause a flash will, in any case, lead to depressuri-
zation phenomena. Consequently, a kit analogous to a tire repair kit
should be evolved to permit quick repairs to such penetrations. Repair
methods are discussed in Hazard Study 21.5.
2. Fire extinguishing equipment should be readily available. Such fluids
as may be used in fire fighting equipment should be selected to have
minimal deleterious effect on the environmental control system.
3. Equipment containing aids to combat burn injuries should be included
in the medical supplies aboard all spacecraft and in the LSB. All
should be trained in the treatment of burns.
2-282
LMSC-A984262C
D
Effects of Hazard 2, Meteoroid Penetration of Space Suit
A meteoroid strike and penetration of a suited man will have effects similar
to those described for Hazard I except the hazard is likely to be much more
severe. The pure oxygen atmosphere may react violently, the small volume
of atmosphere in a suit can be lost more rapidly than in a larger cabin,
backup devices are not so readily kept at hand, and a strike that penetrates
a suit has reached the body of the occupant.
Corrective Measures for Hazard 2
Preventive Measures:
I • Practical preventive measures for meteoroid penetration of an EVA crew-
man's suit are not now available. Some protection can be afforded from
the small meteoroids bj designing outer garments to be penetration re-
sistant, within practical weight limits, and by local shielding of
critical hardware. The knowledge in Ref (a), (b), (c) should be applied
to ascertain the safety of and need for desi_l changes in EVA suits.
Remedial Measures:
• Remedial measures will be futile for any but minor penetrations of an
EVA crewman's suit. Where a penetration has resulted in a slow leak,
with little or no injury to the man, temporary repair of the opening
with a patch or donning of an emergency pressure garment may suffice
until a safe haven can be reached or a rescue accomplished. In either
event, use of the buddy system on EVA should reduce the hazard by pro-
viding immediate assistance.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
Meteoroid punctures may generate a requirement to escape to a backup
pressurized compartment, second vehicle, or other safe haven. If a safe
haven cannot be reached through escape, rescue will be required.
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RECOMMENDATIONF RFURTHERSTUDY
There is a large uncertainty concerning the frequency of the larger sizes
of meteoroids in the vicinity of the Moon. It is reco_nended that additional
studies be initiated to decrease that uncertainty. Interest lies in sizes
of about 1 gramand larger for both stony and nickel/iron meteoroids.
DATASOURCEREFERENCES
(a) Meteoroid Environment Model - 1969 (Near Earth to Lunar Surface), (NASA
SpaceVehicle Design Criteria, Environment), NASASP-8013, March, 1969.
(b) Protection Against Meteoroids (NASASpace Vehicle Design Criteria,
Structures), NASASP-8OXX,May1970 - Preliminary - To be published as
a NASAmonograph.
(c) Space Environment Criteria Guidelines for use in SpaceVehicle Develop-
ment (1969 Revi_on), D. K. Weidner, Editor, Aero-Astrodynamics Labora-
tory, NASATMX- 53957, October 17, 1969; NASA/MSFC.
W
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HAZARDSTUDY38
SUMMARYOFSAFETYGUIDELINESCANDIDATES
1. Every effort shall be madeto provide a two-gas atmosphere in spacecraft
cabins, using a diluent such as nitrogen in order to suppress vaporific
flash during meteoroid penetrations.
2. All critical hardware directly exposed to the space environment shall
have protection against meteoroids as required to meet acceptable risk
probability criteria.
3. Kits shall be devised for the quick repair of small holes in manned
cabins caused by meteoroid punctures.
4. Lunar bases and spacecraft shall be designed, where feasible, to have
two or more compartments, each capable of maintaining the cabin atmos-
phere which supports the crew life functions.
5. All mannedcabins shall carry a spacesuit for each crew memberaboard.
6. All optics in hardware critical to support, protection, and survival of
crew membersshall have protective shields, such as iris-type closures,
whennot in use.
7. The buddy system shall be used for all EVAoperations.
8. All spacecraft, lunar surface base, and other vehicles in t_ lunar
complex shall carry medical equipment for the treatment of burns. All
crew membersshall be trained in the treatment of burns.
9. Makemaximumuse of nonflammablematerials in pressure suits and materials.
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HAZARDSTUDY39
CREWINGRESS/EGRESSPROBLEMSASSOCIATEDWITHDYSBARISM
INTRODUCTION
There are well established hazards to the astronaut associated with rapid
transitions from currently postulated lunar orbital base or advancedlunar
shelter cabin atmospheres to the space suit environment. This section will
discuss the hazards associated with dysbarism and the measures available
for coping with this potential problem.
ASSUMPTIONS
This study deals with transitional effects associated with changes in
environmental atmosphere/pressure. It is important to makecertain assump-
tions regarding the characteristics of advanced lunar vehicles, shelters,
and orbital bases projected for the 1980-90 period. The following table
summarizescurrent thinking in this regard:
Habitable Enclosure
Orbiting Lunar Station (OLS)
AdvancedLarge Cabin Rover
Lunar Surface Base
Space Tug
Current SpaceSuits
Atmosphere Composition
02N2
O2
02N2
02N2
O2
Pressure
14.7 psi
5 psi
14.7 psi*
14.7 psi
3.5 psi
* Ref. (7), Page 168, suggests maximum of 7.5 psia, composition not given.
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THE MAJOR HAZARD
Classified and clinically significant dysbarism is a hazard that could result
from the following astronaut ingress/egress transitions:
OLS to EVA Space Suit
Space Tug Lunar Shelter to Lunar EVA operations
Lunar Surface Base to Lunar EVA
Lunar Surface Base to Lunar Surface Rover
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
Description and Effects of Dysbarism
Dysbarism consists of those disturbances in the body which result from the
existence of a pressure differential in the body between the total ambient
barometric pressure and the total pressures of dissolved and free gases
within the body tissues, fluids and cavities. Hypobarism refers to dis-
turbances in the body resulting from an excess of the gas pressure within
the body fluids, tissues or cavities over the ambient gas pressure. This
form of dysbarism might occur, for.example, when the astronaut transitions
improperly from the Lunar Base 02N2 14.7 psi environment to the space suit
3.5 psi pure oxygen environment. From Ref. 1, examples of Hypobaric dis-
turbances include:
I. Bends - deep, boring pains in the joints, bones or muscles of extrem-
ities including the hip and shoulder caused by the evolution of gas
from solution resulting in bubble formation.
2. Chokes - sense of constriction or tightness in the chest or oppression
in the chest with pain, dry cough, difficulty in breathing with a sense
of suffocation and apprehension due probably to irritation of the pul-
monary tissues when gas emboli cause obstruction of pulmonary arterioles
and capillaries.
3. Central Nervous System Symptoms - The incidence of central nervous
system symptoms is relatively small and very variable in type and
severity. These symptoms include one or more of the following:
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5.
disturbances of equilibrium and coordination, disturbances of function
of large sensory or motor tracts, disturbances of consciousness and
cortical function, e.g., hallucinosis, disturbances suggesting of
increased cranial pressure, e.g., headache and painful eye movements;
nausea; and blood pressure depression.
Skin Disturbances - c_taneous discolorations, rashes, and itching.
Abdominal Symptoms- "gas pains" and bloating
Hyperbaric disturbances result from an excess of the ambient gas pressure over
that within the body fluids, tissues and cavities. This form of dysbarism
might occur subsequent to a transition from a space suit environment to a
higher pressure shelter or orbital station environment. Symptomsassociated
with hyperbarism are:
I. Barotalgia - ear pain caused by blockage of pharyngeal orifice of the
eustachian tube preventing the entrance of air from the oral cavity
into the middle ear and causing a differential pressure across the
tympanic membrane.
2. Barosinusitis - pain in the sinuses due to expansion of mucusmembranes
and the creation of unequal pressures in the sinus cavities.
3. Barodontalgia - pain in the teeth ranging from dull ache to sharp and
severe pain attributable to changes in barometric pressures.
Individuals subject to hyperbaric disturbances may largely be climinated
through crew selection procedures. However, long exposure to space environ-
ment could conceivably susceptability to these effects.
Corrective Measures
Problems associated with dysbarism can be avoided by taking two alternate
tour se s:
I. All habitable elements of the lunar surface and orbital system can be
designed to accommodate the same pressures and atmospheres or
2. orovide adequate transitional means to allow denitrogenation and
accommodation of the astronaut to new pressure/gas environments.
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The first approach; namely that of making all habitable system elements
compatible, offers major problems in regard to space suit design. If the
space suit design could be modified to allow performance of EVA at standard
atmosphere pressure, thereby eliminating transitions from higher shelter or
orbital station atmosphere pressures, the problems associated with dysbarism
would largely be eliminated. Similarly, the large cabin rovers could be
designed for a normal Earth ambient atmosphere.
Impediments to space suit operation at higher total pressures (14.7 vs.
3.5 psi) consisb of the following undesirable suit characteristics:
a)
b)
c)
Greater suit strength req_lired to sustain higher pressures
Higher suit leakage rates would be expected
Reduced astronaut workloads would be anticipated in performing
EVA tasks.
While present "soft" suit concepts do not lend themselves to operation at
greatly increased total pressures (going from 3.5 to 14.7 psi), the "hard"
suit concept could, in all probability, be developed to accommodate these
higher pressures and a mixed gas system. A Litton Ind,_stries pregress
report dated September 1966 states:
_v
The RX series of space suits is designed to accommodate normal operation at
5 psi with either single or mixed gas atmospheres. Implications on perform-
ance of RX suits designed for a mixed gas system are:
1. The mobility of the suit (i.e., joint range and torque) would not
require major redesign of any components if pressure were in the 7
to 7.5 psi regime. A 14.7 psi arm/glove has been developed by Litton
for the Lunar Receiving Laboratory.
2. Weight of the suit would not materially be affected if the suit were
operated at 7 to 7.5 psi. If the suit were made to operate at 14.7 psi
an additional weight penalty of 20 Ibs. could be expected.
3. Life support would not be unduly complicated by the addition of an
inert gas since the low leak rate characteristics of this suit would
require that only oxygen make-up supply be carried in the life support
system. 2-289
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The second alternative approach to coping with the dysbarism problem involves
denitrogenation of EVApersonnel prior to EVAsorties. Denitrogenation
consists of breathing increased percentages of oxygen for extensive periods
prior to transitioning from the 02N2, 14 psi to the 3.5 psi, pure 02 environ-
ment. The elimination of nitrogen from the body prior to exposure to
reduced pressures and before it can form bubbles should prevent the symptoms.
To effect a reduction of nitrogen in the body, high concentrations of oxygen
can be inspired for varying intervals of time.
The rate at which nitrogen is eliminated from the body has been studied by
a number of investigators. About one-half of the body nitrogen is contained
in the fatty tissues of an individual whose fat content is 15 to 20%of his
body weight. During decompressLonsof short duration, the body fat may act
as a reservoir to protect the body against the sudden release of nitrogen
and bubble formation. Typical nitrogen desaturation curves reveal a number
of important facts: (I) the weight of nitrogen dissolved in the body varies
directly with the partial pressure of N2 in the inspired air; (2) the rate
of nitrogen elimination in terms of volume per unit time is a direct
function of the gradient of nitrogen tension (difference in partial pressures)
between the outside and inside of the body. This meansthat if the nitrogen
tension of the inspired air were reduced to zero, the rate of its elimination
would be twice as fast as it would be if its tension were only reduced 50%.
(Ref. I)
There are other features of denitrogenation which are of interest. The
measurementswhich have been madeshowthat denitrogenation is most rapid
at the beginning and then reaches a zero rate after abo1_6 to 8 hours;
50%denitrogenation is accomplished in about 30 minutes.
It is of interest that the rate of nitrogen elimination differs significantly
between individuals and in the sameindividual from day to day, and that the
subjects with a high rate of nitrogen elimination are generally more resistant
to dysbarismthan are other subjects.
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V
It has been found that approximately 4 hours of inhalation of 1OO% oxygen
is necessary to completely protect the more _asceptible individuals who
were expected to exercise at 35,000 ft (3.5 psi). One or two hours of
oxygen inhalation offered more complete protection from bends than from
chokes. Exercise, along with pre-mission denitrogenation might give
accelerated elimination of nitrogen; however, this benefit could be over-
shadowed by the disadvantage of resulting fatigue.
Tests have shown that protection against the bends during denitrogenation is
completely effective so long as 100% oxygen is being used at a pressure of
6.8 psi or greater.
The conclusion, based on this investigation, seems to be to recommend a
minimum denitrogenation period of 3 hours and preferably 4 hours prior to
EVA in addition to selection of a crew relatively immune to dysbarism.
The operational and design implications of denitrogenation or preoxygenation
requirements are clear:
I. Orbital Lunar Station - The airlock should allow provisions for 2-4
hours of aninterrupted preoxygenabion prior to suit donning and EVA
activities. This airlock must be large enough to accommodate simultan-
eous occupancy and suit donning of all EVA personnel including a
standby emergency rescue astronaut.
2. Space Tug - The Space Tug must be compatible with both the orbiting
lunar station (0LS) and lunar surface operations. When docked to the
OLS, the tug should be at 14.7 psi 02N 2 for transfer of personnel. When
transitioning from lunar orbit to lunar surface, psrsonnel who are to
go EVA on the lunar surface should be denitrogenating. This denitro-
genation can occur within the space tug environmental system can be
designed to transition from a two gas 02N 2 15 psi system to a pure
02 3.5 psi system. Time from lunar orbit to lunar _Arface will normally
range from 3.5 to 7 hours allowing for phasing and plane changes. This
time is sufficient to allow denitrogenation for EVA operations upon
landing.
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Lunar Shelters - operated at 02N2, 14.7 psi will similarly require
airlocks which allow denitrogenation capability, and lunar activity
schedules should provide for preoxygenation times of 2 to 4 hours
preceding EVA. Standby rescue personnel would have to be in a pre-
oxygenated and suited condition while other crewmen are engaged in
EVA operations.
Large Cabin Rover - If these vehicles are designed for a 5 psi, pure
oxygen environment, transition to the suit environment offers no
problems beyond the several minutes required for pressure equalization
to the 3.5 psi, 02 suit environment.
In addition to denitrogenation as a technique for avoiding dysbarism effects,
other measures which should be taken are:
1. Selection of astronaut personnel who are relatively immune or less
susceptible to pressure transition effects. Altitude chamber exercises
are useful in classifying personnel with regard to their susceptibility
to dysbarism and hypoxia.
2. Drug therapy as a means of preventing or increasing tolerance for bends
symptoms should continue to be studied.
3. Extensive training of astronaut candidates in the recognition of dysbar-
ism symptoms.
Escape/Rescue Requirements
The first symptoms of pressure change that might appear are barotalgia,
barosinus or abdominal bloating. These symptoms would probably appear while
the astronaut was in the airlock preoxygenating and would prevent him from
going EVA.
The onset of bends, chokes and central nervous system phenomena could appear
while the astronaut was engaged in lunar orbit or lunar surface EVA activities.
The astronaut should be trained to recognize these symptoms of dysbarism and
return to the shelter or orbital station, either unassisted or, depending on
the severity of the symptoms, assisted by a "buddy" astronaut. The possibil-
ity of dysbarism effects argues strongly for the "buddy system" for EVA opera-
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tions since it is unlikely that both astronauts are similarly and simultan-
eously incapacitated if normal precxygenation precautions have been observed.
For severe cases of bends and other dysbarism symptoms, compression therapy
is the treatment required. Studies by the USAF School of Aerospace
Medicine Decompression Sickness Management Team indicate that compression
in hyperbaric treatment chamber is required. A pressure bag has been
designed to afford relief of bends in aircraft. This bag was designed
for combat situations where a crew member might develop severe symptoms
during conditions where descent of the aircraft to lower attitude would
be dangerous. The affected individual is placed in the pressure bag which
is inflated by an air compressor. The bag is equipped with an oxygen
regulator, headset and electrically heated suit circuit.
Some modification of this approach for space application may be required
for treatment of bends. It may also be possible to overpressurize the
airlock compartment of the shelter or lunar base as a treatment technique.
This would incur obvious weight and structural penalties to support the
increased pressure.
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HAZARD STUDY 39
SUMMARY OF SAFETY GUIDELINES CANDIDATES
@
1. The "buddy" system, or presence of a safety man, should be practiced
duri_. EVA activities so that an astronaut who is incapacitated from
dysbari_ effects or other illness, can be guided back to a safe
shelter.
2. Adequate provisions for simultaneously denitrogenating EVA personnel
should be provided in the OLS, the Space Tug and the Lunar Base.
3. Crew activity schedules should allow sufficient time for adequate
denitrogenation when a transition must be made from a higher pressure,
2 gas cabin to lower pressure pure oxygen suit environment.
4. Astronaut selection criteria should continue to stress relative immunity
from the symptoms of dysbarimn.
5. Astronaut training programs should continue to indoctrinate candidates
on the sy_ptomology of dysbari_.
6. Drug therapy as a means for preventing or increasing tolerance for bends
symptoms sh_id be investigated.
7. Compression therapy techniques and devices, such as the pressure bag,
should be developed for space applications to treat dysbariqm symptoms.
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Section 3
SPECIAL TRADEOFFS
THE LUNAR COMPLEX WITH AND WITHOUT AN ORBITING LUNAR STATION
6
@
t
FUNCTIONS OF A LUNAR SPACE STATION
The lunar space station acts as a control center for operations both in
lunar orbit and on the lunar surface. A certain amount of scientific in- •
vestigation will be carried out aboard the station; viz., lunar mapping,
astronomical observations.
The station will act as control center for missions to tae surface and will
provide data to the landers as required. The station will act as a communi-
cations relay between lunar landers, the LSB, and the Earth.
If a separate propellant depot is established in lunar orbit it will be
under the command of the station. The depot and all other members of the
lunar complex will be tracked and essential parameters displayed (and acted
upon if necessary) via telemetry.
Besides operating an astronomical observatory in lunar orbit, all surface
sites of interest will be photographed by the station crew as part of the
planning for scientific investigation of such sites. Data derived from
various lunar experiments will be processed aboard the station.
The statS on would provide a safe haven for crew members rescued via a tug
from orbit or from the surface. This assumes great importance if medical
treatment is needed.
THE LUNAR COMPLEX WITH A LUNAR SPACE STATION
No hazards of any consequence are recognized that are due to the presence of
a lunar space station in the lunar complex.
THE LUNAR COMPLEX WITHOUT A LUNAR SPACE STATION
A number of hazards are apparent if no lunar space station exists in the
lunar complex. The hazards assume greater importance when lunar surface
exploration is initiated since at that time only the tug exists as a haven
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and medical aid, for example, is limited to whatever is aboard the tug.
Other treatment then requires a return to Earth orbit.
I. At lunar complex initiation, neither a space station nor a lunar surface
base are available as a safe haven in the events of injury, need for
medical treatment, or following rescue.
2. No orbital site will exist where a fully (propellant) loaded tug will be
docked, constantly monitored and readily available for rescue, undetered
by involvement in other tasks.
3. It would be difficult to monitor a propellant depot in orbit without the
station, and its location and status would only be knownon an inter-
mittent basis. No station crew would be available to aid in propellant
exchangebetween the depot and another spacecraft. This task becomes
more hazardous when such exchangesare instituted without the experience
and aid of a station crew who are totally familiar with the depot.
%. Since the proposed Integrated Program Plan (IPP) calls for non-nuclear
powered prime transport vehicles to dock at the station when delivering
personnel to the lunar complex, the lack of a station leaves newly
arrived personnel to fend for themselves in getting down to the surface
without briefings and other familiarizing aids. Moreover, there is no
haven where they may prepare themselves for the long sortie on the lunar
surface; therefore their stamina will be imposedupon to a considerable
degree.
5. Operations on the back side of the Moonwould be hazardous, if not
entirely forbidden, since only indirect communications could be con-
ducted using an L2 libration point comsat. Initiating rescue from
the Earth facing side of the Moonto the farside without a space
station would be very time consumingand hence would subject the
farside crew to whatever hazard befell them for extended intervals.
This is certain to increase the severity of many situations; in some
cases crew memberswould be lost because of the lack of quick rescue
capability.
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6. Optical-visual inspection of sites intended for scientific investiga-
tion would also have to be accomplished using the tug and such activity
for any one site would either be time limited or would require relin-
quishing the tug from other tasks for long periods. These kinds of or-
bital tug activity in essence add the requirement for another tug in the
lunar complex. Alternative surface based methods of choosing sites for
investigation would not be as accurate and thus imply the hazard of un-
certainty about the nature of the site. This in turn would compl_cate
rescue should that need arise.
7. In the absence of a lunar orbital terminus, all del_veries of cargo and
crew would have to be made from a prime transport vehicle (PTV) in lunar
orbit directly to the surface. In such a case the PTV would have to bring
a tug to lunar orbit to complete surface del_very or a tug parked on the
surface would have to ascend to lunar orbit, dock to the PTV, transfer
cargo and return to the surface base. Any problems or hazards encount-
ered during orbital transfer activity would have to be resolved by the
tug crew. No station would exist to offer any kind of aid should it be
needed. A tug that had to abort a descent to the surface would face a
great hazard in that no safe haven would exist after the abort. Rescue
would have to be conducted and initiated with a tug on the surface or
from Earth orbit. This type of procedure would increase required ascents
and descents and thereby increase exposure to potential hazards.
8. The lack of a space station in lunar orbit would be to the disadvantage
of arriving PTVs, since with the station injection into lunar orbit could
be made accurately using station beacons and other guidance aids as de-
sired. Without the station the PTV becomes entirely dependent on its
onboard capability. Should an arriving PTV develop any problems on ar-
rival or should lunar _nJection be unsatisfactory (or fail completely),
the hazard of crew isolation arises and rescue would face the handicap
of being initiated from the lunar surface or Earth Orbit. Such a PTV-
involved rescue could leave the crew and tug stranded in orbit for long
periods. Because of the large expenditure of propellant for the rescue,
the tug would need a source of propellant for return to the lunar sur-
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face. Without a station, such a source would have to be on the lunar
surface where the rescue mission is initiated. Transfer of propellant
to the orbital tug would be complicated under such conditions.
The advantages of having a station in lunar orbit together with obviating of
the hazards discussed above by virtue of the presence of such a space sta-
tion makes its existence as part of the IPP very desirable. Even in a
worst-case consideration the station would relegate potential hazards to
positions of considerably less concern to the crews of the lunar complex and
to mission control on Earth.
It is strongly recommendedthat the space station be madea mandatory part
of the lunar complex and that no exploration of the surface begin until such
time that the station is activated and manned.
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3.2 THE LUNAR COMPLEX WITH AND WITHOUT A PROPELLANT DEPOT ON
THE LUNAR SURFACE OR IN LUNAR ORBIT
I
r_
FUNCTIONS OF A PROPELLANT DEPOT
Whether located on the lunar surface or in lunar orbit, a propellant depot
would be used to supply or resupply any spacecraft with propellant to be
used for descent to and ascent from the lunar surface, for spacecraft per-
forming orbital maneuvers in connection with experiments or rescue, and for
the lunar space station in its performance of station-keeping or any essen-
tial orbital maneuvers.
A second use of a propellant depot would be to supply oxygen for the environ-
mental control system for any spacecraft, surface vehicle, or lunar base.
The depot could also supply oxygen and hydrogen for fuel cells for any space-
craft, surface vehicle or base using the cells for electrical power.
In the event that a prime transport vehicle (PTV) used an excessive amount
of propellant in its trip to lunar orbit, the depot could be used to re-
supply propellant to that transport vehicle.
The orbital depot may alternately be attached to the space station, may
station-keep at some fixed distance from the station or may be maneuverable
so that it can be relocated for the performance of its functions. On the
lunar surface, the depot is most likely to be fixed with the option of mov-
ing separate tanks via a large rover type of surface vehicle.
POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF A PROPELLANT DEPOT
For a depot in lunar orbit the following potential hazards exist, although
from a practical viewpoint the likelihood of actual occurrence of any of
them does not appear to be very great. Nevertheless, appropriate precau-
tions and preventive measures should be taken to obviate their occurrence.
1. Collision between depot and another spacecraft.
2. Explosion of a propellant tank due to a meteoroid strike.
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3. A leak in a propellant tank places the depot on a collision
course with the lunar space station.
4. An EVA astronaut on umbilical gets entangled in depot structure.
5. A propellant tank is mishandled when being transferred to depot,
'escapes' to form a hazard in depot - OLS orbit.
All of these hazards are considered in Hazard Study 13, _ogether with the
corrective measures suggested to anticipate and dispose of such hazards.
The only hazard in the list above that appears in consideration of a surface
depot is number 2. The closely related hazard of the depot being struck by
lunar ejecta due to the engine plume of a nearby tug ascending to or descend-
ing from lunar orbit is disposed of by proper relative locations of depot
and tug landing pads. The hazard of propellant tank handling during arrival
at the surface depot is discussed as hazard number 2 in Hazard Study 20.
(Module handling leading to tip-over and injury or damage during arrival and
location of lunar base modules).
Because of its fixed posit_ on, the depot can be protected against micro-
meteoroids by constructing overhead barriers, by placement close to a crater
rim, by construction of _Walls made of lunar surface material or of materials
brought from Earth. Excavating a recess in the surface to contain some or
all of the depot would give added protection to the depot.
SAFETY ADVANTAGES OF A PROPELLANT DEPOT
A depot in lunar orbit would ensure to a large degree that insofar as the
propulsion capacity and delta velocity capability of the space tug is con-
cerned no mission would be left undone. The capability to perform rescue
missions is of major importance in this respect. A depot would ensure the
availability (and therefore remove the potential hazards due to depletion)
of oxygen and hydrogen as each may be needed for fuel cells, environmental
control, station-keeping functions for the space station and for any other
presently unforeseen propellant requirements.
9
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POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A PROPELLANT DEPOT
Not having the depot, in terms of these potential needs, presents a whole
spectrum of potential hazards which include:
(a) Isolation of crew members _n orbit or on the surface because of
insufficient propellant capacity for a tug.
(b) Inability to complete or _nitiate a rescue because of propellant
insufficiency.
(c) Shortage of supplies to operate fuel cells.
(d) In the event of a contaminated atmosphere in the space station
or in the LSB the depot would be a source of fresh oxygen for
replacement of the atmosphere. Nitrogen could also be stored at
a depot for atmospheric replenishment.
An auxiliary depot on the surface would ensure the availability of oxygen
and hydrogen as indicated in (a) to (d) above and would particularly ensure
propellant sufficiency for any tug that intended to ascend to lunar orbit
from the LSB area.
If no depot exists in orbit, then a surface depot must exist to keep landed
tugs f_lled in order to pursue certain rescue missions such as a PTV failure
to inject into lunar orbit. Otherwise, the PTV propulsion failure hazard
might result in the loss of the crew aboard that vehicle.
Should no depot exist either in orbit or on the surface and the requirement
for rescue of the crew of a failed PTV still exist - as it may - then a
surface-based tug would have to be huge _n order to accomplish this mission.
For example, choosing an average response time (see Ref. a., pg, 223, 8 hr.
response time) the delta velocity requirement for this mission is 2%,600 fps:
this includes 8000 fps to escape from the lunar surface, 4600 fps to chase
the PTV, 5600 fps to return to lunar orbit, and 6300 fps to return to the
lunar surface. In the context of the IPP the economic viability to counter
this endangered PTV crew hazard, using so large a tug, is poor.
The present single stage configuration stationed _n lunar orbit could perform
this task at much lower cost and with far less exposure to hazards; viz., the
lunar ascent and descent.
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In sum, the potential hazards that are obviated and the advantages gained,
as discussed herein, lead to a strong recommendationthat a propellant depot
be stationed and maintained in lunar orbit as a fundamental part of the lunar
complex.
Becausepersonnel and traffic levels are expected to increase downstream in
time, it is also recommendedthat a depot be located on the surface event-
ually.
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3.3 TUGDESIGNEFFECTSINGLESTAGEVS _IgOSTAGEVS ONEANDONE-HALFSTAGE
CONFIGURATIONS
O
TUG FUNCTIONS
The lunar tug propulsion functions consist of:
(a) Delivery of personnel and/or cargo to the lunar surface and the
return of personnel/cargo to lunar orbit. This function can occur
between the lunar space station and the surface or between a prime
transport vehicle (PTV) or another orbiting tug and the surface.
(b) Transfer of cargo and personnel in lunar orbit to and from the PTV's
and to and from the lunar space station.
(c) Perform rescue missions:
i. lunar surface to lunar surface
2. lunar orbit to lunar orbit or beyond (e.g., past the Moon or to
Earth)
3. lunar orbit to lunar surface
4- lunar surface to lunar orbit
TUG CONFIGURATIONS
There are presently three configurations being studied for the space tug to
be used in the lunar complex; these include a single stage refuelable tug, a
two-stage tug analogous to the Apollo Lunar Module, and a l½ stage tug in
which propellant tanks are Jettisoned when they are expended.
THE SINGLE STAGE TUG
The single stage tug has the evident potential hazard of propulsion failure
during ascent or descent with no alternative mode or additional stage with
which to recover. A potential method of obviating this shortcoming is to
design the propulsion system with 4 engines located 90 degrees apart and
operating as redundantdiametrically opposed throttleable pairs. The
engines would be operated simultaneously at ½ of their rated thrust value
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during tug ascent or descent missions. In the event of an engine malfunction
its diametric twin would be turned off and the other pa_rs of engines would
come up to full thrust to complete the mission. If the engines are built as
separately replaceable units, then replacement of malfunctioned engines could
be performed in orbit at the space station or on the surface at the LSB after
the time it is activated.
Some redundancy could be placed in the propellant tanks by dividing the tanks
into % or 6 units (2 or 3 tanks of L0 2 and 2 or 3 tanks of LH 2) and designing-
in appropriate crossfeeds in the event of a tank or tank pressurization
failure.
The engine/tank redundancy, plus similar treatment for tug controls, largely
define the preventive measures against the hazards of propulsion/control
failures during ascent or descent procedures.
Failures in 2 engines no__tdiametrically opposed lead to an irrecoverable
situation in which the crew would be lost.
It should be observed that the suggested alternate propulsion design concepts
for the tug would reduce the hazards of propulsion failure substantially
during descent and that this is aided by the assumption that normally at
initiation of descent the rug's propellant tanks are full The situation
is not the same for ascent conditions. A propulsion failure during ascent
is critical because a large percentage of the propellant has been expended
during descent and the remainder may be close to marginal for completion of
ascent so that if only part of it is available (i.e., a tank failure is in-
volved) the tank and other redundancies may be insufficient to avoid an
ascent failure. Thus, ascent missions even _th the alternate concept ad-
vantages will still be hazardous.
Failures in other subsystems for the single stage tug cannot be discussed
presently because knowledge on these subsystems _s not now available. It
is expected, however, that such critical subsystems as electrical p_er will
be redundant to the extent of supplying back-up electrical power during
ascent or descent.
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THE 1} STAGE _UG
All of the considerations given to the single stage configuration apply to
the 1½ stage. However, Jettisoning tanks clearly implies the need for tank
replacement at some later time. The handling of these tanks presents a
hazard not found in the single stage tug to the crew whether replacement
occurs in lunar orbit or on the lunar surface. Because of the need for tank
Jettisoning the I} stage tug is, to some degree, less safe during operation
than the single stage tug, since, if the tank Jettisoning fails to take
place the tug propulsion performance will be degraded.
The hazards to be met in ascent with the I} stage configuration are little
different from those in the single stage tug.
THE TWO STAGE TUG CONFIGURATION
The hazards of stage failure in any lunar descent procedure are circumvented
by the use of a two stage Apollo-LM type lunar lander. However, the ascent
hazard remains since in this configuration the lower stage serves only as a
launching platform for the ascent stage and as a consequence can play no
part in amy ascent procedure. All of the ascent hazards to be found in one
and in the 1½ stage configurations are still present in the upper stage of
the two stage configuration. The use of two pairs of engines/controls as
described for the single stage configuration would essentially overcome the
ascent hazard in the two stage lander. This still gives engine redundancy
and does not require a separation sequence. In the event of an aborted
descent the potential hazard of being isolated in orbit is relieved by the
ability to perform rescue by other manned vehicles in lunar orbit. Such
potential rescue vehicles could be docked at the space station or may con-
stitute a manned tug in lunar orbit by itself. An ascent procedure may also
be aborted if the velocity gain at the time of decision-to-abort is not more
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than approximately 2000 ft/sec and propulsion and attitude control are func-
tioning. However, some provision for landing support hardware would have to
be included on the ascent stage for such a procedure. It is readily realized
that this kind of ascent abort would provide hazard circumvention _n only
part of the spectrum of hazards during ascent; still, because it is a reason-
able technique, it should not be neglected. The technique is applicable to
all 3 configurations discussed in this section. The 2 stage and 1½ stage
tugs introduce addit4onal hazards by virtue of the need to replace the
descent stage or the jett_ sonable tanks. There appears to be no sharp diff-
erences among the three configurations insofar as the presence or lack of
hazards are concerned _n the light of presently ava41able information.
Because of the lack of detailed information on the 3 tug configurations no
recommendation can be made at this time depicting the least hazardous of
these 3 concepts.
It is strongly suggested, however, that when detailed designs of all three
configurations are available a study in depth be conducted to ascertain the
hazards present and the relative safety of the 3 tug configurations.
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APPENDIX A
LUNAR MISSION HAZARDS CHARACTERIZATION
6
This Appendix assembles and presents information relative to the character-
ization of the hazards which might be encountered in projected lunar ex-
ploration missions. It also presents the pertinent definitions, cause and
effect relationships and hazards groupings employed in the Lunar Mission
Safety and Rescue Study - Hazards Analysis Task.
I. Pertinent Definitions (Ref. 1)
Safe_ -- Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment
or property.
Hazard -- The presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe
act or condition, environment or natural phenomenon, personnel error,
design characteristics, time critical normal or emergency operations,
procedure deficiencies, or subsystem malfunction which will cause system
or personnel loss.
Ris.___k-- The chance (qualitative) of injury to personnel or loss of
equipment, or property.
Personnel Loss -- Loss of function or injury requiring medical attention.
Hazard L_vels -- Hazardous levels are identified as follows:
Safety Catastrophic -- Condition(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or subsystem
malfunction will cause system or personnel loss.
Safety Critical -- Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error,
design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or subsystem mal-
function must be counteracted by urgent crew action (no time available
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for ground/flight crew analysis) to prevent system or personnel
loss.
Safety Marginal -- Condition(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteritics, procedural deficiencies, or sub-
system malfunction can be counteracted or controlled with time
available for ground/flight crew analysis to prevent system
and/or personnel loss.
Safety Negligible -- Condition(s) such that personnel error,
design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or subsystem
failure will not result in system or personnel loss.
2. Hazards Groups
The selection of specific hazards groups considered in the study is
based upon the recognition of a direct relationship between the cause
of a hazard, its potential effects upon exposed crew personnel and the
implied threat to personnel safety which the hazard may inherently
contain (Ref. 2). It is felt that any hazards group classification
scheme adopted must account for this relationship in order to avoid
the purely mechanistic or system-oriented approach which neglects
crew personnel as functioning entities. The implications of the
cause, effect and threat relationship are apparent from an exami-
nation of the following:
PRIME CAUSES
EQUIPMENT FAILURES
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
FUNCTIONAL INCAPACITATION
PERSONNEL ERRORS
PROCEDURAL ERRORS
POTENTIAL EFFECTS
FATALITIES
INCAPAC ITATION
DEBILITATION
DISORIENTATION
TRAUMA
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BASIC THREATS
DEPRIVATION OF METABOLIC NEEDS
ORGANIC DAMAGE AND POISONING
EXCESSIVE PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS
EXCESSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS
Note that the presence of a basic threat in any of the prime causes of a
hazardous situation or condition will generate a potential risk to crew
personnel.
A review of the work performed by previous investigators in the determina-
tion of logical hazards classification groupings was accomplished. The
various groupings were compared for similarity, applicability and complete-
ness, and then additionally checked against the cause, effect, threat
relationship to determine specific applicability to crew personnel safety.
The results of this effort were incorporated into a listing of hazards groups
which appear to adequately characterize the range of hazards one might expect
to be associated with a lunar exploration program. For the purpose of the
current study, it was determined that a revised listing of twelve general
classification groups were sufficient to describe the hazards most likely
to be encountered in the hazards analysis.
The hazards groups are as follows:
I. EXPLOSION/IMPLOSION
2. FIRE
3. PRESSURE EXCURSION
i. COLLISION
5. CONTAMINATION
6. INJUKf/ILLNESS
7. PERSONNEL ISOLATION
8. MOTION/ACCELERATIONS
9. HUMAN ERROR
IO. HOSTILE _NVIRONMENT
11. RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
12. SYST_ OR SUBSYSTEM MALFUNCTION
A brief discussion of each hazard group is given in the interest of clarity
of definition:
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Explosion/Implosion: - The hazards attendant to, and/or occasioned
by sudden and violent disruption of vehicle, shelter, or contiguous
equipment component integrity.
Includes: Explosion or Implosion due to: State transformation
of liquids, gases, chemicals, or ordnance sources, or induced
transformations due to heat and/or pressure sources.
Fir.__._e:- The hazards attendant to, and/or occasioned by slow or rapid
combustion of vehicular, habitat, or suit materials capable of sus-
tained burning once ignited.
Includes: Liquids, gases, organic based materials, pyrophoric metals•
Pressure Excursions: - The hazards occasioned by any non-violent
decompression/over-pressure event occurring in vehicle, habitat or
suit, outside of established pressure limits.
Includes: Unplanned venting, pressure loss, unplanned inflation,
unplanned deflation, etc.
Collision: - The hazards occasioned by impact with natural or man-
made objects whether originating from internal (vehicle, shelter) or
external sources•
Includes: Meteroid strikes, debris, unsecured equipments, other
vehicles, lunar surface objects, etc.
Contamination: - The hazards occasioned by the presence of an elemental
or structured substance, or biological organism, whether toxic or non-
toxic, which exceeds specified permissible concentration limits for the
surface, fluid or media under consideration.
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Includes: (a)
(b)
Substances or organisms which are inimical
to human life or intolerable for human well-
being.
Substances which can impair or destroy mechani-
cal/electrical/electronic equipments.
Q
e InJur_/lllness: - The hazards attendant to, and/or occasioned by a
condition in which the health and well-being of the crew or a crew
member is impaired or destroyed, due to organic damage or degradation
or to biological invasion.
Includes: Fractures, punctures, lacerations, concussions, metabolic
deprivation, diseases, infection, death. (Refs. 2 and 3).
7. Personnel Isolation: - The hazard occasioned by a condition or situ-
ation wherein a barrier exists between a crewman and his haven of safety.
Includes: Stranding, entrapment, communication loss, loss of
reference position, visibility difficulties, etc.
e Motion/Accelerations: - The hazards occasioned by the movement of
personnel, or of space or surface vehicles, whether planned or un-
planned.
Includes: Ascent, descent, braking, injection, deorbiting, linear
motion, roll, pitch, yaw, turning, reversing, tumbling, etc.
e Human Errors: - The hazards occasioned by accidental or unintentional
departure from established plans or procedures. Impaired awareness of,
or misjudgment regarding, a situation and a course of action required.
Includes: Inadvertent or accidental activation of systems (button
pushing, switching, etc.); failure to check out, enable, or arm systems;
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fatigue-induced impaired awarenessregarding sequential processes or
procedural requirements and back-up modes; incomplete assessment of
situation or condition at hand, etc.
10. Hostile Environment: - The hazards attendant to, and/or occasioned by
exposure to external environmental conditions which may be inherently
destructive to human life.
Includes: External temperature extremes, space vacuum conditions,
and extraterrestrial body environments (i.e., planetary atmospheric
gases, dust, life-forms, spores, reactive materials and liquids,
lighting phenomena, gravity conditions, etc.)
11. Radiological Hazards: - The hazards attendant to, and/or occasioned
by, natural or man-made electro-magnetic and nuclear radiation sources.
A. Natural Sources: External electromagnetic radiation, cosmic
radiation, solar flares, and by-products of stellar nuclear
reactions.
Includes: Galactic cosmic rays, Van Allem belts, high and low energy
protens, high and low energy electrons, Alpha particles, solar wind
and flares (Refs. 4 & 5).
B. Man-Made Sources: Energy radiating equipments, of all types emit-
ting penetrating rays, beams and particles.
Includes: Radio transmitter microwave, X-ray, radar, laser-beams,
radio-isotopic power generators, nuclear power plants, and nuclear
propulsion systems.
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12. System or Subsystem Malfunction: - The hazards attendant to, and/or
occasioned by, a system or subsystem malfunction, whether due to a
failure to perform, or to performance degradation.
h
Includes: Any system, subsystem, or equipment item (hardware/software),
the functional capability of which is critical to the execution of a
local or remote operation or activity.
REFERENCES
1. N_SCM-1701, "System Safety Program Requirements for Space Flight Contrac-
tors." NASA/MSC - Houston, Texas (not dated)•
2. RM-5200-NASA, "Contingency Planning for Space Flight Emergencies,"
(Dole, et al.), Rand Corporation, January 1967.
3. "Summary of Medical Experience in Apollo 7 through 11 Manned Space
Flights," C. A. Berry, NASA/MSC, Aerospace Medicine, May 1970.
4. "Radiological Concepts for Manned Space Missions," J. Pickering,
Aerospace Medicine, February 1970.
• " F. X. Gavigan, USAEC/SNPO-W,5 "Operational Safety of Nuclear Rockets,
December 1969.
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APPENDIX B
LUNAR MISSION MODEL
l An advanced lunar exploration program proposed for the 1980 to 1990 time
period must be fluid and open to change during the next several years. Equip-
ment designs, operational interfaces, operational safety, exploration objec-
tives, national priorities, and budgets will be among the factors continually
traded off in working toward a firm, approved program. In the meantime,
safety requirements must be developed in order that the equipment elements
may be designed and exploration programs planned to provide the lunar ex-
plorers of the future with a safe operation.
The development of safety guidelines or requirements must proceed from knowl-
edge of the hardware elements to be used and the operations and schedules to
be supported. It is evident that this development process must be iterative.
For the Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue Study it was necessary that a model
program, with alternates, be chosen to expose the potential hazards to man.
The baseline model provided by NASA was the Integrated Program Plan (IPP)
Reference Schedule - High Budget Baseline dated 5-18-70 (Ref. 1), with the
addition of alternate nuclear or chemical shuttles between Earth orbit and
lunar orbit. The IPP Reference Schedule - Low Budget Alternative dated
5-27-70 (Ref. 2) was provided as a representative alternate program.
With the Integrated Program Plan (IPP) high budget model as a baseline,
representative lunar mission operations were defined for use in the study.
Equipment and operations data from current and past studies and actual Apollo
missions were freely consulted in order to make the model as realistic as
possible. Representative hardware elements and use descriptions were ob-
tained from the NASA-MBC Project Description Documents (PDD's) for Space Tug,
Nuclear Stage, Chemical Stage, Lunar Orbit Station, Fuel Depot, Lunar Surface
Base, and Surface Transportation, References 3 through 9, respectively. The
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mission model was summarizedby NASAin Ref. 10.
As an analysis aid, Lockheed developed operations time-lines for the mission
model. The basic traffic model is presented in Ref. 1. The lunar mission
functional flow diagrams are presented in Appendix D of this report, MSC-
03977.
The major items of spacecraft, lunar surface vehicles,surface installations,
and other equipments that were considered to be a part of the lunar complex
and were derived from the constituents of the high level IPP and associated
PDD's include but are not limited to:
i. A space tug consisting of propulsion module, 6-man crew module,
an intelligence module, a cargo module, and landing gear.
2. A Prime Transport Vehicle (PTV) which mayhave a chemical or nuclear
propulsion system. The PTVtransports menand cargo between Earth
orbit and lunar orbit.
3. A 12-manspace station in lunar orbit, together with auxiliary
modules for purposes of conducting experiments and for supporting
other space station activities.
4. A propellant depot in lunar orbit which maybe attached to the
space station or free flying but under the jurisdiction of the
space station. At a date downstreamin the lunar program, a supple-
mentary depot maybe established on the lunar surface.
5. Lunar surface cabin and non-cabin type roving vehicles.
6. Lunar flying vehicles which maybe equipped to carry a pilot and
a passenger.
7. A 6-manto 9-manLunar Surface Basewhich is a multi-compartmented,
multi-decked permanent installation on the lunar surface intended
to support far-ranging surface exploration.
P
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8. Lunar Shelters which maybe brought to any site at which lunar
activities will be conducted. They are considered temporary and
movable structures.
9. Lunar scientific equipment which covers all and any equipment
brought to the surface or to lunar orbit to directly aid in the
spectrum of experiments to be conducted in the lunar complex.
Lunar Surface Support Equipment to be used in supporting all crew
memberactivities including basic functions such as power for life
support and extended functions such as the surface experiments.
A nuclear based electrical power system is expected to be included
whenthe LSBbecomesan operating entity.
ii. Unmannedlunar satellites supporting basic functions such as com-
munications and other satellites used in the realm of scientific
experiments.
i0.
It is emphasizedthat the models were used only as a necessary analysis aid
and point of departure for a broad safety and rescue study. Every effort was
madethroughout the study to keep in mind that the objective was to develop
safety guidelines and rescue concepts in a general sense in order to influence
the design of newequipment and the planned operation of that equipment.
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References:
I. NASA-MBC Integrated Program Plan Reference Schedule, High Budget Baseline
- May 18, 1970.
2. NASA-_C Integrated Program Plan Reference Schedule, Low Budget Alterna-
tive - May 28, 1970.
3. NASA-_BC Project Description Document - Space Tug - April 24, 1970.
4. NASA-_C Project Description Document - Nuclear Stage - April 13, 1970.
5. NASA-MSC Project Description Document - Chemical Stage - May 5, 1970.
6. NASA-M3C Project Description Document - Lunar Orbit Station - April 1970.
7. NASA-MSC Project Description Document - Fuel Depot - April 14, 1970.
8. NASA-MSC Project Description Document - Surface Transportation - March
1970.
9. NASA-MSC Project Description Document - Lunar Surface Base - June 15, 1970.
i0. Contract NAS 9-10969 Statement of Work, Appendix A, Description of Lunar
Program Portion of Manned Spaceflight Integrated Plan - April i, 1970,
NASA-_C.
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APPENDIX C
HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The hazards analysis proceeded from the task objectives and the mission
model defined for the study as shown in Figure C-1.
The first step was to describe, in a top level flow diagram, the functions
and operations of the lunar exploration elements making up the model. This
top level functional flow diagram, presented in Appendix D, displays and
links the major items of lunar exploration equipment and the major opera-
tions that take place with that equipment.
The top level flow diagram is then _expanded in a series of first level flow
charts to display mission events and identify potentially hazardous condi-
tions andsltuations requiring study. The complete first level hazards
assessment is presented in Appendix D and identifies hazard generators,
hazards, potential hazard effects, applicable hazard groups, and the hazard
level range.
Each event in the first level hazards assessment was examined, and a list
of hazardous conditions and situations requiring further study was compiled.
This list was then expanded to include special situations and conditions,
such as lighting, communications, and lunar environment, not stated in the
lunar mission program model of sequence of events. Each item on this list
was subjected to an individual study to identify the hazards in greater
detail, describe the hazards effects, propose alternate preventive and
remedial measures, note requirements for escape and rescue, and present
candidate safety guidelines and requirements. Section 2 of this report
presents the complete results of the individual studies.
Tie first step in each Hazard Study was to state the assumptions important
to th_ s_tuation to be analyzed. Next, the major hazards were listed and
C'l
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described briefly. Each hazard was then analyzed to determine the effects on
crew safety, andto perform trade studies of alternate corrective measures,
both preventive and remedial. For each hazard, the possible need for es-
cape and/or rescue was noted. The final step was preparation of a list of
candidate safety guidelines and requirements. The completed Hazard Study
was then passed on to the Escape/Rescue subtask team where the requirements
were defined in greater detail and escape/rescue concepts and guidelines
proposed.
With the individual studies complete, a study of the hazards identified
and of the guidelines candidates was made to assess compatibility and feas-
ibility and to firm up the recommendations presented in Section 2 of MSC-
03976.
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APPENDIX D
FIRST IEVEL HAZARDS ASSESSMENT
This appendix presents the first level hazards assessment described in
Appendix C.
The top level functional flow, Fig. D-l, displays and links the major items
of lunar exploration equipment and the major operations that take place
with that equipment.
The top level flow diagram is expanded in a series of first level flow
charts to display mission events and identify potentially hazardous con-
ditions and situations that might occur in a typical advanced lunar pro-
gram. For each event in the mission, the hazards generators, hazards,
hazards groups, and hazard level range are identified.
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REF. i.0
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TO
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1.2
i DELIVER FIRST
CREW AND
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1.3
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SUBSEQUENT
_-- CREWS AND
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LUNAR ORBIT
1.4
DELIVER
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TO LUNAR ORBIT
Fig. D-3 Logistics Operations First-Level Functions
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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA REPC_T NO. 1
A STUDY TO EVALUATE RADIATION EXPOSURE OF THE
ORBITING LUNAR STATION AND THE LUNAR SURFACE
RELATED TO REUSABLE NUCLEAR SHUTTLE OPERATIONS
i. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH
This study was conducted to determine the radiation environment created by a
Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS) in performing its normal mission functions
while in the lunar vicinity, and to evaluate the impact of that environment on
the Orbiting Lunar Station (OLS) or lunar surface operations. Trajectory data
and the nuclear engine (NERVA) operating history were taken from data developed
during the Nuclear Flight Systems Definition Study, Phase II (NAS 8-24715)
and reported in Ref. 1. Although operating characteristics of the NERVA
engine have recently been revised in regards to startup, shutdown, and cool-
down, the changes will have only secondary effects on trajectory behavior and
little or no effect on the radiation environment.
The OLS is assumed to be in 60 n.mi. circular polar orbit. The RNS on lunar
arrival will be required only to inject into the reference orbit in the near
vicinity of the OLS. All payload transfers to and from the RNS will be con-
ducted by other space elements (tugs, etc.). Residence time of the RNS in
lunar orbit can vary from about 4 days to 30 days during which time no oper-
ation of the NERVA engine will occur. RNS coplanar lunar arrival opportuni-
ties occur twice each lunar month although normal trip frequency would prob-
ably not exceed one every 54.6 days.
Most lunar departures will require some out-of-plane maneuvers in order to
permit coplanar arrival at Earth. These departures will normally be performed
using a 3-burn maneuver to minimize energy requirements, although single burn
departures may be selected if the total plane change requirement is less than
20 degrees.
E-1
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2. RADIATIONENVIRONMENTCREATEDBY THENUCLEARENGINE
2.1 OPERATIONALENVIRONMENT
The most severe radiation environment will exist during periods in which the
NERVAreactor is operating whenboth neutron and gammaradiation will be
present. The intensity will depend on the reactor power level, distance from
the source, and intervening mass such as engine shielding or components.
From Figure 1 it can be seen that significant dose rates will be encountered
hundreds of miles awayin the vacuumof space during periods of full power
(1575 mw)operation. _
The effect of shielding and scatter from engine and stage hardware on the
neutron and gammadose rates is presented in Figure 2 for a separation dis-
tance of lO0 feet. For this evaluation the 1969 CRAM(CommonRadiation Analy-
sis Model) as given in Ref. 2 wasused. The sharp reduction in dose rate in
the forward sector of the vehicle (0° - 15°) is related to the engine internal
shield. Neutron dose rates assumedan RBE(radiobiological equivalent) fac-
tor of 8. Distance effects can be determined using the inverse square rela-
tionship of dose to distance.
2.2 POSTOPERATIONALENVIRONMENT
Whenthe reactor is shut downand the source of neutrons eliminated, the radi-
ation environment will be considerably diminished, consisting primarily of
gammaradiation due to fission product decay in the core. Unlike the oper-
ating dose rate, which can be considered constant during periods of constant
power operation, the post operational fission product source term is decay-
ing with time with the result that the environment is a function of time after
shutdown as well as distance and view angle. In Figure 3 it can be seen that
1 hour after shutdownthe fission product gammadose rate at 5000 meters
(2.7 nm) is 4 x 10-5 R/sec (0.144 R/hr), while for the operating engine (see
Figure l) the samedose rate from combinedneutron and gammaradiation could
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be received as far away as 150 n.mi. Furthermore, because the fission product
source is diminishing with time (see Figure 4) one would have to remain about
4200 meters from the engine for i hour to receive 0.144 Rem (see Figure 5).
For the first few days following shutdown the fission product source term
will be dominated by the short-lived fission products from the last burn. For
longer decay times the buildup of greater inventories of longer-lived fission
products related to multiple burns will become more pronounced as can be seen
in Figure 5 for the first and second arrival of the RNS in lunar orbit.
For the analyses the post operational fission product source term was computed
following shutdown in lunar orbit for the first lunar mission of the RNS and
is shown in Figure 4. These data are representative of the 90° view angle,
or maximum dose rate considering only the self-shielding effects of the core
itself. Attenuation due to view angle used in the study, again based on
Reference (2), is shown in Figure 6. As was done for the operating case, dis-
tance attenuation was computed using the inverse square relationship.
3. EFFECT OF DECAY HEAT ON RNS PROPULSIVE MANEUVERS
In addition to the radiation environment caused by the decaying fission pro-
ducts in the engine core, a considerable quantity of heat is released which
_mst be removed to prevent damage to the engine. For example, at the end of
shutdown (Scram) for a typical LOI burn the decay heat rate is about 3.7 x
i0 _5 Btu/sec which would be sufficient to vaporize core material if a contin-
uous flow of coolant was not provided. After about 325 seconds the rate will
have dropped to about 6.8 x 103 Btu/sec and the cooling can be provided at a
lower rate, or as is the case, in intermittent pulses. These pulses will con-
tinue with diminishing frequency until the decay heat rate is low enough to
permit cooling by radiation alone. Current data using 5 Btu/sec as the out-
off would require active cooling for approximately %0 hours following the
LOI burn.
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The effect of this cooling requirement on the trajectory at lunar orbit
arrival is shownin Figure 7 in which the impulse produced by the after cool-
ing is used to provide a portion of the_V required for the orbit insertion.
While the long pulse-cooling time (in the example only about 12 hours of cool-
downimpulse were used) Will complicate the maneuver from a guidance and con-
trol standpoint, it has the advantage of increasing the separation distance
betweenRNSand OLSduring the actual reactor operation.
A typical three burn departure maneuveris shownin Figure 8. For this man-
euver only the first burn will occur close enough to the OLSor lunar surface
to be of concern.
4. RADIATIONEXPOSURETOTHEOLSDURINGNC_hMALRNSLUNARMISSIONOPERATIONS
4.1 LUNARORBITINSERTION
The integrated neutron and gammadose levels which would be received at the
OLSduring RNSlunar orbit insertion were evaluated for two conditions; (1)
final LOI lO Kmaheadof the OLS, and (2) lO Kmbehind the OLS.
During the main engine burn the separation distance (RNSto 0LS) and view
angle for both cases are virtually the sameand are presented in Figure 9.
The total dose delivered to the OLSduring the period from startup to scram
was computedto be 0.194 mRem,of which 0.144 mRemwas attributable to neu-
trons and 0.050 mRemto gammaradiation.
Almost coincident with shutdown the view angle becomesless than 15° for both
cases and remains so during most of the cooldown insertion. Thus, even
though the RNS- 0LSdistance is diminishing, the protection provided by
the engine internal shield effectively eliminates any radiation problem at
the OLS. The variations in separation distance and view angle for the case
in which final LOI occurs lO Kmbehind the OLS, and the view angle for the
alternate case, are shownin Figure lO.
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For arrival I0 Kmbehind the OLSa total fission product gammadose of 7.03
toRero,roughly 36 times the dose received during the main burn, will be re-
ceived at the OLS. Most of this dose will be delivered during the time in-
terval from about 38,000 to 39,000 seconds when the RNSis making a close
passage with the OLSand the view angle is in the 60° to 140° range.
For the alternate arrival condition, i0 Kmahead of the OLS, the RNS would
always remain oriented such that the OLS is within the engine shield cone,
effectively eliminating any measurable dose at the OLS. This case also elim-
inated the close passage problem encountered in the other example.
Increasing the separation distance at final L01 would have little effect on
the dose if arrival behind the OLS is selected unless the distance was in-
creased to the point that the close passage was eliminated. It can reason-
ably be concluded then that unless mission conditions dictate otherwise, ar-
rival of the RNS ahead of the OLS would be selected.
4.2 LUNAR ORBIT DEPARTURE
The lunar orbit departure operation may be accomplished using a single burn
or a 3-burn maneuver, depending on the amount of plane change required to
satisfy the trans-earth injection (TEl) conditions. During the 3-burn de-
parture the second and third burns will occur at such high altitudes (see
Figure 8) that no effective dose will be received at the OLS.
The neutron and gamma dose received at the OLS was evaluated for three de-
parture startup conditions; RNS 5.4 n.mi. behind the OLS, RNS 5.4 n.mi.
ahead of the OLS and RNS 20 n.mi. ahead of the OLS.
Separation distances and view angles for startup 5.4 n.mi. (I0 Km) ahead of
and 5.4 n.mi. behind the 0LS are presented in Figures ll and 12. Startup
20 n.mi. ahead would be similar to the 5.4 n.mi. ahead case except that the
distances would be greater by about 15 nomi.
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Integrated neutron and gammadoses at the OLSfor these cases will be:
Position at Startup
5.4 n.mi. behind OLS
5.4 n.mi. ahead of OLS
20 n.mi. aheadof OLS
Neutron Dose GammaDose
42.9 Rem 5.41 Rem
2.52 Rem .139 Rem
.266 Rem .015 Rem
The high dose for the case where startup occurs i0 Kmbehind the OLSresults
from the very close 0LSpassage (about 0.29 n.mi.) during the reactor opera-
ting period. The benefits of even modest increases in separation distance
are readily apparent from the other two cases evaluated.
The high neutron and gammadoses during engine operation for startup behind
the OLScould be eliminated if the initial distance was increased to about
30 n.mi., however, a close 0LSpassage whenfission product gammarates are
near maximnmwouldstill be required. Additionally, the risk of collision
during the flyby would also represent an undesirable hazard.
The analyses support the conclusion that if startup near the 0LSwas required,
a position aheadof it in orbit would be favored. A distance of at least
20 n.mi. would be desirable. Onthe other hand, since the RNSrequires no
direct OLSsupport for the TEI maneuvera more desirable condition for startup
would be with the RNSbeyond the lunar horizon (about 680 n.mi. for 60 n.mi.
orbit altitudes) such that the engine burn could not be seen at the 0LS and
none of the low altitude operation would occur near the OLS.
4.3 RADIATIONEXPOSUREDURINGRNSRESIDENCEIN LUNARORBIT
On arriving at the Moonthe nuclear shuttle will be divested of its outbound
payload by lunar tugs or using propulsion units in the payload itself. Some-
time prior to departure an Earth-return payload will be delivered to the RNS
and docked to it. At all other times, the RNSwill simply stand by in or-
bit waiting either to receive a payload or for the desired TEI opportunity
to occur. If the RNSis near other space elements, it 2an be commandedto
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maintain a "nose-on" attitude toward the particular element to preclude any
dose to crews or equipment, thus eliminating any accumulation of radiation
dose during normal RNS standby operations. It would be parked during such
standby periods sufficiently distant from the 0LS to permit unrestricted
arrivals and departures of lunar tugs or other vehicles.
Except in the event of an RNS system malfunction no hazards would be associ-
ated with this standby period.
5. RADIATION EXPOSURE TO LUNAR SURFACE DURING RNS ARRIVAL OR DEPARTURE
Radiation exposure to men or installations on the lunar surface along the
incoming trajectory trace could occur during periods of nuclear engine oper-
ation for the lunar arrival and departure burns. The most severe arrival
situation would involve a single burn LOI maneuver in which a minimum re-
covery of after-cooling impulse was planned. This type insertion would re-
sult in the lowest altitude during the burn. For evaluation, an incoming
trajectory was selected for which no after-cooling impulse recovery was
employed. The approach is represented pictorially in Figure 13. RNS alti-
tude at the beginning of steady-state operation is about 85 n.mi. Neutron
and gamma doses delivered to various positions along the surface track were
evaluated using the separation distance and view angle data given in Figures
14 and 15.
The neutron and gamma doses received along the ground track reach maximums
of about 23.5 and 3.0 mRem at position 3, vertically below the RNS at shut-
down (see Figure 16). Uprange positions i and 2 benefit from the change in
view angle after the overflight while downrange positions 4 and 5 benefit
from increased range and even more important are hidden by the lunar horizon
during the early portion of the burn with position 5 not coming into view
until shutdown is initiated.
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Normal LOI burns would start up at altitudes of about 125 n.mi. and shut down
at about 95 n.mi. for which case the dose at the surface would be reduced to
perhaps one-third to one-half the values for the low altitude approach. In
any event surface doses from the LOI or TEI burns would cause no concern for
ground positions unless experiments with sensitive measurementinstruments
were involved in which case it maybe necessary to provide someform of pro-
tection for these systems if they are situated in locations which could be
beneath the RNSduring periods of full-power operation.
The most severe dose to the surface would probably occur for a single burn
lunar departure with the RNScarrying maximumpayload. This case was not
evaluated due to the lack of suitable trajectory information on which to base
the analyses. Burn times of 300 to 400 seconds would be required most of
which would occur at or near 60 n.mi. altitude. The picture would not be
too unlike the low altitude arrival with the exception that altitudes and
relative velocities during the 9ull-power interval would be lower suggesting
higher peak doses. While the resulting conditions on the surface should not
be considered as indicative of a problem, they should be considered in plan-
ning surface activities if nuclear lunar shuttles are employed.
6. EFFECT OF NERVA EXHAUST PLUME ON ORBITING LUNAR ELEMENTS
During nuclear engine operation fission products can be ejected from the core
either in particulate matter produced by corrosion of the fuel elements or
as gaseous material diffusing through the fuel matrix. Since these fission
products will be carried along in the exhaust, they could theoretically repre-
sent a hazard to systems such as the OLS or Lunar Tug which subsequently pass
through the expanded exhaust plume or to the RNS itself which during retro
maneuvers will sweep through a portion of its own plume.
Little is known either about the size and mass distribution of the NERVA ex-
haust plume or the concentration of fission products within it, however, West-
inghouse Astronuclear Laboratory has conducted a preliminary evaluation of
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the i_pact of radiation sources in the plume on manned orbital facilities
(Ref. 3). From their analyses, which were intentionally conservative, it
appears that no radiological hazard to men or equipment will result if passage
through the plume occurs after it has achieved its full expansion. Situations
in which only partial expansion has taken place when a manned system enter
the plume, such as would occur for an RNS departing lunar orbit from a posi-
tion ahead of the 0LS, have not been examined to sufficient depth to draw
valid conclusions, however, preliminary assessment for RNS startup 20 n.mi.
or more ahead of the OLS suggest the dose levels from the plume sources at
the OLS will be sufficiently reduced to eliminate it as a serious source of
radiation exposure.
A possible exposure-producing situation is one which might arise from the
capture of radioactive particulate matter by the exterior surfaces of the 0LS
or other manned vehicle systems. Subsequent EVA activities involving contact
with the contaminated surfaces could result in a transfer of particles to
the crewman's space suit or equipment and a potential direct skin contact or
ingestion if the suit were handled after return to the spacecraft cabin.
While a theoretical exposure route can be postulated, the potential for sig-
nificant exposures is considered too remote to be of concern since the par-
ticulate matter would be very small containing an insufficient fission
product inventory to be hazardous even if a large number of such particles were
involved. However, on early missions involving the RNS it would be desirable
to perform inspections of surfaces exposed to the NERVA plume to determine
how much contamination, if ar_, could be expected.
Catastrophic failures such as loss of coolant to the engine cs_sing destruc-
tive disassembly of the reactor could result in hazardous conditions at or
near the OLS or other space elements. Depending on the location and concen-
tration of the radioactive debris it is conceivable that manned activities at
the OLS might have to be restricted or discontinued until sufficient disperse-
ment of the debris had taken place. Steps are being taken in the NERVA and
nuclear shuttle designs to reduce such accidents to incredibility, however,
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procedural safeguards including methods for detection and evaluation covering
such contingencies would be desirable.
7. OFF-NOMINAL RNS OPERATIONS AND THEIR HAZARD POTENTIAL
Some consideration should be given to the possibility of the RNS operating
in an off-nominal manner and what impact such operations might have on the
safety of the RNS or other orbiting space elements. For convenience off-
optimum operations will be constrained to those operations which result from
human error or system malfunctions which do not result in mission abort. Three
conditions were considered which fall into this class: (i) lunar approach
guidance errors which cause low altitude LOI burn and/or operation close to
the OLS, (2) guidance errors during the pulse cooling orbit insertion which
could threaten the OLS with collision or close passage radiation exposure
and (3) reductions in thrust at LOI which could alter burn duration and loca-
tion relative to the 0LS with final orbit insertion in other than the in-
tended orbit.
Approach Guidance Errors. Approach asymptote errors would require an adjust-
ment in the scheduled full-power engine operation at LOI and if the error was
on the low altitude side, could result in performing the LOI burn close enough
to the OLS to be of concern. Off-nominal approaches might be discovered too
late to correct, but would be known far enough in advance to permit evaluation
of the potential hazard which could result if insertion into the planned orbit
was attempted. In the event an unacceptable hazard was predicted, injection
into the planned orbit would be abandoned. A delayed LOI burn could be sub-
stituted, to provide improved separation and view angle, injecting the RNS in-
to elliptical orbit with later transfer to the OLS orbit. In this manner the
radiation hazard to the OLS could be avoided although a performance penalty
for the Earth-return leg would be encountered.
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Guidance Errors During Pulse Cooling LOI. Guidance errors during the cool-
down orbit insertion phase are probably the most likely area where off-nominal
operations are apt to be encountered. Such errors could accidently place the
RNS in an orbit which could cause a collision or very close passage with the
OLS. Preventing a catastrophic event of this type will require frequent up-
dating of the RNS orbital parameters to insure prompt discovery of such a
condition. A small velocity impulse either with the RCS system or a subse-
quent cooling pulse could be used to avoid a collision. Effect of close pass-
age can be minimized by maintaining a nose-on attitude of the RNS during the
period of concern. Initiation of cooling pulses during the close passage can
be delayed or commanded early, as appropriate, to avoid thrusting during the
passage, or if necessary, a direct opposition of the coolant thrust using the
RCS system could be considered if a pulse were mandatory during the close
passage time interval.
Reductions in Thrust During LOI Burn. Reductions in thrust may be encountered
during the main lunar orbit insertion burn due to malfunctions in either stage
or engine systems. If the situation were unanticipated (no prior warning that
full thrust could not be achieved), insertion into the planned orbit in a
single burn could not be accomplished. Instead, the reduced thrust arrival
burn would brake the RNS into elliptical orbit. Near apocenter an idle mode
NERVA burn could be used to reduce the pericenter altitude to 60 n.mi. and
finally a third burn near pericenter would be required to circularize the
orbit. Additional phasing of the RNS in circular orbit might be required
after circularization unless the elliptical orbit period was carefully syn-
chronized with the OLS.
In the above case, initiation of the arrival burn would be at the planned dis-
tance from the OLS and while the burn time would be increased due to the
lower thrust, the reactor power would, in all probability, be proportionally
lower, thus reducing the radiation environment at the OLS. As long as care
were taken to avoid the need to perform the final circularization burn in an
adverse manner (near the OLS and with a bad view angle), no increase in
radiation dose at the OLS is anticipated.
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If prior knowledge that reduced thrust were to be required is available, the
approach asymptote could be adjusted and the burn initiation scheduled so
that a single burn LOI could be performed. Again the burn time would in-
crease due to the lower available thrust a and while the approach altitude
would be lower, the reduced reactor power level would probably preclude any
increase in the radiation environment at the OLS°
REFERENCES
i. LMSC/A968223,"Nuclear Flight System Definition Study, Phase II,"
Final Report VolumeII, Sunnyvale, California, 1 May 1970.
2. Aerojet General Corp. RN-S-0551, "Full Flow Flight Engine CommonRadia-
tion Analysis Model," Sacramento, California, 1969.
3. WANL,DRMNo. 51594, "Preliminary Study on Space Distribution of Fission
Products from the NERVAReactor and Their Potential Hazards," Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, 26 January 1970.
4
E-12
Ib+ t
"t,
_
!01
.q
]_. i _
,it , .'
103 _ _ ;:r
J ....
't
102 _' ..
+.i 27!
_a:÷.!i!i:i ii:._
!00 _& r' : _ : : I m
_'i ! _',i /i
_iiii _:i -i,
!-:i_:ILi i!=.
!0 "1 !!++Ii:; +,_
I0 o
DISTANCE - NM
TI_ :t+_
rii: '_
:::r -
_+. _.
t,r '
Ilt. :i
_ .p-.
,,,+
i
H: ,I
++Ii,+
k-g .
iii! :_
HIJ ::i
L
'K:
m:_
ii,;
;+:!+ ::
DISTANCE - NM
103
I_i0-I
10"2
10"3
ill
O_
10-4 0
I0, $
10"6
103
FJL_m_ :1 - Doee Rite (_ & _nm) _ mtLo_
_ml _ the Oporattn_ IIIIP'A lln_L_
m-13
Lt,IBC-A98_.620
!
0
_H//W3_- 31Y_ 3SCE]
7_,-14
].,I',_-.l.9B4_6;_
ill
_v
?
Y_
1+ j
• f
F_
:.-Z:
.::L.:
=_
--_ .--L.
--L
_:+J+:i
!.:.+i
:L :]
?
O
+;:_-p._:
,i
-,+,+.,-£
_+
,_'+:+..__
-+-_E.E_
,::_z.+-_+.
÷:p.-+_
E_==.--
==:==:
,-!--
!:..+_.:.
_+-.++__
qP_
%_
I+..15
LKSC-A984262C
,g:7:;.: .... ; ...... ;_:,,.,,. .... :.... I-:_,-:..................................... |
' +[_:+::!.::G"- .......... ; _:-*+""j " i" _-- -:':"...... 'i'+-+-:............. "+"-.......... _ ................. |
,_ ..... _+- _i--_+: ......_,,+........... +-:_-_-,!_.: .:-.:-.-_ -_
_-.+,,:_:: .............. .. ............ ........... _ ........._, - ._
"!_:U:7..:" .: i: :_!__--;:!-:Tu-;:_ ::!-_-!-:-.-:--- " :-- " " -- +-: " .... '. :-:-: ---:--:._
_::'-_+---:_. _+--_++-_-_:-:+:,-:-;_: ::.--+:::- -:-_-_:: :-:_::_:: ::+:--:_:--::_-:i-::..:.-_ m° v,_:wANotE ;
O E':.-!_L-.++_: i.-:!:::!!] iii!F!!::!-!".i :ii_!ii : • : : .i !.: : 7 ::-.:. lOOM$1:PAIIATION :]O , r,_-'-r-_'- -_ • •...... _ ................ ..........................
| _t: _' ............. ( • : '-*t ....... _ ' " : - " - ......... :............ ,
. +_::k. .......... ! .... '"_-;:-_- :". ...... :...... ;............ -- ............. "
+i "_: ..... _ .!+-.:.. '.A:. . . -j....;+_._. '_- ..... _.: ...........
-_ .-.:-.._-::--_ . ..... :. _: . ............ , - _ ................. _
_:: :7-- _-i.---_ -: --_ .:.-_---.-::::.. ............:_:.-:.. ._:_::_i_::":: :.:.-........ ._.:+
p.::-:++:: ...... : ............... : ........... . ...-. . . : _ "... ..... : ;.....'..::.:.. • . - . .-:
"1 ..................... " : :'.U. . ..............................................
U 10 .i-:.;,:---.;:;:;:;..;--:---::-:. : _.--;.4--;:;---:.:- .::. '-:..::..;--;-. ....
_+/_:__ _,.+.++.,-__.... +.: ................... ...... __/_-_ ..... +_--_:_ _,,=............. : .............. : ...... _..... :.....
...... +_-_ +._:.. :. - _ _.:: :_ ._
-: ..... .-:-. -_-:- • : .... __L_._ : • • • . " : ': : • _ , "" • "
_, ,'s_/.]::,. : It:- :.: _:_ : : " -:-.. .:: .'"_! . :
in" :- ._ ':i!- ] ..... '-:'-::: .:++.: "!::'-- : " ::-_
•- _ .... ---_ -:.......__- :-+_ .. -........._ _::--:-____:.:_---_:_: .....:,-:+
, ....."+ "\ .: , -- _:_................................................... : :::--:: _i
" '. _'_:,,'"'-' • :.'T_":_ '':" ". I"-/ ": .'-';'-:i "" "" .... " "_ ..... --:--:_-.7-_-!:___"...... :. .: • . . J+l
• :" " -":" :' " i " :.'-I';" : ":::" " .::-:
.. - .:_____ _ ": ... ......
..... ; ..... 410 ......... ;-"_ .... "...... :i _'"_'-"_'- .........................................
....... : .....
':. 7-7-;:7-.:-::-..:_ - --
:. _..::: . .._
__: ....... "
: :-.!
::--':::;:.+::::+++'.+'::_::",+_-_i:-::::':__"_+:-~:::: "_+::-'_ ."_..--:- ::.:---:- ":+--:.'.'::_:+:.; : :::.::-." _: . -:_--.---:
il _ . : ::
I0- •-: :+-;
'
# _' '_ ........ i_+,:_ _,_i.-'--_:_ _-_-._:. ;---_-+--_--_._. '-:---- ..... ; ...... ,_.--.-_-...i .- .]
_::'_:÷il:": :..:!:_".::-_!::..,::...i-::.:'.:.+-._:--_:::_-:-_!_':-!_Li:..:::::..._-:: :- --7.._:.!_:..:...:-.:..:_: ::-:: :-:-...-.-. -. -':
..._ -.. -_'"-+_'- _ ..... : .......... _ t--:::_* :::::._::_; : ":.-':" . :'";_ :-:::-! ::: :.: ::-.:- _ -- : "._
,oi ,oa ,o4 ,os ,o_ ,o7
l'Lii AFTEI SHUTDOWN- SEC
Figure _ - Fission Product i Dose Rate vii Tile After Shutdown
Frclthel_tVA Core - LOlBl_n 111,-441.-711
" E-16
LMSC-A98A262C
%
103........
Io 21'
i
10!:'.
:- T" •
..... ;iL.ld :"; ' ....:__,,
r¢ _ _.iT :.:_
UJ ...', :x ,
0 :
r
: ;'_"
o,_[ ." .I0"
|;: • .
!
.... T}:
'.:l ig
I01
,Y,:;;;
: _'__
!!!_'
!_:i÷
!;2,:i
• t ":i; p,
i ;i_
..I, .:-
..= "!
-'d
!'i :l
:r ..I
; i
_ !'i!
:.a
:.;2 i
:i_i:rl
P'l
102
DISTANCE - METERS
,#
_L_ure . Fission Product Gamma Dose Rate vs Distance from the
Unshielded NERVA Core Following Shutdown
E-17
L_C-A984262C
0
0 !0
_OIDV_ _IA
!
0
E-18
LI_-A9842620
E-19
LMSC&A984262C
LUNAR NORTH
lqRST BURIq - X leR TO -._
se Ha ELUPal \ [ ,4
IN RC FULL POWER _ I
ALT - e0 NM _: 1,
nmCE EROF----- :I /.1-
.ZP_TUP.E .YPE.BOm \ 71 _ ..,,_o¢_j,.
ALT " 448 NM "_ _ ._""_ "
EARTH INJECTION ? "_lll_Ul_----_,__ I
48 SEC FULL POWER 6 AII[1111[[1_-_l ]_- ' I
ALT" 1.458 NM 5:__.._8 ,00
SECOND BURN -------_
90°PLANEC_,_,,GE o / _%|0 8EC FULL POWER
ALT = 10,684 NM j
Figure 8 - Typieal T_ree-Burn Lumz Delma-ture Wlth 90" Plane Cbe_ge
E-20
L_C-A98_2e_C
Q
S_]_03(]- ]'IONV ,_A_IA
R _ _ _ R o
_H
g-21
ENSC-A984262C
030- _ a_ll_
8 R R _ _ R o
- - ---- 0 1-_ _1- ___1_1_.____._
t.... .... ,,__.. __ . __ .__.__ ...... .._,<____
r ' ...... <_:---;---:_ - . < oEl-._
t -:-- - Z_ - : .... _: -0_ ',,r
_ _, _ _ >_oo_
.... -- -- : i
L____,__d__-__:.=__. • :_, : ::. - __:..__,_
• . ..... .. _. . ____.
3_
__-_ .__ ._ ....... • ._._ _f_-
!-. - ._z...- .....: ...... . : . _ t. .... _
,_-:-.-=-._-............ .-_--: ! _--_-_ :-.:7_?-.,
I
_---- ....-_'--7........ __-...... ,,
:__._" . . ____..:_....... i_ _ _
............ ,e _
_- -- .... T -_...... _- :-/ .....m .... ,
;77__-i_?--_-----_ / _7-___. .,o.
...... < 7.... / " - < ,,..t
_- / !_
" Z-- / ........ _---
......... 0 -- .--- _ / --:--
- _i' ........ ._
; " ;. L_- .- ....... / ......
75;_- . " : - - .', .... _ __
i " . - ia .
_.-_-.:.---_- -:7.<..... :_.._- -_ ...._ f_'-
l- -----_-'-- ......... >5 ..... ---;-_
i - -/ ..... _--.= - -J
"....7---_.......... A_ _ .,/ ...... ._ _ _
WN - IDNVA$10 NOIJ, Y_IYIlt$
4r
F.,-22
LHSC-Ag842620
Z
<_
uJ
0
TIME AFTER STARTUP - SEC
!llJ
F.,-23
Ll_fi,-A98/-_ _2C
0
144
I
0
m
18(
120
60
0
0 100 200
TIME AFTER STARTUP- SEC
3OO
,P
Figure 12 - _S Vlev Angle frc_ (Z_ During FLr_t Z_tra
of _ree-B_rn Lunar Del_ Maneuver
E-24
L_-Ag_26P.C
LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION"-"
END CONTINUOUS /-.SHUTDOWN COMPLETE
FLOW COOLING _- BEGIN SHUTDOWN
SU,F_CE__---_ _-I-_'_--- --_-__°,_-_*'"°'_
q
/ia_-'o 13 Relatlve _xmt1_ of _ _e Posltlcn8 Vlth Res]peet
to RIB ZneculnS TrsJeeto_r - _ov Altltude AppFcseh
W
i
LI_-A98A_2620
,-ibi;!
7:1Y
i_ii
i:!!"
i_I.ri_
Y! :L
7_T_Tf
i
g
i, f_-,ii!tt:."l.qt1:.!,tI_I1:'t"t:I,:1,d+: tb.'_ _t,er."l_,_,l__, !+_:_._:T_l_l.ttt.lt-;i,L_,t!_:._+...,.... ..Z:i
............ J ': ,4 .... . ..... _ ;" _' :t _'}"+ _" t ii4l i l% # : ! _ : ' ....
": .... ! I::l: ' :: ',! 11:[7 _ :. !i _:!! 77 :_ :i i i ' , •:I,:,,.I:__!I_,._ , ,.,,_li.I,,I.,_1,,Li:._.._..,:
rl "-" :TIr.-'lr.,il,'lliL_. _ia"7".'. '_: ::i :_t* '1__* .... ! : :i i ilq:,l_i l_i i!:! ::Ji ::/ __d.:"_7..
• . .. :.: .__,.... ._.._:.... ,..:, : ,: _.N_i_._:_:l::::"O.a: O
" i-- ::,,i : G:]:7_I :: .: :,: : :i :l?_ ":;i::: ;::i! :t:: ;'_::!,i
, , :1 : ..... . .... l,t:, ...... .
• . ,:,:_,.,r. : " " ,7:; . : ,':, '. ;:il.:-:-' : _:" "'.1,! :'_ .:.., ...... ... I
. , , _:.t..,. :l ! _,ff. i' _:: i T! :T :iT" . : : :Z
/ "i"!'-V:Vli"_i' _2]/ :_ ',: :_ao"l7'r: 7: r: _fi::l: i : ;7!
i : , :, ! i , I , ', ;;' '+ ,I;, I , I ; ' ,I ; '
",.....: : '.....,......." ,....::v',-ri::
................. • ' , :-I:H.I ; '
. L % i, • ,., ,.. , .... , •
i' • ..............{ I ..... i, ,} i +.... t
........ r'* * _"T ,'c+ _ ' "_"
I ........... ,, ',:i'!i ,,.,: . ):. ' '_ . :,- : ;f _ : ':1. ,:.,..t tl:.,t.i:li!, ,,I..,..... ,1:..t, ll: _ "7"!7:.1;..........
717:: :.P _.... t.;_ ,, : ,.1 .... _,,' . .-q , .I ....... i:_;-:ll:.iSl!i!!::!i ._.:
- : :'-" : : ,"::_;'::t-- i.:t"-q,, :-'g_ :; .+':t_:!': H_, " 'fi l -? ::__ _.,'x'J::;t'.i...t', ! • :':' :: :::r.i:: :+Yi:
• ',l. , .,:i.: i _ ' .,i___.: ' +' ' : "'_"_ "",'" t .'::' .t::!' : " :.. '..t'.+ • , *
:.;/ : , : • . " '. ; ' L .+ ':; : I I , "
• ' :: _:', :': " . .' : :I: !-" i"l • " i .'i : ;: ',,
>/_:!I!:-:LI:I:_o ,o
............ r-: -,-T---r-:---:_ .-:;-. ...... :-:_ -- *--r,:-: ----r:- _-:+-'I _./ "11-
,. ,., ..... : : : -.:: t-- . ;_ , ,..,., i:i; ! _Z
_3](] - ]'IONV M]IA
I
n,,
ILl
.t:-
.<
LU
m
F
e,.
LI_C-A9842620 "
WN - _i_)NVLSla NOILVgVd:IS
U
u_
I
O.
I--
e_
ILl
<
:E
I--
F_-27
L_C-A984262C
..
W_"'- _SOG
0
o
!
E-28
LMSC-A984262C
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA REPORT NO. 2
SOME PROS AND CONS ON THE "BUDDY SYSTE_' FOR EVA
INTR_U_ION
A central issue regarding EVA operations is the question of the number of EVA
astronauts to commit simultaneously to the potentially hostile lunar surface
or lunar orbit space environment. The "Buddy System" concept, which had its
origins in the military realm, as applied to space activities involves the
commitment of at least two astronauts at a time for all activities so that
each can look out for and assist the other in the face of some danger which
threatens one of the astronauts. The "Buddy System" offers immediate proxim-
ity of assistance in case of a variety of problems, both anticipated and un-
foreseen which may arise. Counter-arguments to the Buddy System include the
consideration that the danger or hazard which affects one astronaut, i.e.,
much like the drowning swimmer dragging down his rescuer. Ensuing para-
graphs explore a variety of considerations which affect the advisability of
the "Buddy System" during lunar space activities.
DEFINITION OF BUDDY SYSTEM
The buddy system is defined as that operational mode of activity wherein at
least two members of a space mission crew perform tasks with both (all)
members conducting tasks while near each other at the same site. The buddy
system necessarily includes the capability for each crew member to use the _
subsystems of his fellow crew member by the existence in their' equipment of
hardware which permits such mutual (multiple) use. It may include 2 tugs, 2
flyers, 2 rovers, separated bases, etc.
Thus, if each of M crew members carries N subsystems (life support, communi-
cations, power, etc. ), there are then MN subsystems for their support.
E-29
LMSC-A984262C
The psychological comfort of having a fellow crew member immediately available
in the event of accident, equipment malfunction, illness, or any other irreg-
ularity serves to greatly increase the confidence of the buddy system crew.
By no stretch of the imagination can the buddy system be considered to be in
effect if one member of the team is outside a spacecraft or lunar base while
his monitor(s) is inside the spacecraft or base; no matter whether the latter
is suited-up or not.
CREW SIZE AND FUNCTION
A basic consideration in establishing the requirement for the "Buddy System"
in a given system is the basic crew size and the functions which the crew
must perform to maintain a viable habitat. For example, a two-man crew asso-
ciated with a lunar shelter offers minimal flexibility if one man must con-
tinuously monitor habitat life support and other critical systems to cope imme-
diately with a possible equipment system malfunction. In this context, an-
other consideration is the extent to which Earth surveillance of the lunar
habitat is provided so that habitat system malfunctions can be reported im-
mediately to the crew during periods when both men are EVA.
As crew size becomes larger, the issue of availability of a second or buddy
astronaut assumes less importance. With a three-man lunar habitat crew,
one man can remain in the habitat to monitor critical systems while the other
two can assist each other during EVA operations. When the crew numbers four
or more, a greater degree of flexibility and safety can be achieved by com-
mitting two astronauts to the lunar EVA environment, while a third remains
in the airlock in a suited pressurized condition ready to assist one or both
of the EVA astronauts as required. The fourth man remains behind the monitor
vehicle/shelter systems.
I
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CASESWHERETHEBUDDYSYSTEMPRODUCESSAFETY ADVANTAGES
4
Aside from safety considerations, there are many EVA tasks which can be per-
formed more expeditiously by two men working together as opposed to a solo
effort. Safety advantages are envisioned in the following instances:
1. Motion Sickness Effects. Nausea induced by motion effects may occur as
a result of lunar vehicle motion over the lunar surface or through un-
controlled spinning or tumbling during lunar orbit EVA operations. In
addition, nausea in the space suit may occur as a result of illness.
Hazards associated with vomiting in a space suit have been elaborated
upon in Hazard Study 35. Due to the generally incapacitated state of
the motion-sick astronaut, including possible obscuration of the visor,
a "buddy" astronaut is highly desirable in terms of guiding and assisting
the disabled astronaut as soon as possible to a safe haven. This is
especially important in the case where the astronaut is operating with
a cabinless lunar rover some distance from the shelter, and during lunar
orbital EVA.
2. Suit/PLSS Damage or Malfunctions. Hazards inherent in EVA operations
include suit rupture, portable life support system failures or possible
interruption of life support provisions in switching from one back-pack
to another during EVA. In each of these cases, depending on the rate of
escaping life support gases and depressurization, immediate assistance
rendered by a buddy astronaut can make the difference between saving or
losing the astronaut whose extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) has been
compromised. The "buddy" astronaut, as described more fully in Hazard
Study 23, can aid the endangered astronaut by assisting him to hook on
to a spare PLSS or vehicle mounted ECS System, share his own PLSS with
the astronaut, and/or help guide the astronaut to a safe haven.
3. Dysbarism Effects. Physiological problems may arise when the astronaut
transitions from higher pressure, mixed gas lunar base or shelter en-
vironments to the 3.5 psi, pure oxygen space suit environment. These
symptoms, e.g., the bends, are described in detail in Hazard Study
39. Since it is unlikely that the onset of these disabling symptoms
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would strike two EVAastronauts simultaneously, the affected astronaut
could be returned to a safe shelter and recompressed at higher pressures
with the assistance of a buddy astrons_t. For example, an astronaut
suffering severe bends symptomsmight have serious difficulties in
safely guiding a lunar rover back to a lunar shelter on his own.
Operational Accidents. In addition to the above-mentioned categories of
established and well-defined potential hazards, there are a variety of unpre-
dictable accidents that may occur in the course of normal EVA operations
where a buddy astronaut could provide immediate assistance. Such representa-
tive accidents include:
i. Falling into a crater or injury from other lunar surface physical hazards.
2. Lunar vehicle overturn.
3. Falling off platform of lunar roving vehicle.
4. Tripping over emplaced items of scientific equipment.
5. Snagging of hoses connecting suit and PLSS.
6. Injury from manual deployment of lunar hardware; scientific or axuiliary
vehicles.
7. Uncontrolled spinning or tumbling during lunar orbit EVA.
8. Minor tear, puncture, or rupture of pressure suit.
In addition to providing assistance subsequent to any of the aforementioned
types of accidents, the "buddy" astronaut can serve an important role in the
prevention of these accidents. The encumbering space suit restricts the
astronaut's senses. Vision is limited, hearing is curtailed and the cutaneous
or touch sense is largely voided by the enveloping space suit. For these
reasons, two pairs of eyes may well be better than one in anticipating po-
tential dangers. Certainly there are sufficient precedents from diving to
mountain climbing to justify the buddy system when operating in hostile en-
vi ronment s.
Crew Error. In case of crew error on the part of one crewman the buddy astro-
naut is present to monitor and prevent or aid in remedying the error.
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CASESWHERETHEBUDDYSYSTEMAYJEOPARDIZEBOTHASTRONAUTS
6
As we mentioned earlier, an argument against the "Buddy System" is that a
hazard or danger which threatens one astronaut, could envelope both astro-
nauts. With a small crew, this could jeopardize not only the crew, but the
entire mission. Environmental hazards t_stmight simultaneously affect both
EVA astronauts include:
i. Meteorite showers.
2. Periods of solar radiation intensity.
3. Moon quakes.
In addition to these environmental hazards we _st also consider the case
where in attempting to rescue a disabled astronaut, the assisting astronaut
is ensnared in the same dangerous situation, thereby compounding the serious-
ness of the situation, e.g., an astronaut who is injured attempting to retrieve
his companion from a crater floor.
CONCLUSIONS
8
The safety advantages inherent in the "Buddy System" mode of operation gener-
ally outweight the probability that both EVA astronauts will be enveloped in
a common catastrophe. This generalization definitely applies where the avail-
able crew complement numbers three or more.
Where only two crew members are available to man a lunar habitat, it becomes
imperative to weigh the system monitoring requirements for preserving a safe
habitat against the safety and operational benefits accruing from sim,_itaneous
EVA activities, leaving the shelter unattended. The shelter, under these cir-
cumstances, can be left unattended only where remote surveillance of critical
systems is available to alert the astronauts to return to the shelter and
attend to malfunctions in a timely fashion.
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When solo astronaut EVA operations are indicated because of 'overriding'
concern for habitat system monitoring, the astronaut who remains in the
shelter should be suited/pressurized and on standby to aid the EVA astronaut,
as required, in an emergency. Provisions should be made for visually moni-
toring the EVA astronaut's activities, and the shelter and EVA astronauts
should be in constant commnnications contact. EVA excursions from the
shelter under these circumstances should be limited.
b
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_NTAL DATAREPORTNO. 3
SUGGESTIONSTOIMPROVESAFETYAT A LUNARSURFACEBASE
INTRODUCTION
@
TNis supplemental study presents someideas for improving personnel safety
at a lunar surface base through attention to basic site layout, deployment,
crew ingress/egress, and deployment of scientific equipment.
LUNAR SURFACE BASE SITE LAYOUT
There are many ways in which to arrange a lunar surface base to enhance the
safety of the crew, and many trade-off studies can be performed to ensure
maximum protection for the crew. Four major approaches are shown on Figure
i, along with a summary description of the major advantages and disadvantages
of each site layout.
Q
Of particular importance is the distance between the lunar base itself and
the tug landing sites, the major hazard being damage to the personnel shelter
through bombardment by secondary eJecta thrown up by the rug's engine plume
during final approach, touchdown and take-off. Reference i recommends a
minimum distance of one mile, based on ejecta damage requirements, and a
maximum distance of 1¼ miles based on crew walking capability.
There are a variety of ways to reduce this plume impingement problem by pre-
paring the landing site to be used by the tugs. The initial landings, of
course, will not have this luxury unless the sites are prepared remotely, a
not very likely possibility. Figure 2 summarizes some approaches that could
be used to protect the base.
The problem of having the tug landing site about a mile from the base intro-
duces hazards also. If there will be tug landings and take-offs at the rate
of one every two months and entire crews are to be exchanged every four months,
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there will be muchingressing and egressing and donning and doffing of space
suits and back-packs and getting up and downthe sides of the base and tugs
(the equivalent of a nine-story building). If the crews do not walk, they
will have to be clambering on and off slow moving and complicated roving ve-
hicles, all of which introduce hazards of their own; in other words, it will
be a constant battle with the dusty lunar surface and the ingenious equipment
designed to travel on that surface. It is, therefore, suggested that to re-
duce the hazards of the lunar surface base consideration should be given to
the elevated crew and cargo transfer system shownon Figure 3 whereby, after
initial set-up, the astronaut need never touch the lunar surface for routine
cargo handling purposes and crew exchanges.
DEPLOYMENTOFLUNARSURFACEBASE
The major activities for setting up the base, once the site has been prepared,
are unloading the cargo from the tugs, transporting cargo from tug landing
site to base site, and possibly somedegree of lunar soil handling. Figures
4 through 7 list someof the most likely methods and equipment to be used,
crew activities associated with those methods, and someof the safety prob-
lems and requirements which will emanatefrom that activity.
CREWINGRESS/EGRESS
The major problems associated with ingress and egress are dysbarism (see
Hazard Study 39, airlock operation reliability, extravehicular mobility
unit reliability, and contamination. The lunar surface base atmosphere is
most likely to be a two-gas (02+N2) atmosphere, whereas the pressure suit
the astronaut wears is probably going to be 100%oxygen as in the Apollo
program. The effects (e.g., denitrogenization) of switching from a high
pressure two-gas atmosphere to a low pressure, 100%oxygen, suit atmosphere
and vice-versa are the subject of continuing study by the various environ-
ment control and life support system experts working on the space station
and lunar base studies, and are too complicated for thorough research in
this study. The major difficulties will not be the nominal operation of the
b
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airlock/shelter/suit interface but rather the emergencyconditions requiring
fast reaction by the crew. Onesuggestion is offered here which meybe pert-
inent is that, during a tug rescue mission from the orbiting lunar station
to the surface, the time between separation from the station and touchdown on
the surface could be used to change the tug atmosphere from two-gas to 100%
oxygen so that whenthe rescued crewmenare brought on board they will not
have denitrogenization problems, and during the return flight the changecould
be reversed.
The physical business of getting into and out of the base to the lunar sur-
face has somehazards which are _arized on Fig. 8. A basic requirement is
to be sure the stairs, elevator, or whatever meansis chosen for getting up and
down is at least big enoughto accommodateone prone stretcher case plus a
suited astronaut; all doors, hatches and airlocks should also be designed
with the stretcher case in mind; the height of the door sill from the lunar
surface should be kept to a minimmm.
It is suggested that the base/cabin rover interface be designed such that
the driving crew can makea shirtsleeve ingress/egress between the two struc-
tures. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 9. Such a schemewould save valuable
time during a rescue mission by the cabin rover.
i
DEPLOYMENTANDOPERATIONOFSCIENTIFICEQUIPMENT
r
The hazards involved with deployment of scientific equipment are basically
those associated with EVA activity while setting up, erecting and operating
such large and diverse structures as a 300 meter drill and the enormous
telescope complex which extends 5.6 miles across and is i0 miles away from
the main base as shown in Reference 2. Unless some form of auto-
mation for deploying such items is worked cut, very long periods of EVA and
driving, with their associated hazards, will be necessary. Wherever possible
all equipment operations should be automated. For some of the equipment a
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remote temporary shelter could be used to shorten driving time and double as
an emergencysafe haven; something like the Goodyearself-erecting shelter
(Ref. 3) could be put to good use here since it is lightweight and transport-
able.
REFERENCEANDDATASOURCES
i. 70 MA5828NRSpaceTug, Logistic Vehicle Parameters, July 1970, pp 19-27
2. PD70-40 Lunar Base Synthesis Study, First Interim Progress Report,
North AmericanRockwell, October 1970
3. GET-12246- Lunar Staytime Extension Module - Goodyear AerospaceCo.
4. LMSC/A665606,LESADeploymentProoedures, Lockheed Missiles & Space
Company,Sunnyvale, February 1965
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LUNAR SURFACE BASE - HAZARDS
CONCEPT
l)NO special preparation
Locate landing sites
widespread from each
other
o Locate base in
natural crater
2)Blast Walls
Pre-Fab Wall
ANALYSIS - DEPLOYMENT
SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT
None
Bulldozer;
OPERATIONS
CREW
ACTIVITY
None
Extensive
SAFETY ASPECTS
T±-amspo1"baLion to and from
base to tug sites; tug
maintenance may require
temporary shelter at tug
site for work crews
Wall probably not very high
3) Prepared Surface
/.,X_ --.
A) Rigid Landing Pads
Lifter;
Carrier
Lifter;
Assembly Tools;
Foundation Pads
Bulldozer;
Scraper/
Leveller;
Soil Carrier;
Chemical
Solidifier?
Bulldozer;
Scraper/
Leveller;
Soil Carrier?;
Assembly Tools;
Tie-Downs;
Foundations;
Trailer for
transporting
panels
Driving
Extensive
EVA for
offloading
and assembly
Extensive
Driving
Extensive
Driving
and EVA
requiring fair separation
distance;
Same as i)
Wall could be high and close
to base, or low and away
from base; very reliable
foundation required
Testing of effectiveness of
actual site required before
commitment of LSB; probable
that loose material can be
ejected
Provides excellent control oI
the engine plume once the
set-up problems have been
overcome
SAFE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
o Landing gear spread
o Landing loads, velocities
o Proximity of beacon
o No. of landings
o Angle of repose of soil
o Soil properties
o Engine exhaust velocity
o Ht. above ground at engine cut-off
o Reusability
o Damage to tug nozzle & heat shroud
o Type of soil at sites
o One big site vs several sites
D
Fig. 2 Site Preparation
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LUNAR SURFACE BASE - HAZARDS ANALYSIS - DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS
CREW
CONCEPT ACTIVITY SAFETY ASPECTS
i) A Frame With Hoist
2) Ramp
3) Hoist Platform
4) Davits
5) Monorail & Hoist
EVA on top
deck & sur-
face;
Controlled
by both
crewmen;
intercom
EVA on deck
and surface;
Extensive
EVA for
assembly
Same as
2)
EVA on
deck and
surface
Same as
4)
Handling cables may be required to
prevent swinging; handrails required
on deck; emergency equipment required
on top deck and at surface
Should payload get stuck on ramp -
EVA activity may be required on rails,
dangerous;
Provide walkway and handholds along
rails and deck
Same as 2);
Probably require much EVA for
maintenance;
Ladders required
Extensive intercom between deck and
surface crews; may require cables to
prevent swaying of payloads into
vehicle and crew
Same as 4)
SAFE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS:
o Perform jobs remotely where
possible
o Use buddy system (on deck & surface)
o Multiple intercom capability
o Reduce handling time to minimum
o Provide crew danger warnings
o Simulated training devices
Fig. 4 Unloading
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LUNAR SURFACE BASE - HAZARDS ANALYSIS - DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS
CREW
CONCEPT ACTIVITY SAFETY ASPECTS
6) Mobile Crane
7) Fork Lift ir
8) Roller Conveyer
Saddle Bag - Hinged
Extensive
EVA;
Driving
Same as
6)
EVA for
set up;
Precision control required;
Minimum of 3 crewmen with much
intercom required;
Possible damage to vehicles and
crew
Same as 6)
H5 nged Modules
9)
I
/
lO)
control
EVA for
unloading
modules?
Same as
9)
EVA required for maintenance and
trouble-shooting
Could he unloaded to surface or
transporter remotely
Same as 9)
FOR ADDITIONAL UNLOADING CONCEPTS SEE DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES, LUNAR EXPLORATION SYST_S
FOR APOLLO, LOCKHEED REPORT NO. LMSC-665606, VOL. III APPENDIX PAGE 57
Fig. 5 Unloading
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LUNAR SURFACE BASE - HAZARDS ANALYSIS - DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES
CREW
CONCEPT
ACTIVITY SAFETY ASPECTS
i)
2)
3)
_)
5)
Bicycle Transporter With
Outrigg_
Two Wheels Plus Large
Rover
Four Wheel Trailer Plus
Large Rover
Four Wheel Trailer
Self Pr_
Wheels attached to
Landing Gear - Self
Propelled
EVA for
installation of
tracks, wheels,!
etc;
EVA for control
Road Building
EVA for
disassy, of
landing gear;
assy of wheels;
driving/towing
Similar to
2)
EVA for disassy
of landing gear
assy of wheels;
and for con-
trolling
steering
EVA for wheel
attachment
and
control
steering
Unless provided with good road,
especially for outriggers the whole
assembly would get stuck, damaged
or tip over
Requires very good road; shelter/
cargo will want to pitch forward
and backward which may overload
Rover; requires observers outside
of Rover
Good road required though not as
critical as 2); requires observers
outside of Rover
Sa_e as 3)
Same as 3)
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:
o All concepts require extensive EVA for assembly unless the wheels,
trailers, controls, etc. can be built-in and then remotely hinged or
folded out after landing.
o Control & steering could be remote?
Fig. 6 Transportation of LSB and Cargo Modules
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LUNAR SURFACE BASE - HAZARDS ANALYSIS - DEPLO_T PROCEDURES
CONCEPT CREW ACTIVITY SAFETY ASPECTS
I) Backhoe
2) Dragline
Driving; EVA for
installation of
special purpose
attachments
EVA for set-up
Special dust & falling rocks pro-
tection required (at windows especial_
ly); good visibility required under
all operating conditions; maybe de-
sign attachments so they can be in-
stalled without EVA
Possibly good for remote Ops; some
_i difficult EVA maintenance chores;
infallible foundations required
3) Soil Thrower Driving (towing) ;
EVA for set-up
4) Soil-Box/Trailer/Rover
5) Bucket Conveyor
alignment
Driving;
Attachment hook up_
Controls EVA for
set-up
Driving (towing);
set-up EVA for
repositioning
Doubtful if soil can be accurately
thrown; control problems; poor
visibility
Will require sophisticated _ontrols
to get accurate function; avoid
backing-up type situations.
Probably much EVA for maintenance;
will be difficult & dangerous to
inspect during operation
SAFE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
o Use automation & remote control, checkout,
assembly, etc., wherever possible
o Design must consider soil effects on
machinery & materials
o Protection req'd around all moving parts
o Minimummaintenance
o Maximum accessibility
o Extensive training programs
Fig. 7- Soil Operations
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LUNAR SURFACE BASE - HAZARDS ANALYSIS - DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES
CONCEPT
Ladders
I, jP
2) Hoist Platform
3)
4)
_)
Rigid Elevator Platform
Travelling Airlock
Moving S_irs, or
Large Fixed Stairs.
CREW ACTIVITY
Climbing/
Walking
Hoist Control;
Standing
Hoist control;
Standing;
Assembly
EVA
Airlock control',
Stand ing;
Rail assembly
EVA?
SAFETY ASPECTS
Requires both hands and both feet;
backwards descent; difficult for in-
jured crewman and extremely difficult
for stretcher case; equipment trans-
fer slow; possible to fall or become
entrapped; requires extensive hand-
rails, platforms, etc.
Possible temporary isolation of crew-
men; will require back-up system of
ladder or hoist; possible swaying;
should be big enough to take stretcher
case plus one other crewman
Possible temporary isolation of crew-
men; if mechanical failure occurs
structure can be used as ladder/
platform; should be big enough for
stretcher case & I crewman
_qA for
assembly;
Standing
Requires back-up system; should be
big enough for stretcher case, etc.
Requires handholds/platform;
May have some problems for injured
crewmen/Stretcher boarding problems?;
Probably require a fair amount of EVA
for maintenance; protection required
for all moving parts
Safety Considerations:
o Door sill should be as close to ground as possible.
o Intercomm required during all operations (to surface & shelter)
r
r
Fig. 8- Ingress/Egress Operations
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SUPPLIMENTAL DATA REPORT NO. 4
CREW MODULEMINIMUM VELOCITY REQUIREDWHENLEAVING A ROTATING NUCLEARPRIME
TRANSPORT VEHICLE (PTV)
For the case of a crew module effecting an emergency departure from a
rotating* nuclear PTV, the question arises as to the minimum separation
rate needed to minimize crew radiation exposure from the NERVA engine. The
initial assumption is made that the crew module is provided with a pyrotechnic
separation device which permits a rapid, clean separation response. The
separation rate is then a function of the tumbling rate of the PTV and the
crew module/PTV-c.g, moment arm.
J
As a first approximation, the crew exposure calculations were computed for
a crew module leaving a rotating nuclear PTV with only the relative velocity
imparted by the rotating vehicle. For comparison sake, two PTV angular rates
were postulated; l°/sec and 6°/sec. For the initial calculations, it was
convenient to use NERVA engine radiation data for an engine which had been
shutdown for one hour. Other radiation levels could then be considered by
extrapolation from related data source graphs.
Figures i and 2 present the radiation exposure pulses to the crew module as
it leaves the vicinity of the rotating nuclear PTVwith only the initial
relative velocity imparted by the angular rate. The vehicle configuration
data and mass properties data were adapted from Ref. i.
For the first eleven exposure pulses the integrated radiation dose to the
crew is given as follows:
Engine Shutdown Time Tumble Rate Crew Exposure
1 hr l°/sec 42 R_
i hr 6°/sec 7 R_
0.5 hr l°/sec 253 R_
0.5 hr 6°/sec 44 RIM
*The rotation assumed here is rotation about an axis perpendicular to the
longitudinal axis of the PTV
E-48
@
LI¢_0-9842620
The radiation source data employed in the calculations are presented in Supple-
mental Data Report No. l, Appendix E, of this report.
The calculations illustrate that escape from a l°/sec rotating nuclear PTV
presents a requirement for crew module propulsion capability. For the l°/sec
case the crew module leaves the PTVwith a relative velocity of 1.18 ft/sec.
In order to reduce crew exposure to acceptable limits it would be desirable
to have a crew module _V capability of approximately I00 ft/sec and a thrust-
to-weight ratio of 0.i or higher. A _ V capability of this magnitude would
permit crew module escape at any time after nuclear engine shutdown with low
crew exposure values.
DATA SOURCE REFERENCES
i. Nuclear Shuttle System Definition Study - Phase IIl, Monthly Progress
Report, LMSC/A980259, November 15, 1970.
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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA REPC_T NO. 5
POTENTIAL HAZARDS FACED BY THE APOLLO 14 LUNAR SURFACE ASTRONAUTS
Very good indications of the difficulties that could be encountered by astro-
nauts on future lunar missions requiring navigation procedures and the setting
up of experimental equipment were found in the transcript of communications
for the Apollo 1% mission.
In Hazard Study 26, Lunar Surface Lighting during Rover Traverses, the effects
of travel over the lunar surface during periods of high sunlight angles are
discussed. Some of the highlights of that stu_ point to the problems that
are faced by astronauts in a rover under the conditions of high sun angles
which wash out surface detail to a very large degree. Navigation using surface
features under such conditions becomes a difficult - if not impossible - task.
Surface glare creates the impression that over wide areas in view there are no
depressions or small craters, Just a flat featureless plain. Such an impression
would raise havoc with attempts at navigation. _Lile it is undoubtedly true
that the rover crew would be able to drive out of many craters that they un-
knowingly drove into, there are altogether too many possibilities that could
lead to problems. Finch of this navigation problem would be faced by EVA astro-
nauts. The EVA astronauts would see craters and other obstacles as they got
close, and so would avoid most, if not all of them. However, after traversing
some thousands of feet on foot, it becomes difficult to know Just where one
is located or, indeed, where particular objects are - like the Cone Crater,
for example. Thus, in the Apollo 1% transcript, at about 132.5 hours into
the mission, the astronants state their uncertainty of the way to Cone Crater.
At about 133 hours into the mission they note that "the sun angle is ....very
deceiving".
Earlier in the transcript they claim difficulty in reading flags or scales on
the PLSS in the bright sunlight. These are, of course, important parameters
and should be readable all the time, independent of lighting, location, etc.
The lighting conditions contributed to entanglement in various cables (Ref.
Hazard Study 20). Thus at one point one of the Apollo 1% astronauts is en-
tangled in the TV camera cable - for the second time. Later, such entangle-
ment with the same TV cable is noted as occurring a third time. Elsewhere an
astronaut notes that some cable he is reeling in has become "....a mass of
spaghetti ...." - again, a potential problem of entanglement.
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In reference to Hazard Study 23 (Hazardous Operations with EM_-EMI Malfunc-
tions) where several suit design improvements were suggested so as to avoid
the hazards of loosely hanging hoses, there are incidents shown in the tran-.
script to support the design changes discussed. During the Apollo 14 mission
an aztronant's PLSS hose became kinked end resulted in delay of E_A. At one
time an astronsnt' s PLSS hung up on the LM hatch handle. Later the LMP dis-
covered he had inadvertently hit a transmitter switch, turning it off, thus
giving rise to a co_mications problem which del_yed E_A for a while.
There were some lesser problems involving identification of film magazine_-
which ones_ used, and which were still usable; leaking (torn) lunar
sample bags; the need for a sight for aiming the lunar surface TV camera;
and, finally, the toppling of instruments when relatively rigid cables were
attached to them, during first EVA.
L
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